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INTRODUCTION
MR. BIENEN: I'd like to introduce myself. I'm Henry Bienen, the
President of Northwestern University. It's a particular pleasure for me to
welcome you all to this very important conference on socially-assisted
death. For me, it's especially important that so many parts of Northwest-
ern University have collaborated in putting this conference together. Ob-
viously our medical school and Institute for Health Sciences and Health
Policy as well as our law school, in whose precincts you all are, and
other schools are vitally interested in this because of all the tremendously
important questions and issues raised by the topic.
This conference was more than a year in the planning, and that plan-
ning involved not only many parts of Northwestern University, but also
the University of Iowa. Our good friend, Peter Blanck, from the Univer-
sity of Iowa, has been very instrumental in the conception of this confer-
ence and in putting it together. I will be, in a moment, turning the
podium over to my friend, Henry Betts, the Chairman and CEO of the
Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago (RIC), which has been our partner in
this endeavor. The conference was envisioned before the United States
Supreme Court agreed to hear the major cases that are confronting it.
I don't want to say too much more, except again to express my
thanks to those parts of Northwestern as well the University of Iowa and
the RIC that have been so instrumental in putting the conference on.
Henry Betts is the Chairman and CEO of the Rehabilitation Institute
of Chicago, which is recognized worldwide as the leading rehabilitation
institute in this country. Henry Betts is a Chicago institution. In the two
or more years since I have had the privilege of being President of North-
western, he has become a good friend as well as a collaborator. So he
will forgive me for not giving him his due and listing all the distin-
guished things he has done and all that he represents to our community.
[Vol. 7:267
CONFERENCE TRANscRnr
DR. BETTS: This conference highlights an immense number of
subjects. One of them is that it represents a very intimate alliance be-
tween the Institute and Northwestern University. That, it seems to me, is
a wonderfully productive way to get things done. I have been here since
1963. The alliance between our institutions downtown and whatever
goes on in Evanston has not been intimate. Henry Bienen has made a
very strong effort to bring these two campuses together. There will be
nothing except immense productivity accomplished through that. So that
is a wonderful aspect of the conference.
Certainly in the country today, there is not much that's discussed
more than health care, and in particular, the cost of health care. None of
this can be considered and no solutions will be found, as far as I am
concerned, until the ethical issues are determined. There are a lot of
ways to cut down on health care. Euthanasia of everybody over sixty-
five would have been a very useful way. Euthanasia of all sorts of chil-
dren who don't have long life expectancy and who are disabled is an-
other way. There are a lot of ways to cut down on the cost of health care.
All of these issues in some way surface out of the minds of some
members of the population. I actually have people say to me-they
would like to imply somewhat facetiously--"why are you doctors keep-
ing all those old people alive?" Very nice people sometimes just say that
to me. So there are sort of filthy rumblings through the minds of some
Americans, as wonderful as so many of them are.
People with disabilities have quite rightfully risen up and deter-
mined that there must be ethical considerations given to the way they get
treatment and the way their lives are considered. In health care we have
seen incentives being given to health care workers to do less for people.
We see access to care diminished in many instances in order to save
money. We see cost cutting in the numbers of health care professionals.
We see any number of things going on which can affect the lives of
people. People with disabilities recognize a great hazard. A great deal
of this cost cutting applies to them. That's one aspect of their care.
The other is the more esoteric one involving who should live, who
judges whom, and who judges whose life as being worth living anyway.
We think that in this country that doesn't really enter our lives very
much. Hugh Gallagher, who will speak later, has written very eloquently
about the way this kind of approach existed in Nazi Germany, where
"mercy killings" were done by nice, well-meaning doctors.' They, them-
selves, were judging whether somebody had a high enough quality of life
and whether that person wanted or deserved to live.
1 See HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, By TRUST B rRAx'D: PATIENTS, PHYSICIANs, AND
THm LICENSE TO KILL IN TH THIRD REICH (1995).
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The matter of judging-one person judging the quality of life of
others, and therefore what medical care should be offered to them, and
also whether they indeed should live at all-is an extraordinarily sensi-
tive, significant, and pertinent ethical issue at this time in this country. It
should be dealt with directly, carefully, dramatically, and vigorously in
every possible way.
This conference is the beginning of that. Our Center at the RIC
should take a lead in that. I'm grateful for all of you who have come to
participate. I'm grateful to the University for being a participant. Most
of all, I'm grateful for people with disabilities who are offering their time
and input into this. It should be the beginning of an immensely impor-
tant dialogue extending relevance even beyond the community of people
with disabilities.
The person who makes this most possible is somebody that we
trained at the Institute, a physiatrist, a specialist in physical medicine/
rehabilitation who has gone on to study ethics and who is now the Direc-
tor of our Program of Disability Ethics, Dr. Kristi Kirschner.
I. SESSION ONE: LEGALIZING ASSISTED SUICIDE:
PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS FROM THE
DISABILITY COMMUNITY
DR. KIRSCHNER: Thank you. This conference is a product of a
large committee of people representing the law school, the school for
health policy research, the medical school, and RIC, as well as the Uni-
versity of Iowa. It's been a very collaborative effort. We're delighted
you are with us today. We have passed out to you on arrival a survey.
We would like to use this survey as a tool to learn more about who we
are in the audience today and to stimulate the process of thinking rigor-
ously about this topic.
Physician-assisted suicide is an issue that has sparked tremendous
passion and conflict in our society with factions squaring off and de-
lineating their positions. Our hope today is that we can resist the urge to
stake out positions, but rather open our minds to hear from a multitude of
perspectives and engage in respectful dialogue. If there is one starting
point we should all be able to agree upon, I would hope it is that physi-
cian-assisted suicide is a complex social issue which deserves our careful
thought and consideration.
What is it that we are really talking about here? If it's a simple
question of the rights of terminally ill patients to determine the timing
and manner of their death, why are we raising issues of disability and
social justice in this context?
To begin the process of thinking critically about this issue, I would
like to start out with a few definitions. Some of you may be curious why
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we chose the phrase "socially-assisted dying." Physician-assisted sui-
cide, which is usually defined in our society as a physician giving to a
terminally ill patient who has requested it, a prescription for a lethal dose
of medication that the patient can take on his own, is an issue that is on a
continuum. We are going to be discussing the continuum today.
Now, on the continuum you could consider palliative care, or using
medications to treat symptoms, even if they may as a consequence hasten
death. This concept is also known as the principle of double effect. The
medication is not given with the intention of hastening death but with the
intention of treating symptoms. Also in the continuum, we have the is-
sue of withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment. Then we
have physician-assisted suicide, and farther along on the continuum is
the issue of active euthanasia in which the physician directly acts to end
the patient's life and thus, suffering.
All of these actions can be considered forms of assisted dying. In
our country, the legislative movements and the United States Supreme
Court cases have focused on physician-assisted suicide in the context of
terminal conditions, but that is by current social convention. In the
Netherlands, for example, euthanasia and assisted suicide are available to
people with intractable suffering, whether they are terminally ill or not.
In all of these actions, there are medical as well as social components.
We will be talking about what are the appropriate roles and responsibili-
ties for society in supporting both the living and the dying process, as
well as in protecting rights and interests of disempowered groups.
Now I would like to introduce Dr. Peter Blanck. I have had the
pleasure of working with Peter over the last year in coordinating and
planning this event. Peter comes to us from the University of Iowa
where he is a Professor of Law and Psychology and the Director of the
Iowa Law, Health Policy, and Disability Center. He has also been a Se-
nior Fellow at the Annenberg Washington Program, focusing on the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He is a recognized expert on
the ADA and is frequently called to lecture or testify about issues having
to do with disability and discrimination.
DR. BLANCK: Thank you, Kristi, for that kind introduction, and
President Bienen and President Betts for your support and words, and
thank you Marca Bristo from the National Council on Disabilities.
It's truly a privilege to be here today to introduce and moderate this
opening dialogue of what I believe will be an extremely important two-
day event. It's a privilege to be here among this distinguished audience
of speakers, advocates, persons from varying disciplines, and others to
examine one of the most controversial issues of our time, what we have
called socially-assisted dying.
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As many of you know, this issue is currently before the United
States Supreme Court in Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg.2
More than thirty briefs were filed in opposition to physician-assisted dy-
ing and more than a dozen in support of it, reflecting views on the debate
from all sides of the disability community and from many different
disciplines.
My role today is to facilitate the opening discussion and dialogue.
Our goal together is to begin the examination of the complex social,
medical, legal, and very personal implications of this topic. The debate
today, I believe, on assisted dying is really illustrative of our democracy
at work, perhaps our democracy at its best. It is a debate of individual
privacy and of extremely personal decisions. It is a debate of societal
and State interests, of defining social norms within our constitutional
bounds, of the extent to which the State may attempt to protect individu-
als from harm, or from what is perceived as undue or unfair pressures,
whether based on economics, paternalistic decision-making, or a skewed
public opinion. It is a debate of the extent to which the State may some-
times become an unwarranted and unwelcomed intruder on individual
rights.
The opening dialogue and our discussions over the next two days
will span the various disciplines of medical, moral, philosophical, and
legal thought. It will pay particular attention to the perspectives of per-
sons with disabilities, women, the poor, and vulnerable groups in society.
We will examine the relation of our topic to areas of self-determination,
equal protection under the law, and fundamental constitutional rights in
our democratic society.
On our first panel we have four extraordinary individuals, each
committed to justice, equality, individual dignity, and human respect and
autonomy. They are each committed to the value and sanctity of human
life, yet they are here today to reflect different perspectives from the
disability community on the topic of socially-assisted dying.
In preparing for this dialogue, questions have been raised by these
four panelists and others including: Is it paternalistic to treat all people
with disabilities as a vulnerable class? What is the relation among disa-
bility rights activism, individual self-determination, and the right to de-
termine the circumstances of one's death? In the context of the assisted
dying debate, is the Disabilities Rights Movement only about an individ-
ual's self-determination, or is it also about the historical prejudice and
the harsh economic conditions that have faced millions of Americans
with disabilities in this country and around the world? How are we to
2 The Supreme Court released its opinions after the conference. See Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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analyze issues of personal autonomy for people with disabilities in the
context of the recent and dramatic transformation of the health care sys-
tem in the United States? What is the value of life for persons with
disabilities, and how does the debate we are engaged in today emphasize
death with dignity or grant dignity to the lives of people with disabilities?
Would legalizing or not legalizing the right to die discriminate against
people with severe disabilities, perhaps in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)? If a constitutional right to die is found,
what will be the limits of that right in practice and what safeguards will
be in place for people with terminal and nonterminal disabilities and for
others? Finally, if a constitutional right to die is found, what will it re-
flect about our society's norms today and those we hold for the lives of
millions of unborn Americans with and without disabilities, now and in
generations to come?
We have four panelists. Dr. Paul Longmore cannot be here with us
today. He will be presenting via videotape and also will be hooked into
the conference via telephone. Two panelists, Mr. Andrew Batavia and
Dr. Hugh Gallagher, will discuss the views of proponents from the disa-
bility community about the right to assisted dying. Two panelists, Dr.
Longmore and Dr. Carol Gill, will address what opponents from the disa-
bility community say.
The first panelist is Andrew Batavia. Mr. Batavia Was the lead at-
torney on the amicus brief for respondents, the coalition of people with
disabilities, in one of the cases now before the United States Supreme
Court. He has participated in a similar role in the case before the Florida
Supreme Court, and he has served as Executive Director of the National
Council on Disabilities. He has also been a special assistant to Attorney
General Thornberg and a White House Fellow. He has been Associate
Director of the White House Domestic Policy Council. Currently, he is
counsel to the law firm of McDermott, Will & Emery in Miami, Florida,
and a Visiting Associate Professor at the School of Policy and Manage-
ment at Florida International University in North Miami.
Dr. Hugh Gallagher, the next panelist, has fought for the civil rights
of people with disabilities for over forty years. In the 1960s and 1970s,
he was actively involved in making much of Washington, D.C. accessi-
ble to people with disabilities. He is the author of several prize-winning
books. His articles have appeared in major newspapers and journals
across the country in areas related to medical ethics, euthanasia, and phy-
sician-assisted dying, particularly as they relate to people with disabili-
ties. He also filed a personal statement in the right-to-die cases currently
before the United States Supreme Court. He has been awarded an honor-
ary Ph.D. from John Jay College. I'm pleased to say here that he was a
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1995 winner of the Henry Betts award for lifetime career achievement
for improving the quality of life for persons with disabilities.
Dr. Paul Longmore is a Professor of History at San Francisco State
University. He specializes in United States History. He has written
many scholarly articles related to cultural depictions of people with disa-
bilities. He is the director of the San Francisco State University Institute
on Disabilities, a pioneering multidisciplinary research center and com-
munity service program. He has been the recipient of many honors and
fellowships related to his work in the area of disability studies.
Finally, Dr. Carol Gill is Assistant Professor and Director of the
Chicago Center for Disability Research, Institute on Disability and
Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago. As a
clinical psychologist, Dr. Gill has worked with hundreds of people in
clinical, medical, and counseling settings. In her articles and books and
many speaking activities, she has been extremely active in the debate on
physician-assisted dying. This goes back to her involvement in 1983
with the Elizabeth Bouvia case. Dr. Gill has filed a declaration in the
Oregon decision, and she has recently testified before Congress on the
effects of legalized assisted suicide.
The speakers on this truly blue-ribbon panel will have roughly fif-
teen minutes each to state their positions. Mr. Longmore will present his
views via videotape, and then he'll be available via telephone hookup.
After opening remarks, we will continue with a discussion among the
panelists, which, knowing these individuals, I may or may not be able to
moderate successfully. If time permits, we will allow questions to panel-
ists from the audience. I would like to assure you that over the next two
days, there will be ample time for discussion, both formal and informal,
and also time for reflection.
MR. BATAVIA: I am very pleased and honored to be here this
morning to discuss a topic that is extremely important to me as a person
with a disability, and that has enormous implications for people with or
without disabilities everywhere.
In 1973, when I was sixteen years old, I was a passenger in an auto
accident in upstate New York, and I sustained a high-level spinal cord
injury. At that time, very few people survived with my level of injury-
C23-3 quadriplegia. I was fortunate to have been admitted to one of the
finest rehabilitation facilities in the world, Rusk Institute in Manhattan.
At Rusk, I was prepared well for the challenges associated with living
with a disability for the remainder of my life.
I had no illusions then that I was going to be walking again, and that
did not particularly bother me. What truly disturbed me, though, was the
possibility that I might have to live my entire life in severe pain and
discomfort and the related possibility that I would never be able to be-
[Vol. 7:267
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come fully productive. I did not see the point of living if either of those
circumstances occurred. Fortunately, they did not, and I have been able
to live a happy and productive life.
However, back at that time, I did not know how things would turn
out, and my anxiety level was therefore fairly high. I knew that, at the
very least, the years to come would be extremely difficult. There was
one thought that helped me keep going during those difficult times. That
thought was, if things got as bad as they possibly could, I would find a
way to end my life and my suffering. Although I did not know how I
would do it, I knew that there would always be some way. It was not
what I wanted, and fortunately it never came to that, but the thought
alone gave me great peace of mind and allowed me to move ahead with
my life.
At the same time that I was at Rusk, there was another fellow, who I
will call Mike, in the room directly across the hall from me. Mike also
was a quadriplegic. He had been back to Rusk on several different occa-
sions because he had severe bed sores (decubitus ulcers) all over his but-
tocks and his hips. Mike was an extremely bright fellow. He came from
a good family and had resources available to him. But because of his
sores, he was going to have to spend the vast majority of the rest of his
life on his stomach. He would only be able to sit up in his wheelchair for
brief periods of time. He would not be able to pursue a career. He
would not be able to engage in most social activities. He was constantly
getting infections from his bed sores, despite the fact that he had the best
care in the world.
On three different occasions, Mike decided that he simply did not
wish to live like that. The first time, he grabbed a knife to the extent that
he could with his mostly paralyzed hands, and he attempted to impale-
himself in the chest. He failed in his objective, but managed to wound
himself severely. He was in great pain, and he developed more infec-
tions. His wounds finally healed, and then several months later he tried
again, using the same approach. Again he failed and his wounds ulti-
mately healed, but he remained on his stomach due to his bed sores, and
his prospects for a life that could ever be satisfying to him remained the
same.
Finally, I was told several years after I left Rusk, that, during a brief
period in which Mike was able to sit up in his wheelchair, one day he
managed to go up to the roof of the facility, and with whatever strength
he could muster, he pulled himself over and threw himself off the roof to
his death. He was obviously not willing to risk failure on this third at-
tempt. This was clearly not the impulsive act of a person who had not
thought it through adequately, or the coerced act of a person incapable of
autonomy. It was an act of self-determination by a person with a, disabil-
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ity based on his own assessment of his life. I deeply regret that my
friend, Mike, did not have available to him the assistance of his physi-
cians to help him end his prolonged pain and suffering.
Recently, in three major court cases, I had the honor of representing
two coalitions of people with disabilities who believe that they have the
right to end their lives with the assistance of their physicians in the event
of a terminal illness. The two cases before the United States Supreme
Court are Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. The case before
the Florida Supreme Court is Krischer v. Mclver.3 Because the individu-
als who seek assistance in ending their lives in these cases are all termi-
nally ill, and therefore have very little life left, the State's interest in
preserving and prolonging their lives against their wills is particularly
weak. Consequently, I believe that these cases are even stronger than the
case that Mike would have had to bring.
Interestingly, as I was drafting my briefs, I had an experience that
gave me additional personal insight into the issue of physician-assisted
death. In reviewing the several briefs filed by disability organizations
opposing recognition of a right, I began questioning whether my position
was right. What if my opponents were correct that this would be the
beginning of the next holocaust for people with disabilities? A good
lawyer can convince an open-minded person of most anything.
Just as I began questioning myself, something happened that con-
vinced me that my position was correct. My wife and I had recently
adopted two children from Russia, and one day one of them came home
from school with a horrible flu. The next thing I knew, I was coughing
incessantly and unable to breathe. My wife called 911 and the ambu-
lance came with oxygen. After being in the emergency room and inten-
sive care, I had an opportunity to be reflective. What if this were not a
short-term episode? What if the terror that I was experiencing in gasping
for my next breath was part of a terminal condition, and I would continue
to experience it for some indeterminate period of time? Wouldn't I want
to be able to have the assistance of my physician to end that suffering?
Wouldn't it be horrible for the State to be interfering with my decision at
my deathbed? I have not questioned my position again since.
There are several disability-related arguments that you will be hear-
ing from the other side over the next couple of days of this conference. I
would like to address them briefly here.4
3 The Supreme Court of Florida released its opinion after the conference. See Krischer
v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
4 See generally Andrew I. Batavia, Disability and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1671 (1997) (discussing disability related arguments against physician-assisted
suicide).
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First is the slippery slope argument. This is the concept that physi-
cian-assisted death cannot and will not be limited to the voluntary deci-
sions of terminally ill individuals, and that it will inevitably be expanded
to people who are not terminally ill and to individuals who have not
voluntarily decided to end their lives. Disability organizations that make
this contention claim that the next step after recognition of physician-
assisted suicide for terminally ill people will be active involuntary eutha-
nasia for people with disabilities generally. I do not believe that this
would be the case. I believe that we can impose regulations and enforce
them rigorously to ensure that people are not killed against their will.
While I would never support involuntary euthanasia, I strongly support
the right of people with terminal illnesses to exercise autonomy in ending
their own lives.
The second argument that you will be hearing is that this right is
based on a societal misconception that people with disabilities have a
diminished quality of life. Although many people have this misconcep-
tion, it is not the basis for the right to physician-assisted suicide. The
right is based on the autonomy and self-determination of individuals to
assess the quality of their own lives.
A third argument that is made repeatedly by disability advocates
who oppose physician-assisted death concerns the alleged "vulnerability"
and "oppression" of people with disabilities. I do not consider myself
either vulnerable or oppressed. The vast majority of people with disabili-
ties whom I know do not consider themselves vulnerable or oppressed.
We do not believe that our physicians would be eager to end our lives,
and even if we did believe this, we would never allow our physicians to
control such decisions. We recognize that there are significant problems
with the way in which our society treats many people with disabilities.
We also recognize that some people with disabilities are, in fact, vulnera-
ble to coercion, and many have very limited options available to them.
These individuals, such as some people living in institutions, may require
special safeguards and protections. However, the fact that some disabled
people may be vulnerable or even oppressed is no reason to deny all
terminally ill people who are suffering horribly from ending their lives
with the assistance of their physicians.
Finally, opponents of the right to physician-assisted suicide are fond
of saying, how can our society allow this right when it has not allowed a
right to health care generally. To me, this argument is a red herring. I
personally favor the establishment of universal health insurance in this
country, though my preferred approach to developing such a system is
probably quite different from that of advocates on the other side of this
issue. Irrespective of our personal policy preferences, our society has not
yet made a commitment to universal health insurance, and this is not a
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legitimate justification for denying terminally ill individuals assistance in
ending their suffering.
It is dangerous for people with disabilities to compromise their au-
tonomy over any aspect of their lives. To me, autonomy is the funda-
mental basis of the disability rights movement in this country.
Paternalism, which is evident in all of the opponents' arguments, is pre-
cisely what the movement has always aimed to eliminate. I resent disa-
bility being used as a justification for denying a basic right to all
Americans. All Americans can potentially contract a terminal disease,
and may wish to have access to physician assistance in hastening their
deaths under such circumstances. I particularly resent one group of dis-
abled people attempting to limit the autonomy of another group of dis-
abled people, people in the terminal stages of AIDS and other diseases.
DR. GALLAGHER: Drew, that was a remarkable statement.
Thank you for it.
Drew and I happened to be talking about this issue about four years
ago. We had just met at a cocktail party. In our discussion, we came to
realize that we had a shared experience. Both Drew and I had found
profound comfort in the knowledge painfully gained from the most criti-
cal days of our recovery. We learned that if the pain becomes too great,
death becomes an easy alternative. When I was in the iron lung breath-
ing through my tracheotomy for three months and then, during the sev-
eral years of rehabilitation, I always had present the knowledge that if the
suffering got to be too much, if I couldn't hack it, then I would find a
way to die. I was very, very sick and it would have been a simple thing
to give up and die. I felt that this thought empowered me to keep going.
And during my rehabilitation, there were times when I would go to bed
at night and say, well, in the morning, we will see about whether to keep
on living.
The second thing that is similar is that I had pneumonia this winter,
too. It came on very quickly, and it certainly brought memories of being
in the iron lung and being unable to breathe. The experience reminded
me that death comes not as an enemy, but as a friend.
I wrote a book called By Trust Betrayed which is about patients and
disabled people in Nazi Germany during the 1930s and into the 1940s.
At the beginning, many of the people participating had the best of inten-
tions. Their theory was that institutionalized disabled people, mentally-
ill people, people paralyzed, blind, and deaf had poor quality of life and
were suffering, and it would be an act of charity to put them out of their
misery.
Germany is a very hierarchical society, and during the 1930s it was
even more so. At the top of the pyramid were physicians. At the bottom
of the pyramid were disabled people. The physicians had not a doubt in
[Vol. 7:267
CONFERENCE TRANscRIPT
the world that they had the knowledge and the right to judge the quality
of life of their patients. That is the distinction between what we are talk-
ing about today and Nazi Germany. Over 200,000 to 300,000 German
citizens were put to their death against their will by their doctors, some-
times fighting physically against them.
Suicide was illegal. There was one case of a young girl in a mental
institution who was so desperate she attempted suicide. She failed. But
by attempting suicide, she had broken the rules of the institution, so they
killed her.
What I am talking about today is the final stage of a terminal illness
of a competent person. I see this as a civil rights issue. My whole pro-
fessional life has been in the civil rights area. I worked on Capitol Hill
for the Judiciary Committee during the Civil Rights debates of the 1960s,
and I wrote the first Civil Rights Act relating to disabled people in 1997.
I believe that people's rights, people's wishes, should be respected at all
times, and, I believe, especially at the end of life.
I believe that disabled people should have the same access to treat-
ment as able-bodied people even though the care of disabled people costs
a good deal more than the care of nondisabled people. A society that
respects the right of each individual should not make decisions on the
basis of cost. I have lost over fifty friends from AIDS, and I have
watched their dying. Each case is very different.
There is no across-the-board situation, a rule that would apply to all.
People have different pain thresholds. Some people can stand great pain
and have the quality of life and fight on. Other people are not that good
at it, or are not that strong in that sense.
Different religions: the Roman Catholics do not allow assisted sui-
cide, but they allow palliative care, which can amount to the same thing.
The Shintos, Japanese Shintos, do not believe the moment of death, or
death itself, is the same thing that the Christians believe. For example,
they believe that if your stomach is still functioning, you are alive. If
you have a transplant, then you are no longer perfect, so you cannot be
accepted into heaven. Ethnic traditions, and family traditions vary
immensely.
There is the will to live. People die when they have a will to die.
Some people in the final stages of a disease live indefinitely, and other
people decide to die, and they do. Also the strength of the disease, the
complications of the situation, and the physical strength of the patient are
factors. So each case is different.
The civil rights of disabled people have changed greatly in my life-
time. When I first got polio, the disabled were still oppressed and in
extraordinary ways: unable to marry, unable to enter certain professions,
unable to be priests, denied public education, denied the vote, denied
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their constitutional rights. We were not supposed to be on the street
much either because we were an embarrassment. By and large, we were
seen as incapable children who never got well, and it was thought we
were not competent to make adult decisions. Well, this has changed, and
it has been changed by disabled people insisting upon autonomy, insist-
ing upon control over their lives, control over their bodies, and control
over the medical treatment they receive.
Now, if disability rights is about control, then surely disability rights
do not end with terminal illness. To me the most personal control issue
is whether to live or whether to die. I do not want doctors deciding
whether I will live or die. I do not want governments deciding whether I
will live or die. I don't want outsiders meddling with what is mine. It is
my liberty right.
Probably the most famous words ever to have been written in the
United States say that all men are endowed by their Creator with these
inalienable rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Surely this
most personal right of all, life or death, is for me to decide. And I would
no more presume to tell another person how he must live his final hours
on earth any more than I would allow him to tell me. It's my own deci-
sion, and it's yours. Thank you.
DR. BLANCK: Now, we will go to the videotape of Dr. Paul
Longmore.
DR. LONGMORE: If physician-assisted suicide is legalized, it will
take place within the context of a health care system and a society that
are already pervaded with prejudice and discrimination against people
with disabilities. Let me give a couple of examples. The Guidelines for
Health Care Providers recommended in the fall of 1996 by the Colorado
Collective for Medical Decisions regarding CPR advised: "CPR should
be unusual if it is known that the patient had significant physical or
mental impairment prior to the cardiac arrest." Now, the guidelines did
not define "significant." This recommendation seemed on the face of it
to many disability rights activists to be prejudicial and discriminatory. I
am told, although I have not been able to verify this, that when those
advocates protested against this recommendation as being discrimina-
tory, it was withdrawn.
But it seems ominous that it was proposed in the first place. People
with significant disabilities have also been reporting that when they enter
hospitals for life-sustaining treatments, they have repeatedly been pres-
sured to sign Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders. Let me quote from Not
Dead Yet, a disability rights group opposing legalization of physician-
assisted suicide:
Yvonne Duffy had hospital personnel constantly urging
and demanding that she sign the order. Robert Powell, a
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wheelchair rider, was denied admittance to a hospital
when he refused to sign a DNR. More recently, Joe
Ehman of The Mouth staff declined to sign a DNR prior
to hospital admission for back surgery. Hospital staff ac-
tually followed him home, harassing him to sign.5
What sort of "choices" are being offered for these individuals with
disabilities regarding their health care? Surely not free and uncoerced
ones. So that's the first point I want to make: if physician-assisted sui-
cide is legalized, it will be within the context of a system that is already
discriminatory and indeed abusive of many people with disabilities.
Second, many advocates of legalization have from the beginning of
their movement aimed to establish physician-assisted suicide, not just for
those who are terminally ill, but for persons with disabilities as well.
Derek Humphry and Timothy Quill have both said in interviews, in
articles, and in Humphry's book, Final Exit, that once physician-assisted
suicide is legalized for terminally-ill persons, they hope to see it ex-
tended to persons with chronic conditions. 6
In addition, the advocacy of legalization has always been riddled
with prejudice against people with disabilities, on the part of some advo-
cates of physician-assisted suicide. Not surprisingly, the most blatant
bigotry has been expressed by Jack Kevorkian. Most of the suicides he
has abetted have been by people with disabilities, not by people who
were terminally ill.7 The two most recent were a woman with arthritis
and a man with a spinal-cord injury. Kevorkian justified his activities to
a Michigan Court in August 1990. He said: "The voluntary self-elimina-
tion of individual and mortally diseased or crippled lives, taken collec-
tively, can only enhance the preservation of public health and welfare."'8
Now, this statement and his actions regarding persons with disabili-
ties alarm many disability rights activists. They wonder why the news
media have failed to report Kevorkian's highly prejudicial views. Why
instead have the media typically portrayed him as some sort of eccentric
folk hero? Why also, many of us wonder, have advocates of physician-
assisted suicide failed to condemn Kevorkian's-well, let me put it
bluntly-neo-Nazi bigotry against people with disabilities? Why instead
do they confine themselves to lamenting his actions as unregulated, but
5 Private email message from Stephen N. Drake, Nov. 15, 1996 (quoting Joint State-
ment from Evan Kemp and Justin Dart) (on file with speaker); see also Carl Weiser, Protesting
Assisted Suicide Disabled People Shout, "We're Not Dead Yet , " CoutrER-J. (Louisville), Jan.
9, 1997, at 4A.
6 DEREK HuMPHRY, FINAL ExTr: THE PRAcncALrrrEs oF SauF-DauVEAacE AND As-
siSTFD SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991).
7 See infra note 71 & accompanying text.
8 Nat Hentoff, Not Dead Yet, WAsH. PosT, June 8, 1997, at A15 (quoting Jack Kevor-
kian, written statement to Oakland County, Michigan, Superior Court, August 17, 1990).
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go on to praise him for having forced to public awareness the important
issue of patient suffering and of the need for legalized physician aid-in-
dying? We wonder also, some of us, if the handful of disability rights
activists who have aligned themselves on the side of legalization have
demanded of their nondisabled allies that those allies publicly denounce
Kevorkian's contempt of people with disabilities.
The third point I want to note is that the arguments justifying physi-
cian-assisted suicide are often based on social attitudes and deeper cul-
tural values that are extremely prejudicial toward individuals who are
sick or disabled. Time Magazine, interviewing Jack Kevorkian, asked,
"How do you decide whom to help? Does the patient have to suffer from
a life-threatening illness?" "No, of course not," said Kevorkian. "And it
doesn't have to be painful, as with quadriplegia. But your life quality
has to be nil."9
Well, all too many people with disabilities have had all too many
doctors dismiss their "quality of life" as "nil" and recommend withhold-
ing medical treatment that would sustain their lives, recommending in-
stead that they'd be better off dead, and that their families would be
better off with them dead.
This phrase "quality of life" is used frequently to justify physician-
assisted suicide. Janet Good, a sometime collaborator with Jack Kevor-
kian in abetting the suicides of several individuals with disabilities, told
the Washington Post:
Pain is not the main reason we want to die. It's the in-
dignity. It's the inability to get out of bed, or get onto
the toilet, let alone drive a car and go shopping, without
another's help. I can speak for literally hundreds of peo-
ple whose bedside I've sat at over the years.... they've
had enough when they can't go to the bathroom by
themselves. Most of them say, "I can't stand my
mother, my husband, wiping my butt." That's why
everybody in the movement talks about death with dig-
nity. People have their pride. They want to be in
control. 10
One disability rights activist, a man with a disability himself, re-
sponded to this statement of Janet Good. This is what he said:
Many people with disabilities need such assistance in the
bathroom, assistance which they are in charge of and
9 Kevorkian Speaks His Mind, TIME, May 31, 1993, at 38 (John Hull interviewing Dr.
Kevorkian).
10 Richard Leiby, Whose Death Is It Anyway? The Kevorkian Debate. It's a Matter of
Faith, In the End, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1996, at Fl.
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which they do not regard as undignified. It's a shame
that Ms. Good doesn't convey a more respectful attitude
toward her "clients." Instead she reinforces and lethally
acts out the devaluing attitudes of our society that tell
sick or disabled people they lack dignity because they
need assistance with basic activities of daily living, and
would be better off dead. Have we really gotten to the
point in this country that we will sanction and abet the
suicides of people because they can't wipe their own
behinds? People who have internalized society's con-
tempt as self-hatred? That Janet Good thinks this justi-
fies facilitating suicides shows what little progress we
have made in rooting out disability prejudice."
When proponents of physician-assisted suicide set quality of life as
a justifiable reason for aiding deaths, they almost always invoke "dig-
nity," and they simultaneously raise the specter of "dependency." What
they fail to note is that these are not objective descriptions of illness or
disability. Instead, they are highly value-laden terms that shape percep-
tions. They are rooted in American values that make absolute personal
autonomy and complete physical self-sufficiency cultural ideals. They
express a myth, and that myth is that real Americans are rugged individu-
alists who quite literally stand alone, stand on their own two feet. The
ideal, the authentic, American is not in any way dependent on others. Or
at least, so the myth teaches us to pretend. To become sick or disabled in
America is to lose one's social validity. It is to acquire a relentlessly and
radically negative identity. It is to become the inversion of what a real
American is supposed to be.
That's why the Disability Rights Movement has fought the values
and myths that are dominant in this culture about personal autonomy,
because inevitably those values have produced discrimination against
people with disabilities. That's why disability rights activists have typi-
cally sharply criticized dominant notions of individual autonomy for hav-
ing the effect, in part, of masking the structural arrangements of power
and privilege, advantage and economic opportunity that have marginal-
ized people with disabilities. That's why disability rights activists have
argued for recognition of the fact that quality of life is constructed by
public policies and by socio-economic conditions that are often forced
upon people with disabilities by present arrangements. That's why disa-
bility rights activists have fought for independent living and for govern-
ment programs to liberate people with disabilities from nursing homes.
I See The Real Hemlock Society, (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.acils.com/
NotDeadYet/hemlock.htmn>.
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Many people with disabilities have expressed the feeling that they would
rather be dead than be in nursing homes. The Disability Rights Move-
ment has fought to eliminate the pressures that have forced some people
with disabilities to choose between the nursing home and the grave.
That's why disability rights activists have fought for the Individuals
with Disabilities Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and access
and accommodations and full access to health care. That's why disabil-
ity rights activists are currently fighting to protect all of those rights from
the current fierce attack that is being mounted against them.
Yet, when courts in right-to-die cases make their rulings, their rea-
soning typically expresses the reigning prejudices instead of condemning
them. Take, for example, the Ninth Circuit ruling.12 It claimed in gen-
eral that it was establishing the right to a physician-assisted suicide only
for those who are terminally ill. But, in fact, the court ruling included, or
intended to include, persons with disabilities as well. The court noted the
concerns of "some representatives of the physically impaired, including
the fear that certain physical disabilities will erroneously be deemed to
make life 'valueless."' 13 The court said:
While we recognize the legitimacy of these concerns, we
also recognize that seriously impaired individuals will,
along with non-impaired individuals, be the beneficiaries
of the liberty interest asserted here-and that if they are
not afforded the option to control their own fate, they
like many others will be compelled, against their will, to
endure unusual and protracted suffering.14
In other words, what the court was saying was, first of all, physi-
cian-assisted suicide should be available to people with disabilities be-
cause, they assume, as many nondisabled people assume, that "suffering"
is inherent in any disability. The court also ignored the history of preju-
dice and segregation, and even at times in some places, extermination of
people with disabilities. The court completely disregarded that the suf-
fering of many people with disabilities is socially constructed, inflicted
by public policies, power arrangements, and denial of access to society.
The court wanted to guarantee the right of persons with disabilities to
control their own fate regarding their dying; this at a time when the civil
rights guarantees of self-determination regarding every other sphere of
life are under assault.
12 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
13 Id. at 825.
14 Id.
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The fourth thing I would like to note is that for all these reasons the
vast majority of disability rights activists have been insisting in the cur-
rent debate about physician-assisted suicide that we focus on economic
issues. We note that the United States has not yet guaranteed a basic
right to health care for Americans. We note that medical decisions in-
creasingly are being made, not by doctors, let alone by patients, but by
profit-minded managed-care executives. We note that abuse under that
system is not only inevitable, it is already occurring, and leading to the
deaths of some individuals.
Yet, in legalizing physician-assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit de-
clared, "in a society in which the costs of protracted health care can be so
exorbitant, it is improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the
economic welfare of their families and loved ones into consideration."' 15
The court said it didn't have any authority to make any rulings about
access to health care. It left that to the legislature. The court also dis-
missed concerns that legalization might expose "the poor and minorities
to exploitation."'16 It rejected such concerns as "disingenuous," "falla-
cious" and "meretricious."' 17 The court wrote, "The argument that disad-
vantaged persons will receive more medical services than the remainder
of the population in one, and only one, area-assisted suicide-is ludi-
crous on its face."'18
Only affluent, privileged white people who enjoy the advantages of
the current economic system could be so arrogantly scornful of the con-
cerns of many people in minority communities as well as people with
disabilities, who are often poor themselves. Only people with such ad-
vantages could convince themselves that physician-assisted suicide oper-
ates without abuse. People with disabilities, who are often
disadvantaged, cannot afford to indulge in such naivet6.
To most of the civil-rights activists, this is simply acquiescing in the
current health-care system and the current economic system, which in
our view are not only increasingly unjust, but downright savage. As one
activist said, "In a profit-oriented system [pervaded by prejudice and ig-
norance about disability], so-called patient choice to die will not long
remain any choice at all."'19
What we finally want to note, what we want to warn everyone
about, is that while the threat of legalization of physician-assisted suicide
within the current system is especially great to those who are sick and
15 Id. at 826.
16 Id. at 825.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Harvey Lipman, Disabled Group Urges Supreme Court to Reject Assisted Suicide,
ALBANY TIwES UNIoN, Jan. 8, 1997, at B2 (quoting Michael Volkman).
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those who are disabled, legalization of assisted suicided within the pres-
ent system will ultimately prove dangerous to everyone.
DR. GILL: I thought I would start today by reading a statement
that's alluded to often in this debate. The statement is based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Basically, it
says: All persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. It's a
simple but profound statement. It's the stuff that inspires social justice
movements.
Over the last three decades, our brothers and sisters with disabilities
have argued and lobbied and participated in sit-ins and at times even
gotten arrested to uphold that principle. All persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike. You may not discriminate on the basis of
our disabilities. That principle has been used by us to get jobs and es-
cape institutions and emerge from third-rate segregated schools and as-
sert our right to transportation, gain access to the built environment. We
even used the principle of nondiscrimination to save our lives when we
defeated plans to ration health care based on quality of life judgments.
But now proponents of physician-assisted suicide want the govern-
ment to sanction, and the medical system to carry out, deliberate discrim-
inatory treatment on the basis of physical condition. They want people
with disabilities who express the desire to die to be treated differently
from nondisabled people who express the desire to die. They would be-
tray the hard work of all those tireless disability rights activists who have
held the line against discrimination.
These proponents, I believe, make several very important errors.
They severely underestimate the threat of discrimination in our lives, and
they downplay the gravity of social oppression in preventing people with
disabilities from having real choices to live. At the same time, I feel,
they overestimate the effectiveness of safeguards and guidelines to con-
trol what they seek to unleash on the disability community.
I hear a lot of false reassurance that I shouldn't worry so much. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court opinion that Dr. Longmore quoted
points out that there are plenty of disability advocacy groups that protect
us.20 Of course, those of us on the Boards of such organizations who
have tried to intervene in right-to-die cases involving disabled persons
have been told by the court that we have no legal standing in such a
private matter.
Derek Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, tells his follow-
ers that the disabled are amply protected from harm by two factors: first,
the National Council on Disability, which he says is just rolling in bucks
20 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 825.
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from the federal government, and second, the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act. I guess he has never heard of the war on unfunded mandates.
Now we have Hugh Gallagher and Andrew Batavia telling us that
we are not experiencing the threats to our freedoms that we thought we
were. Mr. Batavia takes issue with our characterization of people with
disabilities as oppressed, and I was interested to hear that the majority of
his friends are not oppressed. Actually, I am very glad to hear that. But
I think he may not be acquainted with a lot of people with disabilities
that I know.
Dr. Gallagher, in a statement to the Supreme Court, reassures me by
saying this:
In our generation, great strides have been made to wel-
come people with disabilities into society as equal mem-
bers with equal rights. For the first time, people with
disabilities have assumed control over their own lives,
without fear of sterilization, internment, segregation, and
ostracism, and the denial to their rights to vote, hold
property, enter legal contracts, and obtain public educa-
tion, transportation, and accommodation. 21
Nonetheless, I do worry. My perspective on these matters has been
shaped by my role and experience as a clinical psychologist, a re-
searcher, and a woman with a disability. I am a trained crisis therapist,
and I have worked extensively with suicidal people, both disabled and
nondisabled. I have also read the work of our country's leading suicide
experts. The conclusion is clear. Once you peel away the rhetoric and
look at reality, suicide is not much of an act of freedom. It's a forced
decision that occurs when a person loses hope of finding a way to get
what he or she needs to make life worth living.
Furthermore, most people die for socially mediated reasons, not
pain. Even the best physicians agree about that. People die because of
shame, loss of self-worth, loneliness, fear, feelings of uselessness or guilt
over hurting others.
A point that can't be stressed too much about suicide is that ambiva-
lence is always present in suicide whether it's easily detectable or not. A
major problem with physician-assisted suicide is that once a second or
third person participates in an individual suicide, the whole dynamic
changes. It ceases to be a private decision between the individual and the
individual's soul. He or she is no longer free to be so ambivalent, to
waiver. The process goes into motion and there are not as many degrees
21 Brief for the Amici Curiae: Gay Men's Health Crisis and Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund at 3a, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Nos. 96-110, 95-
1858) (statement of Hugh Gregory Gallagher).
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of freedom in the act itself. So, an assisted suicide always becomes a
completed suicide.
This certain path to death is actually very different and unequal to
what nondisabled people get when they are suicidal. First, what do
nondisabled people get when they are suicidal? They get disagreement,
generally. People say: "you shouldn't do it." They get intervention.
Last but not least, they get the chance to fail to die by suicide.
When we look at the safeguards that are commonly recommended
to control physician-assisted suicide, we find that they demonstrate mis-
conceptions about suicide and about the real experience of people with
disabilities. One that's commonly offered is that the suicide wish should
be persistent over time. But the persistence of suicide expressions is a
very poor predictor of whether an act of suicide will be completed or not.
Expressions of suicidal feelings that last for months are quite common in
people with disabilities going through a disability adjustment process and
at different points in their life thereafter.
Another safeguard is professional assessment: that two or more
health professionals should assess the competence of the person in mak-
ing the suicidal wish. Well, first of all, people with disabilities don't
have access to mental health services in general from professionals who
understand their experience. Secondly, physicians are notorious for
overlooking signs of depression in people with health complaints. There
is a whole literature about that. Next, physicians cannot ensure that peo-
ple with disabilities are fully informed about their options because, let's
face it, aside from the physicians in this room, most don't know what our
options are, and they don't even know that they don't know. But perhaps
most distressing of all, physicians in general demonstrate very negative
attitudes about disability and quality of life, and they reinforce each
other's biases, so having two doesn't help.
I could review for you, if I had more time, the literature on physi-
cian attitudes towards disability. But let me summarize it and say that
number one, it shows that health professionals' attitudes and beliefs
about disability are unfortunately as negative and often more negative
than the attitudes of the general public. Number two, health profession-
als often take a significantly dimmer view of our lives than we do in the
aggregate.
Just one example, in one recent study, 86 percent of spinal cord
injured high-level quadriplegics rated their quality of life as average or
better, 86 percent. But only 17 percent of emergency room doctors,
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nurses, and technicians thought that they themselves would have an aver-
age or better quality of life if they acquired quadriplegia.22
In one study of women with disabilities, the author says:
The women in this study regularly reported bad exper-
iences of health professionals, in particular doctors,
describing them as punitive, patronising, dismissive, and
unhelpful.. . . Every now and then a woman might
come across a general practitioner or a consultant who
was helpful and acted in partnership with them. The
gratitude, enthusiasm, and warmth with which these wo-
men described such contact suggests that they are rare
encounters.23
Last, but not least, among the proffered safeguards, proponents say
we should rule out coercion as a factor in the decision. There is no way
to rule out social coercion in the lives of people with extensive disabili-
ties who are so devalued. The kind of coercion that undermines the de-
sire to live for people with disabilities is not something blatant like a
malicious family member who doesn't want this person around. It can
be a lot more difficult to put your finger on. It can be as subtle as feeling
like a burden or fearing the imminent abandonment of a spouse, or just
having a doctor validate your suicide as a possible solution for you.
We don't have adequate research to know what the impact of that
doctor's agreement to do this act is. We don't have that research yet.
But we do know that the doctor's message can be a determining factor
for parents who make treatment decisions about disabled newborns.
I want just to look at some of the facts of oppression in disabled
people's lives that we do know. We know that people with disabilities
are, indeed, oppressed in our society, and it's especially severe for wo-
men and for people of color with disabilities. A third of all people with
disabilities live at or near the poverty level;24 70 percent of us of working
age are unemployed.25 We suffer tremendous social isolation. We have
to rely on restrictive health care coverage. We are also at high risk for
domestic violence. We are physically, sexually, and emotionally as-
saulted by our partners, family members, personal assistants, and, yes,
22 See Kenneth A. Gerhart et al., Quality of Life Following Spinal Cord Injury: Knowl-
edge and Attitudes of Emergency Care Providers, 23 ANNALS OF EME-Gm. MED. 807-12 (1994).
23 SusAN LONSDALE, WOMEN AND DIsABLrrY: THE EXPERIENCE OF PHYSICAL DIsAB,-
rrY AmONG WOMEN 52 (1990).
24 See Ellen M. Yacknin, Helping the Voices of Poverty to be Heard in the Health Care
Reform Debate, 60 BROOK. L. Rnv. 143, 166 n.47.
25 See Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportunity, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from 1990-1993, 79 IOWA L. Rnv. 853, 873
n.95 (1994) (citing a 1994 Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities).
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health professionals at approximately twice the rate experienced by
nondisabled women.26
A study by the DisAbled Women's Network (DAWN) in Canada
found a significant association between suicide, depression, and abuse.
Of 371 women with a variety of disabilities, 60 percent had contemplated
suicide, and almost half of those had attempted suicide at least once. The
more types of abuse a woman had experienced, in fact, the more likely
she was to consider suicide.27
I have interviewed many women with disabilities. When I listen to
their stories, I hear of broken dreams, people who want to do things like
go to school, get jobs, become parents, live in their own homes rather
than being forced to live with abusive spouses or other family members.
They are not getting to do what they want to do, live.
People with disabilities in my research have also talked in particular
about the oppression they experience in health service settings. Again, I
don't really have time to talk about this much today. Suffice it to say,
people with disabilities don't feel heard, understood, or accepted as ful
human beings by most of the people in the health service system that
they come into contact with. And, yes, some of them with more privi-
leges have good experiences, but that doesn't typify the majority.
The proponents of assisted suicide say: keep the government out of
this personal decision; don't tamper with my right to control my life. My
response is: okay, it's a deal. Keep suicide private; keep the government
out of it; don't codify it into law. In other words, commit suicide pri-
vately if you feel that's your right, but do not tamper with my medical
system's policies. Leave my right to nondiscriminatory suicide interven-
tion alone.
Drew, it's interesting to hear about your acquisition of disability
twenty-four years ago. I worry that if you acquired your disability now,
even though the medical technology is better, you might not survive the
emergency room. I was at a conference a few years ago. A senior reha-
bilitation physician got up and said people with quadriplegia are dying
wrongfully every day in emergency rooms because the ER staffs make
decisions to let them go. Separate standards are never equal. I think
that's why African-Americans who know that so well have joined the
minority opposition to assisted suicide.
26 See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 808-09 n.5
(1993); Maura Beth Johnson, Note, Home Sweet Home?: New Jersey's Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1991, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 234, 240 (1993).
27 See S. Masuda, Research Summary, SAFTY NET/WoRK CommuNrry Krr: FROM
ABUSE TO SUICIDE PREVENTION AND WOMEN wrrIH DisABmrris (1996).
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In conclusion, I would like to address the proponents of physician-
assisted suicide directly. In over two hundred years of United States his-
tory, the right to assisted suicide has never been legal. In my opposition
to physician-assisted suicide, I am not denying you something that's
yours. You have never had it. Why now, now before we have our rights
to live, now in the new age of managed care, and now before its impact
on our community has been adequately studied?
I will defend your right to equality in access to work, relationships,
transport and education. You already have the right to refuse treatment,
the right to be left alone, and the right to get palliative care, so you don't
suffer the way Mike did in Mr. Batavia's story. But it seems that you
want more than that. You want a special privilege, and you want it now.
You are willing to strike down my legal protections and set a precedent
for my discriminatory treatment in order to get it. You would deprive me
of rigorous suicide prevention to get it. You will risk encouraging disa-
bility prejudice in doctors, and you will change my medical system to get
it.
If that's not enough, you want something even beyond what nondis-
abled people have. You want a certain easy death. That, I believe, is a
most unreasonable accommodation. Society and doctors must never be
complicit in the suicides of people on the basis of physical difference.
The risk of even one wrongful death in the disability community is too
much.
DR. BLANCK: Dr. Gallagher, Drew Batavia, are you betraying the
Civil Rights Movement involving persons with disabilities?
DR. GALLAGHER: I just don't see it. This business of oppressed
minority and victimhood isa difficult one, and it's a popular one. But I
often think that a person who feels that he is oppressed by his society all
the time and at every turn is giving up. I think this victimhood can be
like paranoia, and that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. You get into
a position where you say, "I can't do it because I am disabled." It tends
to lead to inaction and it's often a symptom, as Carol knows, of
depression.
Just one other thing in terms of an oppressed minority, I agree with
virtually everything that Carol Gill said about social attitudes and so
forth. But it's some kind of interesting oppression when you consider
that approximately one dollar out of every twelve spent by the federal
government is spent on the care for the living and needs of disabled peo-
ple. When you think of how America in our time has rebuilt itself in
curb cuts and busses and public transportation, it's a completely different
world than it was thirty years ago.
When you consider the lobbying power that the disabled people
demonstrated to get the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) passed,
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when they overturned the most powerful lobbies in Washington-small
business and transport-they overcame the opposition of the Bush cabi-
net, and they convinced President Bush. They've got some kind of
power-they're right up there with the senior citizens.
MR. BATAVIA: I agree with all of what Hugh Gallagher just said.
I would just like to add that to me, there is nothing more oppressive and
no more pernicious type of discrimination than one group of people with
disabilities telling another group with disabilities that they can't control
their lives, particularly at the very end of their lives when they are suffer-
ing horribly.
The Disability Rights Movement to me is about control over one's
life. That's the bottom line. Any way that the opponents put it, you are
getting in the way of my right and the right of other people with disabili-
ties who don't feel oppressed, who don't feel victimized, who just want
to control our lives, like other people.
DR. GILL: Well, I challenge the notion that recognizing your op-
pression leads necessarily to being passive and depressed. I didn't see
that during the black Civil Rights Movement. I didn't see that during the
Women's Movement. I didn't see that in almost any other social justice
movement. I think that I need to prescribe for you to go to your next
ADAPT demonstration and see if you see a lot of passive people there.
As for lots of federal health dollars going into the support of people
with disabilities, of course, the nursing home industry alone sucks up a
good portion of that and as do other inflated health care costs while the
managed care organizations get rich and the people who manufacture
wheelchairs get rich and so on. I don't think we can be blamed for how
much it costs for us to have decent lives.
DR. LONGMORE: Well, I listen to a lot of these discussions with
the ears and mind of a historian, and what always strikes me is how
much of the discussion on the proponent's side is really American myth-
making about personal autonomy. Somebody said to me this morning,
there is no real freedom if you don't have any real choices. The vast
majority of people with disabilities are denied real choices about most
aspects of their lives. The problem is that given the pervasiveness of the
prejudice and discrimination we still face if physician-assisted suicide is
legalized, a good many of those people are going to find themselves
under pressure to make a "choice" to end their allegedly miserable lives
rather than being given access to society.
We may have gotten the ADA passed, but it's been under assault
constantly since its passage. There's been a widespread refusal to imple-
ment it. The reality for most people with disabilities in this society is
that they don't have real choices regarding the rest of their lives.
DR. BLANCK: Is there a middle ground?
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MR. BATAVIA: There is, I believe, some common ground. We
recognize that there are some major problems in our society with the way
in which people with disabilities are treated. We must rigorously address
those problems. But in doing so, we can't do it in a way that's going in
any way to compromise the autonomy or control over their lives by peo-
ple with disabilities, because it's too risky. Once we do that, we compro-
mise the basic premise of this movement, which has been so valuable
and important for all of us.
DR. BLANCK: Hugh Gallagher, what do you hope to see for the
rest of your lifetime?
DR. GALLAGHER: First, I want to say that I am troubled by this
idea of speaking on behalf of the disabled. It's very difficult. I see no
polls of substance that could tell how disabled people feel. There have
been a couple of indications. One, I saw seven friends in death seriously
disabled: a professor, a doctor, an editor, a writer, a lawyer, and an en-
trepreneur. They all insisted upon the right for themselves, should at the
end of their life, they wish suicide. But they, too, do not approve of it for
society.
There was an issue of New Mobility. They asked readers to write in
the mail. According to the editor of New Mobility, the responses were
running 80 percent in favor of having the right to assisted suicide. I
think we have a lot to contribute to this debate. We know about pain and
illness and quality of life, and how they are not related. We have learned
lessons that the able people are only to learn as they approach old age,
becoming decrepit, or diseased, and they need to have reassurance from
us; they need to learn what we have to offer. It's an important contribu-
tion that we can make to all of society. I hope we do, and I hope we
don't alienate ourselves from this discussion by thinking of it in terms of
a conspiracy.
DR. LONGMORE: I think the Disability Rights Movement in one
way has ironically benefited from this current debate. It's compelling us
to elaborate on the ideology of disability rights. The Disability Rights
Movement has always been about much more than personal autonomy.
It has even defined personal autonomy in different ways than in the dom-
inant society. But the movement also has been about an analysis of
structural inequities, of the allocations of economic resources, of the mal-
distribution of power, and of the basis of community, not just among
people with disabilities, but in general. This whole debate can help us
further develop our analysis and critique-an agenda that will benefit not
just people with disabilities, but help in a much needed reassessment of
American society.. I think we have a lot to contribute on that score.
DR. GILL: My first piece of advice would be to defer this whole
thing, delay it. Don't legalize physician-assisted suicide. Dr. Gallagher
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has conceded that we don't know enough. We don't even know enough
about what people with disabilities would think about all of this if they
had access to information. I say that we need to work with people with
disabilities on establishing equal access to health care for everyone. We
need to start doing some research to get in touch with our people, but
don't do skewed research where you don't even go to nursing homes and
ask people with disabilities who are incarcerated there what they think.
Most surveys avoid that population.
I think that we need also to start working in partnerships much more
with physicians and other health care professionals, so that they learn
about our lives, and so that we can tell them the options that people with
disabilities can use to live dignified lives. And let's get personal assis-
tant services for everybody federally funded so we can live with dignity
in our own homes.
II. SESSION TWO: THE SEMANTICS AND CONCEPTS
UNDERLYING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DYING
DR. KIRSCHNER: Our panel this afternoon will be examining in
depth some of the language and the concepts we use in discussing physi-
cian-assisted suicide-some of the concepts and language that we have
taken for granted. We will be exploring issues such as autonomy, self-
determination, suffering, quality of life, and hopelessness.
Our first speaker is Dr. Haavi Morreim. She has been a professor in
the College of Medicine from the University of Tennessee in the Depart-
ment of Human Values in Ethics for twelve years, for the four previous
years at the University of Virginia School of Medicine. She has done
clinical teaching and consulting in medical ethics. Although her research
spans a variety of topics, it particularly focuses on the ethical and legal
implications of medicine's changing economics.
She has over seventy publications in journals of law, medicine, and
ethics, including the Journal of the AMA, the Hastings Center Report,
and the Wall Street Journal. Her book Balancing Act: The New Medical
Ethics of Medicine's New Economics, first appeared in 1991 and has
been republished in paperback by Georgetown University Press in 1995.
DR. MORREIM: Each of us was invited to focus on one particular
dimension in this whole nest of issues at which we are looking today. I
was invited to look at autonomy, and at what exactly is going on in the
autonomy argument behind assisted suicide. Therefore, you will find
that some important things will be missing from my remarks. They are
not intended to be an all-encompassing view of physician-assisted sui-
cide or socially-assisted suicide.
The essence of the autonomy concept is quite simple and familiar.
Basically, the principle says that if I am capable of doing so, then I ought
[Vol. 7:267
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to be able to make my own decisions regarding my own life. I must live
with the consequences, and I should be able to use my own values to
make my decisions. The autonomy argument can also go a bit deeper. It
seems to me that in order to be morally accountable agents-in other
words, to be people who can be held responsible for what we do-we
must have the liberty to be able to shape ourselves, our character, and our
personal histories according to the values that we hold dear. Otherwise,
if we are just buffeted about here and there by forces outside our control,
then we are not really accountable for ourselves. We are just a product
of what others have done.
As we move from basic notions of autonomy to the more specific
idea that perhaps somebody might be entitled at some point to end his
own life, it's useful to go beyond just the suicide concept. It is clear, for
instance, that competent adults are permitted to forego medical life-sup-
port for any reason of their choosing. This is not actually considered
suicide, but rather a refusal of unwanted interventions. One can also
think, more broadly still, of occasions in which a person is willing to
sacrifice or endanger his life for the sake of something that one regards
as being more important than his life. Some of these involve religious
commitments. When a Jehovah's Witness forgoes blood in order to ob-
serve Biblical dictates, even at the cost of his life, he is not committing
suicide. He is, however, placing that spiritual value higher than life.
Other examples involve people who commit or risk self-sacrifice for the
benefit of other people, from fire fighters, police, and military heroes, to
parents rescuing their children. So there are a variety of ways in which
people are permitted in our society to place something ahead of preserv-
ing their own lives. All these are reflections of the value our society
places on personal autonomy and its exercise.
In the context of assisted suicide, the relevant values prompting
someone to lose a desire for further living will often concern that per-
son's judgments about the quality of his life, and the kind of life that is
worth living. The need for assistance from others in ending that life can
arisefrom several factors. The individual may be physically unable to
perform the necessary actions on his own; he may lack information about
what methods would work effectively and comfortably in ending his life;
or he may be legally unable to obtain access to the means for accom-
plishing the desired end. In the latter instance, patients can only obtain
legal access to drugs via physicians, who have exclusive control over
them. For those who wish to end their lives, drugs would often appear to
be a more benign means than firearms or other alternatives. Hence, our
focus evolves from autonomously placing certain values above life, to
foregoing life-support, to suicide, to assisted suicide, to physician-as-
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sisted suicide. In the last set of cases, it is difficult for someone to act on
his autonomous wishes without enlisting help from others.
The Ninth2 8 and especially the Second Circuit2 9 opinions took note
of this in their decisions about physician-assisted suicide, as they dis-
cussed the different position of those people who are dependent on
mechanical life-support, versus those who are not. The former are per-
mitted to enlist physicians' help by asking them to remove these inter-
ventions, but because the latter are not machine-dependent, they
therefore can only die quickly if some new death-producing process is
introduced, such as a lethal dose of drugs. Because those drugs are un-
available without prescription, they can only be obtained with physi-
cians' help. To some observers, it seems unfair to permit the one group a
relatively easy escape from unwanted life, while requiring the other to
endure unwanted suffering. In either case, after all, the physician must
be involved, and yet while courts have clearly authorized the former sort
of assistance, the latter remains deeply disputed. In the near future, the
United States Supreme Court is expected to render its own judgment on
this matter.30
If physicians are to be permitted to assist in suicide by making pre-
scription drugs available, or even if they are merely to honor a request to
abate aggressive life-support, there are several caveats, which have been
mentioned elsewhere. If assisted suicide is to be even potentially accept-
able according to the principle of autonomy, the person must not be in
the midst of transient despair or depression; the diagnosis and prognosis
must be accurate to the best of reasonable medical knowledge; undue
pressure must not be exerted by family, physicians, hospital people, nurs-
ing home people, or whomever; and one must identify cases that are not
actually a request for suicide, but a cry for some other kind of help.
It seems to me that two issues are particularly important here. One
is empirical and the other is normative. Realistically, we can be quite
sure that abuses and errors will happen if assisted suicide is legally per-
mitted. The empirical question is how prevalent, how likely, how fre-
quent, and how severe and regrettable these occasions are going to be.
The other question is the value question: given that there will be errors
and abuses to one degree or another, how shall we manage the uncertain-
ties? Where shall we draw the balance?
On the one hand, we could draw such strict safeguards that almost
no one will be permitted to commit suicide or to seek assisted suicide. In
that case, those who will suffer are those who want, but are unable to
28 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d. 790 (9th Cir 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
29 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
30 See supra note 2.
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secure, that kind of exit. On the other hand, if we permit assisted suicide
fairly freely, some other people will suffer. More lenient criteria mean
higher possibilities for abuse, and some people would thus die who did
not want or need to. Some of the other speakers at today's forum en-
courage us to take this hazard very seriously, particularly regarding dis-
abled persons.
In essence, then, the value question is a weighing of the uncertain-
ties: who will get the benefit of the doubt, who should bear the higher
chance of falling victim to error, and how do we define what constitutes
a "benefit?" There are vitalists who believe that life is infinitely pre-
cious, and is a benefit no matter what its quality. On the other side, there
are those who believe that, at least under some conditions, the quality of
life is too poor to justify its further extension. Those with a robust view
of autonomy not only favor the latter approach, but believe that compe-
tent adult individuals should be permitted to make and carry out that
decision regarding their own lives. The question, then, is whether citi-
zens should have the freedom to make such choices, or whether the pos-
sibility of serious errors should ward us off in favor of other resolutions.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Our next speaker is the Honorable Paul Steven
Miller. Mr. Miller comes to us from Washington, D.C., where he serves
as one of the four Commissioners on the United States Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He has served in this capacity
since 1994. He also serves as a Co-Chair on a Commission-wide task
force to develop an alternative dispute resolution program for the EEOC
and as a member of the Executive Committee of the President's Commit-
tee on the Employment of People with Disabilities.
Prior to his work with the EEOC, Mr. Miller served as the Director
of Litigation for the Western Law Center for Disability Rights, a non-
profit legal services center specializing in disability rights issues. He has
addressed the British Parliament on disability rights and served as a
member of an American Delegation to Japan on disability rights and is
the author of many articles on the civil rights of people with disabilities.
MR. MILLER: Although I respect the fact that this subject has
prompted a range of perspectives from the community of people with
disabilities, I am hopeful that we can use the discussion over the next two
days to broaden the areas upon which we agree and to narrow the issues
.upon which we disagree. I believe that both those with disabilities who
support physician-assisted suicide and those who oppose it begin with
the notion that people with disabilities should be empowered to make
choices regarding their participation or nonparticipation in the health
care system. Moreover, those on both sides would likely acknowledge
that the current health care system leaves many individuals with disabili-
ties without an adequate range of choices, and in some cases forces dis-
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abled people to accept interventions that are unwarranted or harmful,
such as involuntary commitment and the like.
I believe that the debate in the disability community around assisted
suicide centers on this concept of individual autonomy and dignity.31
Some of us believe that we have an alienable right to die and should be
able to enlist assistance in carrying out this choice. Others believe that
the concept of a government-sanctioned suicide system is inherently sus-
pect given the pressures that are likely to bear on people with disabilities,
our families, and the health care system.
I come down on the side of those who oppose physician-assisted
suicide because of the widespread cultural devaluing of people with disa-
bilities which still exists in this country, and some of the unlikely and
unwarranted results if we make it easier for people to end their lives with
the assistance of doctors. I find it ironic that at this same historical mo-
ment when a disabled person's civil rights have begun to take root in
federal law, the right-to-die movement is reinforcing the stereotypical
notions about the tragedy of a disabled person's existence.
From my perspective, the most troubling thing about the assisted
suicide movement is how it defines the concepts of personal autonomy,
freedom, and dignity which are being used to empower people with disa-
bilities to kill themselves, rather than to enable people with disabilities to
live independent lives with dignity. Such basic civil rights concepts are
literally turned on their heads to reinforce stereotypical roles (leading to
an acceptable and rational death for people with disabilities), rather than
to create and strive for equal opportunity and independence. The debate
over assisted suicide emphasizes "death with dignity," but it ignores the
possibility, I believe, of recognizing the dignity of a disabled person's
existence while living with that disability.
In addition to encouraging society at large to regard the suicide of a
person with a disability as rational, such prejudices reinforce the aliena-
tion of people with disabilities with regard to how they feel about them-
selves and the world around them, particularly in the time immediately
following the onset of a disability. This resulting self-hatred can result in
a "rational act of suicide."
I also believe that we cannot ignore the lessons of history on this
topic. In his 1990 book, By Trust Betrayed, Hugh Gallagher has written
about the organized programs of active euthanasia which resulted in the
victimization of people with disabilities in Nazi Germany, and more re-
cently in the Netherlands. 32 In such environments as Nazi Germany and
31 See generally Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg:
An Essay about Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming
1998).
32 See GALLAGHER, supra note 1.
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the modem Netherlands, people with disabilities are often viewed by
others and by themselves as burdens on society and as burdens on their
family. This, I think, results in an inordinate cultural pressure on people
to exercise their free will, their right, so to speak, to suicide.
We heard earlier about the Hemlock Society and how they are
pitching this same issue. The focus of such groups as the Hemlock Soci-
ety is on the right of persons with disabilities, not terminal folks, but
persons with disabilities to voluntarily end their own lives.
While I understand that there is a desire to separate the money ques-
tions from the meaning questions for purposes of organizing these panels
at this conference, I believe that we must all start with the realization that
questions of money and resources are behind much of the fear and mis-
trust in the disability community around assisted suicide. With the
growth of managed care, the overburdened federal and state Medicaid
budgets, and the increasing efforts on the part of employers to avoid pro-
viding health care benefits for their employees, people with disabilities
have very real concern about a health care system and government that
may determine that their lives are not worth the cost of keeping them
alive. As the cost of health care increases in this country, the pressure to
resort to assisted suicide for a disabled family member will be great, and
is sure to increase if assisted suicide becomes sanctioned and more read-
ily accessible and available.
The choice between life and death must, I think, be left to the indi-
vidual alone. Government has no place substituting its judgment in such
private and personal decisions. However, government, I believe, is re-
sponsible for ensuring that an informed, voluntary, nonbiased, and
noncoerced judgment is made. That delicate balance exists between in-
dividual autonomy and the impact of the prejudice of situational and
clinical depression for people with disabilities. Because disabled people
are subject to this prejudice that devalues their very right to exist, I be-
lieve that often their decisions to commit suicide are not informed or
voluntary. Therefore, a disabled person's request for assistance with sui-
cide on its face should never be immediately acceded to or unquestiona-
bly accepted. The involvement of the third party in assisting suicide is
not only coercive, but dangerous.
The simple fact is that society's response to an individual who ex-
presses a desire to commit suicide should be no different for a disabled
person than for an able-bodied person. Before we consider whether as-
sisted suicide should be a right, we should ask ourselves whether the
underlying reasons for persons with disabilities choosing death are valid
and whether we should first attempt to create the option of a dignified
life for a person with a disability. I think that people with disabilities
deserve that option. Only then will the suicide be requested by a free
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will and the choice not be coerced. Otherwise, there is substantial risk
that the right to assisted suicide will become a duty of assisted suicide.
In closing, let me just say that I think that there is a lot of naivet6
out there on the part of many well-intentioned people in the disability
community with respect to this issue. Drew Batavia is a friend of mine,
and I think Drew Batavia is right. He and I, we are not oppressed. We
are the disabled elite. I am not worried about Ivy League lawyers like
myself and Drew Batavia being oppressed by the health care system. I
am very worried about the great majority of people with disabilities who
are not of our economic status and who are being oppressed by a health
care system.
No individual doctor would make a decision to kill her patient, but
it is very naive to think that a single doctor makes that decision alone. A
decision is increasingly made on the basis of economics. Just look at the
attempts in this country to ration health care. And last, it is very naive to
think that disabled people control their lives in this health care system
with managed care. I think it is simply and sadly naive.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Our third speaker is Dr. Robert Weir. Dr. Weir
comes to us from the University of Iowa College of Medicine where he
serves as the Director of the Program in Biomedical Ethics and has a
professorship in pediatrics and religious studies. Dr. Weir is a recog-
nized expert on a number of ethical issues ranging from genetics, organ
transplantation, issues at the end and the beginning of life, and critical
care medicine. He is the primary author, with the Multidisciplinary Ethi-
cal, Legal and Social Implications Committee, of the paper entitled,
I.R.D. Guidelines for Genetic Research, and the editor of the book enti-
tled, Physician Assisted Suicide: Ethical Positions, Medical Practices
and Public Policy Options.
DR. WEIR: I was asked to speak with you about the concept of
quality of life as that figures into the debates about physician-assisted
suicide.
I am going to begin with a poem and then I am going to give several
quotations to indicate examples of differing quality of life perspectives
that apply to physician-assisted suicide. I am going to discuss some
problems that we have in talking about physician-assisted suicide in the
context of disabilities. I am going to draw some distinctions that might
be helpful as we think about these complex issues. Then I want to pro-
vide a format for thinking, a way that at least I find helpful for thinking
about quality of life issues as they pertain to life and death decisions.
First of all, a poem. This is a well-known poem by Edward Arling-
ton Robinson, an American poet:
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Richard Cory
Whenever Richard Cory went down town,
We people on the pavement looked at him:
He was a gentleman from soul to crown,
Clean favored, and imperially slim.
And he was always quietly arrayed,
And he was always human when he talked;
But still he fluttered pulses when he said,
"Good morning," and he glittered when he walked.
And he was rich-yes, richer than a king-
And admirably schooled in every grace:
In fine, we thought that he was everything
To make us wish that we were in his place.
So on we worked, and waited for the light,
And went without the meat, and cursed the bread;
And Richard Cory, one calm summer night,
Went home and put a bullet through his head.33
It matters a lot in making quality of life judgments whether we are
making quality of life judgments about our own lives or the lives of other
people. In the poem you have an example. We could all recite numerous
similar examples in our own lives in which we have heard about the
suicide of this individual or that individual, and we have been stunned
because we had thought that they had a very good quality of life and
wanted to continue living.
Now, some differing perspectives on physician-assisted suicide that
reflect differing quality of life judgments. This is a quotation from a
1993 court decision in British Columbia involving a woman named Sue
Rodriguez:
Ms. Rodriguez suffers from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(ALS), . . . her life expectancy is between 2 and 14
months, but her condition is rapidly deteriorating. Very
soon she will lose the ability to swallow, speak, walk,
and move her body without assistance. Thereafter, she
will lose the capacity to breathe without a respirator, to
eat without a gastrotomy, and will eventually become
confined to a bed.... She does not wish to die so long
as she still has the capacity to enjoy life. However, by
the time she no longer is able to enjoy life, she will be
physically unable to terminate her life without
assistance.34
33 EDwARD A. ROBINSON, COLLECrED PoEMs 82 (1924).
34 Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 349 (Can. 1993).
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Here is a description of another patient involved in a legal case hav-
ing to do with physician-assisted suicide. This is one of the three pa-
tients involved initially in the case arising in New York that involves
Timothy Quill. This patient is known only as Jane Doe, and she says:
I have a large cancerous tumor which is wrapped around
the right carotid artery in my neck and is collapsing my
esophagus and invading my voice box.... The cancer
has metastasized .... It is not possible for me to reduce
my pain to an acceptable level of comfort and retain an
alert state .... At the point at which I can no longer
endure the pain and suffering associated with my cancer,
I want to have drugs available for the purpose of hasten-
ing my death in a humane and certain manner.35
William Barth is another patient involved in that same New York
case. William Barth says:
In May 1992, I developed a Kaposi's Sarcoma skin le-
sion. This was my first major illness associated with
AIDS .... In September 1993, I was diagnosed with
cytomegalovirus . . .which caused severe diarrhea, fe-
vers, and wasting .... In February 1994, I was diag-
nosed with microsporidiosis, a parasitic infection for
which there is effectively no treatment.36
Then, he adds that he also has severe diarrhea, extreme abdominal pain,
nausea, and concludes by saying, "I understand that there are no cures. I
can no longer endure the pain and suffering. ' 37 Three patients with dif-
ferent medical conditions, all who have decided, at least in part on the
basis of their assessments of their own quality of life, to seek assistance
in committing suicide so that they can end their lives.
Now, in opposition to these are examples of persons who have come
to different kinds of conclusions. Ira Byock, a hospice physician in Mis-
soula, Montana, has a recent book on dying entitled, Dying Well. This
quotation comes from a paper by Dr. Byock, which appeared in my ed-
ited book. Dr. Byock writes that, "care of the dying includes at the mini-
mum the following: the provision of shelter from the elements, the
provision of hygiene, assistance with elimination, the offering of food
and fluid, the keeping of company"-which is his way of talking about
nonabandonment-and what he calls "bearing witness" by recognizing
35 Quill, 80 F.3d at 720.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 721.
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the essential value of each individual, and also "the relief of suffering. ' 38
It is Dr. Byock's view that there are other medical, moral, and legal alter-
natives that are preferable to physician-assisted suicide.
Finally, a quotation from a document that was being handed around
by members of Not Dead Yet in Washington at the time of the Supreme
Court arguments on the cases in January of 1997: "Americans with disa-
bilities don't want your pity or your lethal mercy. We cannot allow eu-
thanasia to become the law of the land. If we hope to stop it, we have
only a few weeks to mobilize an entire nation. '39
So six quite different perspectives, all of them using variations of a
quality of life argument to try to make points about physician-assisted
suicide. I would like to simply point out some problems that we all have,
persons with disabilities as well as able-bodied individuals, when we
think about quality of life judgments in the context of physician-assisted
suicide. One of those problems is that many of us tend to overestimate
the difficulties connected with disabilities because we cannot imagine
being disabled. Many of us tend to undervalue persons with disabilities
by ignoring them, avoiding them, stigmatizing them, or discriminating
against them. As many in this audience know far better than I, there
seem to be many who only respond to persons with disabilities with
either pity or criticism.
One of the problems in this ongoing discussion has to do with phy-
sicians and the rest of us who are inadequately trained to provide appro-
priate care for persons with disabilities. In addition, some physicians
because of their training as well as their own value systems may be in-
clined to give up too quickly when responding to requests for physician
assistance by persons with disabilities. On the other side, some persons
in the disability community may be inclined to criticize physicians and
other persons with disabilities and perhaps criticize them too quickly
when they opt for or argue in favor of physician-assisted suicide.
Now, these are some distinctions that may be helpful in thinking
about physician-assisted suicide and especially about quality of life judg-
ments as they relate to that subject. One obvious distinction is between
my assessment of my quality of life versus my assessment of your qual-
ity of life or, for that matter, your assessment of my quality of life. It is
obvious that it matters a great deal who is doing the assessing of whose
quality of life.
Another distinction about which it is sometimes helpful to remem-
ber is the distinction between a somewhat objective assessment by, per-
38 Ira R. Byock, Physician Assisted Suicide is not an Acceptable Practice for Physicians,
in PHYSiCLAN-ASSISTMD SUICIDE 107, 114 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1997).
39 For similar comments by members of Not Dead Yet, see Hentoff, supra note 8, at
A15.
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haps, a multiple disciplinary group or a committee of quality of life
versus the subjective contentment of the person with that quality of life.
It is certainly entirely possible for many persons to judge that an individ-
ual's quality of life is very low and yet that particular individual will be
quite content with the quality of life he or she has.
Then it's helpful to distinguish between the disabling conditions
that a person has and the person who has those disabling conditions. It is
unfortunately too easy simply to refer to persons with disabilities by
naming the disabling condition the way that some health professionals
refer to patients, not by name, but by the number of their room, or by the
medical condition that they have. It's important to distinguish between
descriptive statements about disability as opposed to evaluative state-
ments about disability. Finally, there is a difference between assessing
the quality of life of an individual and assessing the quality of life of
persons affected by that individual.
During the last decade when there was a great deal of debate in our
country about what should be done with infants born very prematurely
and with serious disabling conditions. It was often very important to try
to isolate what kind of projections we might make about the quality of
life that a baby might have if he or she survived a number of years, and
to put aside, to the extent that we could, the effect that child's life would
predictably have on the quality of life that would be enjoyed by parents
and by siblings of the child.
It's so terribly easy when we talk about quality of life of individuals
to expand it to include persons affected by that quality of life-people
whose quality of life are also affected by that individual. I think it's
helpful to narrow our perspective and try to talk only about the quality of
life of a person who is thinking about continued living or hastening
death, whether the person thinking about this is an individual thinking,
and perhaps acting, in isolation or, perhaps a physician and a patient
having communication with one another about the quality of life that the
patient has at the moment.
So how can we think about quality of life matters as we think about
life-and-death decisions? I find that this particular format is helpful in
thinking about a number of important variables that apply to the quality
of life an individual patient has or might be expected to have in the fu-
ture. I group these variables into two groups. One of them, I refer to as
"objective" variables, and I put the word objective in quotation marks
because these are as objective as medicine can be objective, and there are
four of these. I will not elaborate on them. A lot more could be said
about each one of these.
The first variable that obviously is important is to try to get some
kind of handle on the severity of a patient's medical condition. Fortu-
[Vol. 7:267
CONFERENCE TRANscRn-r
nately physicians have numerous diagnostic tools at hand according to
which they can gain a fairly sophisticated judgment about the severity of
an individual's medical condition compared with all patients, and also
compared with other patients having that particular kind of medical
condition.
A second variable to think about has to do with the reversibility of
this medical condition with medical treatment: what is available for us to
treat it, to cure it, to reverse it. For persons with disabilities, it is often
very important to try to think about what other kinds of options are avail-
able for providing a better quality of life for those individuals.
A third variable that's important in thinking about these kinds of
quality of life judgments at the end of life or possibly at the end of life
has to do with the achievability of important medical goals. There are at
least eight acceptable medical goals in the care of any individual patient.
It's important to try to get a handle on what is the particular medical goal
being sought in an individual case, and what is the likelihood of accom-
plishing that goal. For example, is the goal to relieve the patient's suffer-
ing? Is the goal to prolong the patient's life? What does one do when
these two goals are in conflict in an individual case?
The fourth variable has to do with the presence of serious neurolog-
ical impairments and/or the presence of serious physical disabilities and
how neurological impairments and/or physical disabilities lead into the
assessments of the person's quality of life by that individual.
Then, there are four subjective variables when we think about the
quality of life or continuing life or hastening death. One of those has to
do with the presence of unrelieved pain. One of the things that American
physicians as a group are not very well-trained to do is to assess pain and
to try to treat it effectively.
A second variable that has to do with patient perceptions of quality
of life is the kind of physical suffering the patient may be experiencing
and/or the kind of psychological suffering the patient might be undergo-
ing. So here I have in mind on the physical suffering side: things like
pain, things like adipsia [absence of thirst], diarrhea, constipation. On
the psychological side, things like anxiety, fear, despair, helplessness,
hopelessness.
The third variable on the subjective side has to do with a patient's
perspective on an intolerable life. It's my view that all of us have some
border or some line that we can cross under certain circumstances that
will lead us to conclude that life, as we're presently experiencing it, is
intolerable. Fortunately that threshold is not one that very many of us
pass very often. But I would suspect that almost everybody in this audi-
ence can think of someone, a friend, a relative, who had a number of
problems, ongoing problems in life, and then there was one more prob-
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lem that beset that individual, and at that point life became intolerable.
Then that person decided to opt out by committing suicide or asking for
assistance in committing suicide.
Finally, the bottom line in all of this is trying to determine the best
interest of the patient, trying to determine whether it makes sense to con-
tinue living, or to try to hasten death in some way. The bottom line,
unfortunately, perhaps is subjective, and it has to do with trying to bal-
ance the burdens of continued living, that is, burdens to that person and
compare those with benefits to that person through available medical
treatment.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Our next speaker is Dr. Linda Emanuel. Dr.
Emanuel comes to us today from the American Medical Association
(AMA), where she is the Vice President of the Ethics Standards Division
and the Director of the Institute for Ethics. Prior to joining the AMA,
Dr. Emanuel was the Assistant Director for the Division of Medical Eth-
ics and an Associate Professor of Medical Ethics at Harvard Medical
School. She has published and lectured extensively on clinical ethics
including advance directives, the patient-physician relationship, the defi-
nition of death, and professionalism. She was on the faculty at the Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital in general internal medicine before moving
to Chicago this year.
DR. EMANUEL: We have been assigned the task of talking about
words in this dilemmatic issue. Usually people have associated the
phrases, "compassion in dying," or "aid in dying," almost exclusively
with physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. I would suggest that all
dying people should have aid and all dying people should have compas-
sion. I would attribute this association largely to strong media and advo-
cacy. I want to raise the question: is the problem with society or with the
medical system? If both, then in what proportion?
I am going to share with you some data that is so hot off the press
that I've only seen it for a matter of hours myself.40 The data that I refer
to comes from surveys of just short of a thousand people who were
given less than six months by their physician before they were expected
to die. They are a random sample representative of the nation taken from
physicians' references, oncologists, internists, pulmonologists, and cardi-
ologists, also randomly selected across the nation. We found some inter-
esting things.
By contrast to the high proportion of the people in the famous sup-
port study who were found to be dying in moderate to severe pain, we
found 48 percent, about 10 percent less, but 67 percent had their desired
40 Data on file with Dr. Emanuel.
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level of pain treatment; 21 percent wanted more treatment, but 8 percent
wanted less.
What about personal meaning for those who are dying? Between 62
and 87 percent said that they were fulfilled in that they had someone to
love, someone to confide in, and their personal faith was sustaining them.
What about physician performance? From 83 to 96 percent of these
patients said that their physician knew how to tell bad news well, had
their complete trust, showed them respect, listened to them, provided
clear information, and shared decisions with them.
What about economic hardship? Of the people who we talked to,
between 2 and 9 percent (these are ranges because they're all separate
questions) had to spend down their earnings to be eligible for Medicare/
Medicaid, had to borrow, had to sell property or change their work in
order to pay their bills. So that's 2 to 9 percent. It's bad again, but
nowhere near as bad as we had thought.
Now, here is something that I thought was much worse than we
thought, about the burden of care to the people around the person who is
dying and to the person who is dying. Only 1.5 percent said that they
had a volunteer coming to help them from the community, and 53 per-
cent had no help whatsoever for their nursing care needs at home.
So I would suggest that contrary to our previous assumption, our
failure is at our community level, perhaps our family support level as
well. Indeed, we live in a death denying culture. We have done so since
the dawn of the scientific era. We care about our youthful appearances.
We have face lifts and tummy tucks and hair transplants, and we send
our dying to institutions. We have lost track of the grounding adjustment
to dying that bespeaks a healthy civilized society and a healthy personal
psyche.
Death has been a taboo subject, and we don't know how to talk
about it. So this is an area where doctors can help. We have been mak-
ing attempts to teach physicians how to go through the process of talking
about and planning for a terminal illness with patients. It is a process. It
is not a one time conversation. It is a longitudinal conversation that is
woven in and out of clinical care. There is a core structured deliberation
that needs to take place which ideally should be done around a validated
worksheet with a doctor in the loop somewhere.
It is very important that doctors know how to structure those discus-
sions to help those patients and members of society who do not know
how to have them. In order for doctors to do this, they must be taught
themselves because they are no better at this than other members of
society.
We went so far as to put words into our trainee doctors' mouths.
Exactly how do you raise the subject? Exactly how do you bring the
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proxy or family member in and start building a team? It takes a team to
care for any patient and certainly a dying patient.
I would like to tell you, also, about a project that we will be launch-
ing from the American Medical Association's New Institute for Ethics,
which is called the Compassionate Competent Care Project or CCC. We
gave it that title because we wanted to bring those words back into tradi-
tional caring associations. In that program, we plan over the next two
years to train all practicing physicians, half directly and half indirectly, in
several very important areas. Every single practicing physician needs to
be competent in symptom management-at least competent enough to
know how and when to refer patients when situations are beyond their
expertise. They need to be competent in the recognition and treatment of
psychiatric complications of terminal illness, depression most impor-
tantly, but also hallucinations and so forth. They need to be competent in
the communication planning and decision-making area that I refer to and
in the team-building area.
Toward that end, we have also put forward the idea of guidelines
somewhat different in philosophy from Dr. Weir's. We have some base-
line assumptions that physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are not
medical procedures. Physicians should not provide them and many who
consider physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia are in need of care or
assistance which, once provided, makes these considerations simply dis-
appear. While physicians should not provide assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia-and may need to say so frankly-patients or family members
who consider or request it should not be abandoned. Rather, they should
be provided with care that will meet as many needs as possible for pa-
tient autonomy, dignity, and compassionate care of symptoms.
This is an illustration of a clinical approach. It's very familiar to
those of you who are in clinical care and I am going to highlight it piece
by piece. It allows a physician to have some sense as to how to go
forward when they are faced with a patient who is asking for assisted
suicide and euthanasia. To just say "no" is not enough.
Assess the depression, of course. First of all, it's not widely enough
known that amongst patients who request assisted suicide, many are de-
pressed. We're not talking about rational suicide. We're talking about
depressed patients. Of course, if they are depressed, there is treatment
for depression. If they are not depressed, then assess their competence.
That's another important screen. Then, engage in the structured delibera-
tion that I have been describing and attempting to talk to physicians
about.
Now, during structured deliberations, it has become eminently clear
to me from my own clinical practice that people who have been request-
ing assisted suicide drop the request for a number of reasons. They real-
[Vol. 7:267
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ize that they are not going to be abandoned. They realize that there are
ways of handling the burden put on those they love so it won't be exces-
sive. They realize that their version of dignity can be obtained without
recourse to assisted suicide. They realize that other things that they fear,
such as pain, can be managed even if it is necessary to go to something
as extreme as terminal sedation. The intent to end life is just not
necessary.
In this context, let me remind you that very few of those who re-
quest assisted suicide are in intractable pain.41 This is not a dominant
reason for requesting assisted suicide. The dominant reasons are depres-
sion, fear of abandonment, fear of burdening loved ones, fear of being
undignified, and fear of, but not actual pain. The reasons are all in the
psychosocial realm. They are not in the realm of physical suffering.
Step four of the same general approach notes that the real issue is to
find and address directly the root causes of the request for assisted sui-
cide. Is it physical suffering? We know how to handle that. Is it psy-
chological suffering? We know how to handle that, too. Is it suffering in
the social context? Well, we do not know how to handle .that, but we
should, and it is not a reason to start in with assisted suicide. Is it spiri-
tual suffering? We can ask for help there too.
The guidelines have an additional set of counterparts-guidelines
for addressing family members when they are interested in assisted sui-
cide for the patient, a very worrisome possibility. Unfortunately, we
have data from this group published in the Archives in Internal Medicine
last year that show that family members are more interested in assisted
suicide for the patient than the patient.42
We have another worrisome problem, and that is when a physician
leans toward physician-assisted suicide, because physicians sometimes
do. Physicians need to know how to call for help when that happens, and
they need to know that they have gone beyond a limit which should not
be surpassed. Unfortunately, we have data which suggests that this is a
very real threat. Russell Portenoy and his colleagues found that when
they interviewed physicians, nurses, and social workers, those who favor
assisted suicide had three troubling characteristics in common: Their
personality profiles were less empathic, their technical skills in symptom
management were lower, and they spent less time with their patients.43
41 See Back et al., Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State, 275
JAMA 919, 924 (1996).
42 See Harold G. Koenig et al., Attitudes of Elderly Patients and Their Families Toward
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 156 ARcHnmV oF INTERNAL MED. 2240 (1996).
43 See Russell K. Portenoy et al., Determinants of the Willingness to Endorse Assisted
Suicide: A Survey of Physicians, Nurses, and Social Workers, 38 PSYCHOSOMATICS 277
(1997).
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So we have many reasons to worry about physician-assisted suicide
being terribly misused. We also have very strong reasons to try and re-
claim the words "compassion" and "aid in dying" for traditional, hospice,
and palliative care in our care of dying patients.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Our next speaker is Dr. Thomas Strax, a phy-
siatrist, who comes to us from New Jersey where he serves as Professor
and Chairman of the Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilita-
tion at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey at the
Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, and is the Medical Director for
the JFK/Johnson Rehabilitation Institute. Tom is a former President of
the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine and is the current
Vice President of the International Rehabilitation Medicine Association.
In addition to his professional experience, Tom has had significant
personal experience growing up with a disability. Tom shared with me
that he was the first child with a developmental disability to be main-
streamed in New York. During his residency at New York University,
he developed a program for college-bound disabled adults. He has been
the recipient of a number of awards, including the New Jersey Gover-
nor's Award and the New York University Alumni award.
DR. STRAX: I have been asked to talk about function instead of
disease in defining quality of life. On my way to a speaking engagement
in Sydney, Australia, in 1995, I stopped in New Zealand. The headline
of the largest paper in New Zealand had a story about a man whose
crutch was stolen. For three days the newspaper continued the story of
the stolen crutch and its implications. Ironically, towards the back of the
same newspaper, there appeared an article which throughout the rest of
the world had been front page headlines!
I was born fifty-five years ago. The obstetrician that delivered me
told my parents that they were young and healthy, and that I was better
off dead. At that time, the world was at war. One of the leaders in that
war felt that those with developmental disabilities, those with retardation
and mental problems, should be put to death.
A great philosopher has said, "We see what we're looking for, we
look for what we know, and what we don't know, we never see." As-
sumption is far more important than diagnosis. In another story, a one
hundred-year-old man goes to see his physician and says, "Doctor, my
right knee hurts." "What do you expect," the physician replies; "you are
one hundred years old." "But my left knee is also a hundred years old,
and it does not hurt," retorted the old man.
I'd like to address the issue of function. The World Health Organi-
zation has three terms which I think are worth redefining: impairment,
disability, and handicap. Impairment is something that you might lack:
physical, mental, emotional. A disability is something that you cannot
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do because of your damage. Handicap, on the other hand, has the social
implication. It is something that you have to do that you cannot do
because of your impairment or disability.
In some cases, an impairment such as being deaf, gives you an ad-
vantage if you are going to be a sandblaster. Somebody who wears a
foot or ankle prosthesis can do fine if she is a CEO of a company, but
will be handicapped if she is a patrolman on the beat.
I have cerebral palsy. It took a court, someone that owed my father
a favor, an ex-Naval officer who was president of a union to get me into
school. I can spend hours telling you stories of discrimination and
triumph.
However, I'd like to describe two stories that have to do with atti-
tude. I bought my first house and had just returned from the store when a
car pulled into my next-door neighbor's driveway. I ran out and held my
hand out, and said, "Hi, I'm your new neighbor." The driver said, "The
new people live over there." I said, "Right, I'm your new neighbor." He
said, "You must be mistaken; my new neighbor is a doctor." I said,
"Yes, I'm a physician."
Often when I walk through the halls of my own institution, patients
and families will come up to me and tell me how well I am doing.
Sometimes they ask me what room I am in, and, of course, I will give
them a room number!
Each of you has a chance of spending ten years of your life with
some kind of disability. In the blink of an eye, you can be like me.
Think of it. How will the health care and legal community view you?
Will they view you for standard of care or diagnoses, or will they con-
sider your functional status in considering the quality of your life?
Quality of life, and with it a reason to go on, depends upon what
you can do and enjoy doing, how you feel about it, as well as those who
are available to share your life, dreams, and aspirations. The technical,
medical, and social resources that are available help preserve and in-
crease your function, and this is extremely important in defining the
quality of life.44
I believe in the right of the individual to self-determination, provid-
ing the individual is competent both mentally and emotionally and also
has been given a clear and comprehensive view of what is available to
improve the quality of his or her life. Function is far more important
than diagnosis.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Our next speaker is Reverend Monsignor Ken-
neth Velo. Monsignor Velo is a Chicago native who has spent most of
44 At this point in the discussion, Dr. Strax played a video that showed, in eight-year
segments, the life of a child born without any extremities.
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his professional career in Chicago working first as a pastor, and then
since 1981 with the Archdiocese of Chicago. Most recently, he served as
the executive assistant to the late beloved Joseph Cardinal Bernardin. In
1994, he was appointed President of the Catholic Church Extension Soci-
ety by Pope John Paul H and continues in this capacity today.
MONSIGNOR VELO: I come not as a moral theologian, not as an
ethicist, but really as a Roman Catholic priest, yes, the primary caregiver
of the late Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, and most of all, as a fellow human
being on the journey of life.
In preparing my remarks, I was reminded these last few days of the
beautiful passage from the Old Testament Book of Ecclesiastes:
There is a point of time for everything. A time for every
matter under the heavens. A time to be born and a time
to die. A time to plant and a time to uproot the plant. A
time to kill and a time to heal. A time to tear down and a
time to build. A time to weep and a time to laugh .... 45
Allow me for a few moments to share a story. A second-year high
school student began a study of biology. He was walking through the
woods. He saw a cocoon on the side of a path. Very excited, he picked
up the cocoon. He took out his pocketknife and slit the cocoon open. As
the light peered into the cocoon, he saw life. He saw a butterfly. He
thought he would be helpful. He slit the rest of the cocoon open, opened
it up to allow the butterfly to get out. The butterfly began to move,
flutter its wings. But soon after, it fell, fell to the ground and died.
Shortly thereafter he was in class with his teacher and a number of
classmates, and he told them the story of how he was excited to find that
cocoon and how he slit it open and saw life and then opened it up all the
more so that the butterfly could be released. It was then that he found
out what had happened. His teacher, and his classmates, told him that,
really, it is in the cocoon that the butterfly stretches its wings and gains
strength. As it moves, the cocoon opens; as it releases itself in the strug-
gle, it finds life. It finds its ability to fly. That is the way it was meant to
be.
Now, you may wonder, why would I mention a story like that at a
conference like this. I have two reasons. First of all, together we're
slitting open the cocoon just a little bit-the cocoon of life itself all
around us-to look at an important issue, to shed light on it, to see that
there is life, and to learn from it. Secondly, it's in the struggles of life
that we find energy and new life. It is part of the Christian tradition. As
the Lord said, we must die ourselves to gain new life. As part of the
45 Ecclesiastes 3:1-4 (King James).
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Christian tradition we understand that his suffering and the cross brought
us life.
I would like to tell you about two Josephs: One you don't know;
one perhaps you do know. The one Joseph is a nephew, the husband of
one of my nieces. At the age of thirty-six, this last March, he succumbed
to multiple sclerosis and its complications. For four years he was in a
wheelchair. He couldn't pick up things; he noticed all sorts of problems.
It got worse eventually. He was confined to a wheelchair, couldn't do
anything for himself. His wife and three children cared for him.
Now, most people around him saw him get weaker and weaker and
weaker. Through the eyes of faith, we also saw him get stronger and
stronger and stronger as he dealt with the issues, as he confronted the
problems, as he continued to do what he could to be an example for his
children. As he suffered and struggled, there was new life.
The other Joseph you may know about. He was one of the greatest
religious leaders of our times. He died on November 14, 1996. He
served as Archbishop of Chicago from 1982 to 1996, fourteen years.
Throughout his life, and throughout his priesthood, he addressed life is-
sues. These past years were a struggle. First of all, through a terrible
allegation, he was accused of having abused someone, a minor. He stood
up to that, dealt with that. Through that struggle, there was strength;
there was life, new life.4 6
But in June of 1995, in a doctor's office in Chicago's south side, he
learned that he had pancreatic cancer. The doctors said it would most
likely be his life-ending event. Although the tumor was removed,
although there was no sign of cancer for a number of months, in August
of 1996 in a doctor's office after an MRI, he was told that the cancer had
returned. He faced the ultimate event quietly and simply, but in the
course of those last months spoke to us about life and about dying and
about new life. Through the struggle, there was life. Through the strug-
gle, there was new life.
He was disabled during this time. Because of radiation and chemo-
therapy, there was osteoporosis and other problems. He couldn't walk as
he wanted. He couldn't maintain the normal course of activity. But it
was during this time, too, that he also helped us as he addressed a signifi-
cant life issue: physician-assisted suicide. He had prepared to address
the United States Supreme Court Justices because he knew that they
would be handling this particular matter: The question of the right of the
people to end life. He wrote on November 7th this letter:
46 For a more detailed discussion of Cardinal Bernardin's life, see THE GiFr OF PEACE,
JOSEPH CARDmrAL BERmARDwI (1997).
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Dear Honorable Justices: I am at the end of my
earthly life. There is much that I have contemplated
these last few months of my illness. But as one who is
dying, I have especially come to appreciate the gift of
life. I know from my own experiences that patients
often face difficult and deeply personal decisions about
their care. However, I also know that even a person who
decides to forego treatment does not necessarily choose
death, rather, he chooses life without the burden of dis-
proportionate medical intervention.
In this case, the court faces one of the most impor-
tant issues of our times. Physician-assisted suicide is de-
cidedly a public matter. It is not simply a decision made
between a patient and a physician. Because life affects
every person it is of primary public concern. Our legal
and ethical tradition has held consistently that suicide,
assisted suicide, and euthanasia are wrong because they
involve a direct attack on innocent human life. And it is
a matter of public policy because it involves a violation
of a fundamental human good. There can be no such
thing as a right to assisted suicide because there can be
no legal or moral order which tolerates the killing of in-
nocent human life, even if the agent of death is self-ad-
ministered. Creating a new right to assisted suicide will
endanger society and send a false signal that a less than
perfect life is not worth living.
Physician-assisted suicide also directly affects the
physician-patient relationship and through that, the
wider role of physicians in society. As has been noted
by others, it introduces a deep ambiguity into the very
definition of medical care if care comes to involve kill-
ing. Beyond the physician, a move to assisted suicide
and perhaps beyond that to euthanasia creates social am-
biguity about the law. In civilized society, the law exists
to protect life. When it begins to legitimate the taking of
life as a policy, one has a right to ask what lies ahead for
our life together as a society.
In order to protect patients from abuse and to pro-
tect society in a dangerous erosion in its commitment to
preserving human life, I urge the court not to create any
right to assisted suicide. With cordial good wishes, I re-
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main sincerely yours, Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Arch-
bishop of Chicago.47
Those next seven days after he wrote this letter, the Cardinal re-
mained in the cocoon of life, struggling. There was weakness. There
was great discomfort. He was at peace, but, yes, at times late at night or
in the early morning before the sun came up, there was anxiety. "What
will these next few days, these next few weeks be like?" he asked.
On November 14th, at 1:30 in the morning, he was called home. It
was through the struggle that there was life, through the struggle that
there was much more new life.
When we talk about physician-assisted suicide, some people may
think we're talking about a right. Let's stand up because what we really
are speaking about is taking life before its time, exterminating the oppor-
tunity for growth, strength and new life, even in the struggle. Thank you.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Next on our distinguished panel, we have Dr.
Jesus Rodriguez. Dr. Rodriguez is a board certified chaplain and the
Director of the Educational Programs for the AIDS Pastoral Care Net-
work here in Chicago. Dr. Rodriguez has worked with and counseled
IV positive and AIDS patients for the last five years, four years at the
Cook County Hospital HIV Primary Care Center, and the last year in his
current position at the AIDS Pastoral Care Network.
DR. RODRIGUEZ: Folks, I want to say up-front that I fully respect
a person's decision to choose assisted suicide. I also want to say that I
do respect a doctor who, on an individual basis, is willing to facilitate
that process for a patient. However, when it comes to legalizing and
furthermore institutionalizing the practice, I must say that I have a great,
great many reservations with this issue. My concerns are not with the act
of suicide itself. My concerns are at a deeper level. My concern, and
thus my subject, is with the ethos and the locus of the decision-making
process as we as a nation move forward in considering legalizing and
institutionalizing assisted suicide.
Now, before explaining how the ethos and the locus interface with
the decision-making process of legalizing and institutionalizing the prac-
tice of physician-assisted suicide, I would like to "plant an idea" at this
point as a way of making in advance the point of my entire discussion.
To do that, I would like to invite you to please take part with me in a
brief exercise.
47 For further discussion of Cardinal Bernardin's letter, see Assisted Suicide: Hearing of
the Health and Environment Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee, FED. NEws
SERvICE, Mar. 6, 1997 (statement of Cardinal Bernard Law quoting Cardinal Bemardin) [here-
inafter Assisted Suicide Hearing].
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Take a good look at the persons sitting to your left and to your right
side. Are you done? This is the end of the exercise. Please remember
the people at whom you just looked. In a few moments you will find a
practical application of this exercise.
Let me now address the issue of the ethos and the locus of the deci-
sion-making process in the discussion of legalizing and institutionalizing
the practice of physician-assisted suicide by framing these concepts
within a cultural perspective.
DEFINITION OF TERMs:
By ethos I mean the guiding beliefs and influence mass society has
over a given issue. I like to say "mass society" rather than "the white
folks," because the term is less racially motivated; it sounds better, and
these days, is a more politically correct term, right? By locus or locus of
control I mean "where the power to decide" resides. I will address sepa-
rately each of these concepts.
Ethos. Three questions in three different areas: societal, cultural,
and institutional levels, can be asked to discover the ethos of this issue:
1. From the societal perspective, the question here is who or which
sector of our society is talking about patient assisted suicide. Once you
ask yourself that question, then you can begin to answer the stated issue
regarding who or which sector of our society is engaged in the issue.
I ask you: Having seen a minute ago at your left and at your right,
ask yourself, are the African-Americans, Latinos, and other minorities of
our nation talking about physician-assisted suicide?
By now you know that we can count (in this audience) the number
of Hispanics, Latinos, or African Americans we have here on two hands.
Now, why is it that representatives of these minorities are not here to-
day? I really don't think they just missed the bus or the train coming
here, and I am sure that with the organizational capacity present in this
institution to promote events of this nature they were sent a promotional
invitation. I think indeed that their absence in this auditorium speaks
"loudly" about where they may be with regards to this issue. I suppose
that with their absence they are saying, "we're not engaged in this
discussion."
My point is that the ethos in our "public" discussion is very narrow.
It is certainly not representative of the African-American community. It
is clearly not representative of the Latino/Hispanic community. Neither
is it representative of the Filipinos, Native Americans and other
minorities.
So we need to be clear about who is talking and who is not. It is the
mass society who is talking about this issue. In that sense, the question
then is whether we as minorities are part of this ethos or not. Having
[Vol. 7:267
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asked that question then, the obvious next question is whether physician-
assisted suicide is another issue that is going to be imposed on others by
the guiding beliefs and values of the mass society? That's a very power-
ful ethical question that we as a nation need to consider because if the
minorities are not part of the informing ethos, then I have to assume that
physician-assisted suicide is being forced upon us and that potentially
serious consequences may follow.
2. From the cultural perspective the question is about values. We
can ask, how the beliefs and guiding values of the mass society are in-
forming this process? And, to whose cultural values are we listening?
Which values of the mass society are informing this process? Are we
considering the cultural values of African Americans, Latinos, Native
Americans and other minorities?
Obviously all these are questions of a political nature and power, a
very important concern to the mass society. And so after asking these
questions then, the answer is clear. The composition of this audience
suggests to me that we are not listening to the mix of cultural values of
the African-American, Hispanic and many other minorities that "make"
this nation.
People, like me, who work in hospital environments know that on
the question of minorities' values regarding euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide, minorities respond differently than persons from the
mass society. My experience is that when the doctor approaches a mi-
nority person and asks them the question regarding their preferences,
"wellness or longevity," or "to feel better or to live longer," often minori-
ties tend to answer that they would rather live longer. However, in the
same situations, usually the folks from mass society will prefer weliness.
In minority communities people talk about living longer regardless of
what it takes.48
Our communities have been so used to living with the minimum in
many contexts that while quality of life is an important issue for us, we
have learned to live with little, and we are more concerned about living
longer than living better. We are people with survival mentalities, and
survivalists are concerned with issues of continuation, endurance, resist-
ance and subsistence, not termination, eradication and discontinuation.
If you want to see this survival mentality attitude exemplified, take
the train down to Humboldt Park or go to the South Side of Chicago.
You see Latino people trying to live longer, although they have little, and
the African-American folks living with little but seeking to live longer.
48 See Lori Montgomery, Blacks Fearful of White Doctors Pulling the Plug, WAsH. FimE
PRmss, Feb. 26, 1997.
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As a theologian I ask, "What is the relationship between God and
power in a capitalistic society that makes the mass society think about
issues of suicide from a control perspective rather than from other coping
or surviving perspectives?" This is a matter that needs further attention
and I suggest that you read a study conducted between 1977 and 1988 by
the National Opinion Research Center with 8,384 Americans to discern
their attitudes towards euthanasia.49 The findings suggest that those
highly educated, politically liberal respondents with a less religious self-
perception are most likely to accept active euthanasia or suicide for ter-
minally ill patients.50 As you may be aware, categories such as "highly
educated and politically liberal," usually do not speak of minorities'
socio-economic reality. I want you to know that right now as we speak
many illegal immigrants in this nation are afraid that the beliefs and
guiding values that inform the immigration laws of the land, and that
have defined their inability to exist in this nation, are the same values
that may influence the legislative processes around the physician-assisted
suicide issue.
I was in a support group a couple days ago, and while trying to
explore their opinions on the physician-assisted suicide issues, I posed to
them the question. An illegal immigrant framed the issue of values in
this way: "Suddenly, if it's not legal to be in this nation, it is not legal to
live in this nation. " That's how he translated physician-assisted sui-
cide-in fear of the values that inform this debate.
3. From the institutional perspective, the question is which sector
of our medical institutions are talking about patient assisted suicide. Is
this an issue informed by legitimate concerns of our medical institutions?
Has this issue been financed by health insurance companies?
In the HIV community, there is a deep fear, I don't want to say
paranoia, but it's a legitimate fear that suddenly now we're talking about
this issue in the context of a very strange marriage that looks to us more
like "adultery" than a marriage between health care systems, insurance
companies and managed care. The timing of this whole notion of physi-
cian-assisted suicide is suspicious and my patients are asking what is
behind this alliance.
I suppose that they have legitimate reasons to ask this question be-
cause it is only recently that we have learned that all those studies that
we have heard about for generations and generations that said nicotine
has nothing to do with health and that tobacco did not cause cancer were
financed by whom?
AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Tobacco companies.
49 See David C. Caddell & Rae R. Newton, Euthanasia: American Attitudes Toward the
Physician's Role, 40 Soc. ScL MED. 1671, 1671-81.
50 See id.
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DR. RODRIGUEZ: Say it in unison. By the tobacco companies.
So my patients who are really struggling with health systems and
insurance companies who have denied them all their medical needs, are
puzzled by this strange marriage. Is this marriage financing the whole
discussion about physician-assisted suicide? Maybe as with the tobacco
companies, we will have to wait forty or fifty years to find the answer to
that question.
A patient of mine related to me this concern in the best way possi-
ble. She said:
I wonder how insurance companies are financing this
discussion and manipulating at some very subtle level
the minds of Americans. It seems that with the new pro-
tease inhibitors we're too costly to keep alive, and they
are trying to buy our conscience by using the language
of merciful killing, dying with dignity, and so on and so
forth. You know Rev., that can be a very politically-
oriented language, too. Some one can say to you: Oh,
you know, be gentle to yourself, die with dignity and in
the peace. Yeah! I translate that as: You cost us half a
million dollars. So think about dying with dignity in the
presence of the Lord, and we will get you a nice Chap-
lain that will help you die with dignity and pray with
you.
Locus or locus of control. Again, by locus I mean where the power
to decide resides. When we are talking about physician-assisted suicide,
are we asking or expecting doctors to decide for us, or are we keeping
the decision-making process in the hands of the person who is choosing
this option? If so, are we going to have in place a number of safeguards
that will ensure the appropriate practice of .physician-assisted suicide?
Because we have not been there yet, we need then to look into how
others who have legalized this practice have succeeded in what we are
just beginning to do here. Obviously, the places to visit are the countries
in which the practice has been established. In this case the Netherlands
is the best candidate.
Tony Snow from The Detroit News comments that when doctors in
Holland were authorized to euthanize the sick, they designed strict stan-
dards to ensure that the locus of control in deciding physician-assisted
suicide was "prudent" and ethical.51 However, "protocols" came into
tension with issues of human indifference. The protocols' red tape was
bypassed within six years. Consequently, the Dutch medical community
51 Tony Snow, Comment: Assisted Suicide a High-risk Issue, DBr. NEws, Oct. 8, 1996,
at A7.
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had abandoned most of its so-called "guidelines." "A stunning study in
1990 discovered that doctors that year killed 2,300 patients who wanted
to die, assisted in the suicides of 400 others-and did away with more
than 1,000 others who never asked for fatal 'help.' "52 Victims included
everybody from handicapped children who had stomach aches to acci-
dent victims who doctors figured would be too expensive to keep alive
and, therefore, were given lethal injections without the knowledge or
consent of family members. Moreover, it was found that the right to die
curdled into something far more appalling. What began as an attempt to
humanize suffering and death with compassion evolved from benevo-
lence in understanding the needs of the ill, to being annoyed by the sick,
to finally, impatience for the sufferers. It is suggested that for a period of
time, most requests for euthanasia in the Netherlands came not from pa-
tients, but from their families. Mr. Snow adds that if a parent seems less
vibrant and more expensive than they did in the good old days, Dutch
kids get on the phone and summon the angels of death.53
A 1995 study of the practice of physician-assisted suicide and eu-
thanasia in the Netherlands suggests that during the past two decades, the
Netherlands has moved to a point of giving legal sanction for euthanasia
not only of the terminally ill, but also of those who are chronically ill and
those with psychological distress.5 4 The study also suggests that while
involuntary euthanasia is not legally sanctioned by the Dutch, almost 20
percent of the physicians' cases of euthanasia reported in this 1995 study
involved ending a life without the patient's consent. 55
Clearly in both cases what started as a dignifying process to allevi-
ate the suffering of the ill ended in abuse of power. Why? Because the
locus of control shifted from the patient to the doctors and others who
decided to euthanize the patient disregarding the established guidelines
and protocols. So, what makes us think that something similar will not
occur in the USA? In fact, a parallel situation has already happened here
in the States. Just consider what happened at Tuskegee. The locus of
control was not in the hands of the patient, but in the hands of doctors
who responded to an institutionalized attitude towards black men and
used them as guinea-pigs in syphilis studies.
Because I am skeptical about how our society will handle these is-
sues, I will respect in specific cases a person's right to choose assisted
52 Id.
53 See id.
54 See Herbert Hendin et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Nether-
lands: Lessons From the Dutch, 277 JAMA 1720, 1720 (1997).
55 See id. at 1721; Joseph P. Shapiro, Euthanasia's Home: What the Dutch Experience
Can Teach Americans about Assisted Suicide, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 13, 1997, at 24.
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suicide. I can also respect a doctor's choice of facilitating that process,
but I am not ready to consider institutionalizing the practice.
Essentially, and finally, the issue of the locus of control is very im-
portant for me. Will you place the decision-making power, externally or
internally? Is it mine, the doctor's or someone else's decision to make?
Where will the power reside?
I do not think that American society is so foolish as to place this
decision-making power in the hands of doctors, or medical institutions or
insurance companies alone. History is filled with bad scenarios when
you place such power in someone else's hands.
I respect a person's decision in this process. But because I am a
Hispanic person, and because I work with patients whom the medical and
health insurance systems manipulate and oppress, I can endorse the con-
cept of physician-assisted suicide, but I have to be very suspicious of it at
the same time.
So, because I am not clear of where the ethos and the locus of this
whole discussion are, I have a problem of dislocation. I want to respect
the right of any person to choose the way that he or she wants to live and
die, and I want to respect the doctors who will choose to follow that
decision. If somebody calls me to facilitate the process as a clergy, I will
be present. I will be there, but I cannot vote in favor of legalizing this
process, not now.
There is an issue of equality that has not been resolved. There are
too many voices that we are not listening to. There are too many people
that are, politically speaking, handicapped. They are, politically speak-
ing, disabled, and they are not in the process. I think that this is a good
time to test democracy, and I think this is a good time also to test our
political ability to dialogue as a nation. But it cannot happen until we
listen to those who do not have a voice in this "debate."
A final recommendation. Since the minorities of this nation, their
values and their worries on this issues are not listened to, I will suggest,
and can only dream, that funding be allocated to replicate this event for
the African-American, Hispanic, Native American and other minorities
in their native languages, according to their needs. Only then we will be
able to speak and decide as a nation, and mirror eloquently to the rest of
the world, how to be inclusive in a process of this nature. Suicide is a
terminal decision and it needs to be considered seriously.
Thank you for your attention.
DR. STRAX: I have one comment. The largest minority group in
this country is women. If men had babies, if they had breast cancer, we
would see different kinds of health care.
The second largest group in this country is the physically disabled.
If all men were disabled, we would see a different kind of health care.
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What has happened is the masses have been able to keep the minorities
separated. If the minorities recognized that they were minorities and got
together, we would have a different health care system. Go and do it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question for Dr. Weir. I am a
disability rights activist.
My question for you is, in evaluating quality of life, what about the
fact that physicians routinely undervalue the quality of life of the dis-
abled and the fact that almost everyone I know in the disability rights
movement has been told, including myself, at one time or another that we
wouldn't live through the night; that we were dying. I was supposed to
die when I was five weeks old. That was more than twenty years ago, I
promise. So, how do you evaluate those kinds of errors or, you know,
realities, into the equation that you are putting together for quality of
life?
DR. WEIR: I think it's clearly true that physicians and, for that
matter, other health professionals in this country are largely not well-
trained to assess pain. I also indicated earlier that physicians and other
health professionals and a lot of us have not been adequately trained to
understand persons within the disability community, and life with disa-
bilities that we may not have.
The format that I proposed was one that would apply to a patient, an
individual doing his or her own quality of life assessment. If that's done
in conversation with the physician, it would seem to be clearly in that
person's best interest, if that patient is disabled, to factor in this expecta-
tion that the physician may undervalue the kind of life that is being
assessed.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I work for the National Council on Disa-
bilities. I do not have a medical background at all, but I wanted to ask
Dr. Emanuel a question. Do you think physicians should be trained in
pain management?
DR. EMANUEL: Pain management was in the first category of ar-
eas I mentioned, in which doctors are to be trained on how to manage
symptoms of the dying. There are some twenty very common symptoms
of the dying. Pain is most certainly one of them.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I represent Psychiatric Survivors. I have
heard the word depressive used here all afternoon as though it's a medi-
cal condition. I want to state my strong objection to pathologizing what I
would consider normal feelings, especially for people who have debilitat-
ing, and maybe life-threatening conditions. I also happen to live with
cancer. If you had cancer, you would be depressed, too.
I'd also point out to you that what happens to people when they do
try to commit suicide can be worse than death itself: to be locked up, to
be strapped down, to be thrown into rooms without clothing, to be
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drugged with drugs that are very dangerous and debilitating, and to be
labeled for the rest of your life for the crime of having thought about
killing yourself. For me that is worse than death. I don't know if you
have thought through these things, but many of us have. They are very
important issues and we are the largest group of disabled people in
America.
DR. STRAX: In fact, your issue and the one on pain go together.
Many people who have major changes in their ability go through major
depression requiring treatment.5 6 Most medical schools do not really
push this issue. Even in many rehabilitation centers, you will not find
patients being treated properly for major depression.
Same with pain. There is a society called the American Pain Soci-
ety, which is a professional society, that had as its mandate this year to
develop clinical pathways in dealing with pain, both acute pain and can-
cer pain and post-operative pain and chronic pain from cancer and back
pain, et cetera. I believe this is an undertreated area, and only through
the demands of huge numbers of people in need of these kinds of treat-
ments will we get professionals to change.
It is true that the HIMOs do not wish to deal with this because an
HMO is interested only in limited situations. They don't want people
who are going to continue needing something because that means they
will lose money. There is a need for a national program to look at health
care, to look at disincentives, to look at the way people are discredited,
and maybe to look at the fact that we don't pay for it in the healthcare
system. All we're doing is cost shifting. That means if you don't take
the thirty-five year old woman who is disabled with two kids and treat
her, then all you do is put her in a wheelchair. If you do treat her, or treat
the cancer patient, they will go back to work.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: With all due respect, sir, you totally
missed my point. The point is not to diagnose people who have feelings
with diseases like depression for which the treatment is forced medica-
tion. Because that's all HMO and managed care companies will pay for.
They don't pay for this wonderful minister to come sit and talk to me.
Oh, no. They will pay for Prozac. You all laugh because every single
person in this room knows someone who is taking Prozac. You all laugh
because you all know somebody who took Valium in the '80s and Ritalin
in the '90s for kids and Miltown in the '50s.
You know, this is pathologizing the human condition. Sadness,
feeling bad because you are sick; these are normal responses to normal
phenomena, which do not need psychiatric interventions, especially un-
wanted psychiatric interventions.
56 See Assisted Suicide Hearing, supra note 47 (statement of Lonnie R. Bristow, M.D.).
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DR. EMANUEL: You are absolutely correct, that to pathologize
normal feelings would be wrong and is wrong when it happens, and un-
fortunately it does happen too much. There are very clear clinical ways
to distinguish between situation appropriate sadness-even to the point
of feeling that life is not worth living-and depression, which disorders
one's thinking.
However, it's worth going through some of the cases that were well
described by Dr. Weir and asking whether those really are situations in
which death is preferable or assisted suicide is necessary. Because we
have considerable-extensive, actually-ability to control the way in
which we die now, we have the ability to withhold and withdraw life-
sustaining intervention, and to provide aggressive comfort care. We're
just beginning to teach physicians exactly how to provide that.
So although I completely agree with you that we should not
pathologize what is normal, don't let us make that an endorsement of
assisted suicide.
DR. MORREIM: Tying together several of the things that have
been said today, I want to observe that much of my research and writing
concerns the changing economics of health care. As Deep Throat said to
Woodward and Bernstein during the Watergate era, "follow the money."
In this case, careful analysis of the financial structures behind our health
care institutions can reveal remarkable insights into our ethical
challenges.
Reverend Rodriguez very correctly pointed out that minority people
in this society are not ordinarily frightened of getting too much medical
care. Rather, health care money has been directed heavily toward the
"mass society," rather than toward minority groups. I like that expres-
sion. The money has been so lavish that people in my community have
actually been subjected in many instances to excessive health care, to the
point where Caucasians sometimes must beg, plead, and find a lawyer to
say "please back off' from unwanted interventions. Numerous court
cases, from Karen Quinlan and on, feature well-insured Caucasians who
have been subjected to interventions they did not want-forcibly in a
number of cases-and who were compelled to resort to litigation to se-
cure their autonomy and freedom. Not surprisingly, the excess medical
care is where the generous funding has been, and it is there where people
have had to fight against excess. Reciprocally, people who receive too
little care are fighting the battle for more care, not for less.
I'll turn now to the question of why physicians seem to underdiag-
nose some of the problems that disabled persons face, and why they
don't always seem to understand important facets of a disabled person's
quality of life. Here, too, "follow the money." In medicine, research
hitherto has not focused very much on ordinary people with ordinary
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problems, or on quality of life issues. Thus, we have not spent huge
sums on how to make a person with, say, rheumatoid arthritis, maximally
functional.
There are some fairly clear economic reasons for this. Until re-
cently health care companies, particularly manufacturers of drugs and
devices, made money by developing exciting new toys. After all, as
soon as a new drug or device is approved, it is almost automatically paid
for by insurers. That is, government approval of a new intervention as
"safe and effective" almost automatically renders it mandatory, i.e.,
"medically necessary," so that health care insurers must cover it. And
so, of course, the economic incentives have favored development of ex-
otic new technologies, rather than any steady study of mundane maladies
or quality of life concerns-despite the importance of these to so many
people. If a company can develop and sell a fancy new device or a costly
new drug that will dramatically save lives and earn you money, they will
be significantly rewarded.
Similarly, physicians had incentives to focus on exotic conditions.
They are much more likely to receive promotions, lab space, research
grants, and public recognition for dramatic life-saving discoveries than
for cheerful care of more ordinary problems. Likewise, we have focused
our medical education on the "interesting" or exotic case, not on making
life easier for the vast number of people in this country who are strug-
gling daily against a chronic illness or a disability.
Only recently has it become highly important for health plans to
learn how to save money, how to do better by doing less. Hence, only
recently do we see a plethora of "outcomes studies," clinical guidelines,
and other measures directed at the care of ordinary patients with routine
problems. Medicine is now being rewritten, from the ground up. It will
take time, but the money we "follow" is now heading towards people
whose needs have traditionally been underrecognized.
From this point I'll move to psychiatric care, which was the focus of
the ques$ion from the audience. For a number of years, very large
amounts of money went into mental health care, particularly the inpatient
care of psychiatric patients. So long as that was true, a wide array of life
problems and emotional difficulties were identified as mental illnesses or
disorders-they were "pathologized," as the audience member pointed
out, and many psychiatric hospitals and other providers made vast prof-
its. Now, however, funding for mental health care is considerably
scarcer. It should come as no surprise that as the money shrinks, we are
witnessing some reduction, not just in the array of diagnostic categories,
but more importantly in the frequency, with which mental health diagno-
ses are being ascribed. If excessive pathologizing and unwanted inter-
ventions were once the problem, it is my prediction that this will subside,
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giving way to the opposite problem: insufficient care for people with
very real disturbances who could benefit from the help.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Thank you.
Ill. SESSION THREE: KEYNOTE: KEVORKIAN AS
FOLK HERO
MR. VAN ZANDT: I'd like to welcome everyone. My name is
David Van Zandt. I'm the Dean of Northwestern Law School. I am
extremely proud to be one of the hosts for this event. I think it's an
extremely important event, an event that plays very well to some of the
strengths here at Northwestern University, namely, the medical school,
the Rehabilitation Institute, and the law school. I'm extremely proud to
be part of this event.
I would also like to thank both Kristi Kirschner and Leigh Bienen
who played a lead role in organizing this conference. I think they put
together a fantastic conference. Finally, I'd like to thank all of you for
coming. I have met some of you. I look forward to meeting more of
you. Again, I just want to welcome you and hope you have an exciting
day. Thank you.
DR. KIRSCHNER: Good morning and welcome back. We have a
very exciting day today. We're going to start this morning with Mr.
Joseph Shapiro. Joseph Shapiro comes to us from Washington, D.C.,
where he is a Senior Writer for U.S. News & World Report, covering
social policy issues for the magazine since 1987.
Joe Shapiro won the Alicia Patterson Foundation Fellowship in
1990 which he used to study the history of the civil rights movement as it
relates to people with disabilities. He is the author of the award-winning
book No Pity: People With Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights
Movement. I personally think this book should be required reading for
all health care providers.
Joe currently holds the Kaiser Media Fellowship in Health and is
using the fellowship to study long-term care and aging issues. Joe has
written for U.S. News & World Report on a wide variety of social policy
issues, including physician-assisted suicide, gay and lesbian issues,
churches and charity, teen pregnancy, and the Kennedy assassination.
He has received numerous awards for his writing, including honors
from the Society of Professional Journalists at Harvard University's Joan
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy and the
Unity Award for coverage of civil rights and the disadvantaged.
Of course, I can't properly introduce Joe without mentioning our
common bond as alumni of our beloved liberal arts college in Northfield,
Minnesota, Carleton College. It is my privilege and pleasure to intro-
duce to you Mr. Joseph Shapiro.
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MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you very much.
In Washington D.C. where I live, we put great faith in pollsters and
polling. President Clinton, the first Democratic president since Franklin
Roosevelt to be elected to two consecutive terms, has an approval rate
right now at about 54 percent.57 The Speaker of the House, Newt Ging-
rich fares a lot worse. His approval rating now is 25 percent.5 8 So 24
percent for Newt Gingrich; 54 percent for President Clinton. There's
also polling on Jack Kevorkian. His approval rating is higher than the
rating for Bill Clinton, twice as high as that for Newt Gingrich. Between
52 and 58 percent of Americans say they approve of Jack Kevorkian
assisting people who want to commit suicide;59 and about three-quarters
of Americans, whether they approve of Kevorkian's methods or not, say
they believe that a terminally ill person should have a right to assisted
suicide.60
So whatever you think about Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich, I
think there's something very striking about the fact that more people ap-
prove of Jack Kevorkian because Kevorkian, as Americans know, is a
bizarre man on the fringe of medical practice. This is a man who got the
nickname Dr. Death because as a medical resident he pushed around a
bulky mounted camera so that he could take photographs of people's
eyes at the moment of death. He would tape open the eyelids of a dying
patient and then focus his camera. This is a man who experimented with
transfusing blood from corpses into live patients. One friend of Kevor-
kian's got such a bad case of hepatitis from cadaver blood that his eye-
balls turned orange.
You may have read a few weeks ago that Dr. Kevorkian had a show
of his art that opened in Michigan. He is a talented artist, but his paint-
ings are gruesome and disturbing. He has pictures of severed heads and
cannibalism and maggot-filled corpses. On some of the paintings on the
picture frames he has used his own blood to stain the picture frames.
And his take on Christmas is less than cheery. In one painting you see
Santa Claus's boot coming down a chimney, but this is not exactly the
traditional image of jolly Saint Nick because in this one Santa's boot is
57 See President Clinton's Job Performance, GALLup ORGAnZATION (visited March 18,
1998) <http://www.lib.uconn.edu/RoperCenter/clintgal.htm> (listing President Clinton's ap-
proval ratings from January, 1993 to the present).
58 See Chris Black, Stalled House is Grousing: Gingrich Faces GOP Ire on Return From
Recess, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 1997, at Al.
59 See ROPER CENTER AT UNIVERSITY OF CoNNEcIcuT, Dec. 15, 1993 (52 percent ap-
proved of Kevorkian helping terminally ill people who want to commit suicide); ROPER
CEN= AT UNWERsrrY OF CoNcncuT, Dec. 6, 1993 (58 percent approved of Kevorkian
helping terminally ill people who want to commit suicide).
60 See Judy Foreman, Assisted Suicide Seen Gaining Favor, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1,
1996, at 3; Jeff Hooten, The Fatal Attraction of Dr. Death: Kevorkian's Bizarre Ideas Gain
Frightening Support, REcoRD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sep. 23, 1996, at A15.
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crushing a baby lying in the fireplace. So, this is a weird man on the
fringe of medical practice, and yet Americans seem to approve of what
he does. We give him celebrity, and we give him honor.
At the end of last year, pollsters for Newsweek magazine asked
Americans to vote for the newsmaker of the year in the sciences. Kevor-
kian was chosen as the man who in 1996 had done the most for the
sciences. He beat out David Ho, America's leading AIDS researcher.
Now, Time magazine put David Ho on the cover as the person of the
year; but when the choice was put to the American people, Newsweek
magazine readers by a wide margin picked the inventor of the suicide
machine over the man who was finding cures for AIDS.
61
In Michigan, Kevorkian's home state, people seem particularly tol-
erant: 73 percent of the people in Michigan think that prosecutors should
quit taking Kevorkian to trial. 62 Last year, voters defeated the prosecutor
who has brought Kevorkian to trial, and they voted in another prosecutor
who said that he wouldn't bother.
Just this week you may have seen Larry King's column in USA
Today in which he had one of those epigrams of his that seem to come
out of nowhere: he praised Dr. Kevorkian and said, "Nobody agrees with
what Jack Kevorkian does except the majority of the U.S.A." 63 That's
actually sort of a nice way of summing it up. Nobody agrees with what
Jack Kevorkian does except the majority of the U.S.A. Jack Kevorkian,
this overzealous pathologist, makes us uneasy, and yet Americans think
he's doing a good thing. We cheer him on despite this quirky, messianic
campaign of his. We cheer him on, yet we make fun of him at the same
time.
He's become a staple of David Letterman's Top Ten List. In Letter-
man's top ten promotional slogans for the suicide machine, he had things
like: "Just try it once, that's all we ask." Or, "If you're not dead in thirty
minutes, it's free." So what's going on that this bizarre man gets a
higher approval rating than the President of the United States or the
Speaker of the House? Now, this may speak to our cynicism about poli-
ticians, but that's a matter for another conference.
There are a couple reasons for Kevorkian's popularity. Reason one:
modem dying has become something that we fear. Doctors now possess
the technology to forestall death almost indefinitely. Too often patients'
wishes get ignored. Living wills and advanced directives are ignored.
Doctors are reluctant to talk to patients about dying. Too often the termi-
nally ill suffer needless pain; they're kept alive with no hope; and fami-
61 The 100 Newsmakers of 1996, NEWSWEEK, Winter 1997 (Special edition), at 4.
62 Michigan Poll Backs Kevorkian, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 30, 1996,
at A9.
63 Larry King, Larry King's People, USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 1997, at 2D.
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lies hold a harrowing deathwatch. So Kevorkian becomes a hero because
he promises control over this nightmarish vision of death.
Reason two: we're becoming a chronic disease nation. About one
in four Americans have a chronic medical condition. It actually depends
on which survey you're looking at, what you're counting as a chronic
medical condition; but the important point is that most of us will die of
chronic progressive illness, usually one that gradually worsens over the
years before we die.
That's very different from the way of death just a few generations
ago. At the turn of the century the average life span was about forty-nine
years.64 At the beginning of the century, people died from accidents;
women died in childbirth and infant mortality rates were high. Now,
most of us will live to an old age. The median life span is now about
seventy-six years old.65 Two researchers recently estimated that half the
people in the United States, half the people in this room, would not be
alive today if the mortality rates were still at 1900 levels.66 Antibiotics
and medical advances have allowed us to live to old age, but as we live
longer, our bodies wear out, our arteries clog, our sight, our vision, our
hearing diminishes. I've seen one number that about half the people
eighty-five and older have Alzheimer's or some form of dementia. The
eighty-five-year-plus population is the fastest growing age cohort in our
country.67
Just look at nursing homes. It's very different than it was a genera-
tion ago. There are different estimates, but between 50 percent and
maybe 60 percent of people who live in nursing homes now have some
form of dementia.68 So we have become a chronic disease nation, and it
scares us. It scares us because we know that as the life span expands, so
does our chance of living with chronic illness and disability. As people
in this auditorium know, we live in a society that is afraid of aging and
very afraid of disability.
By the way, baby boomers are the most skittish about aging. One
poll recently showed three out of four boomers think that they look
younger than their age.6 9 Statistically it's not possible, but eight out of
ten boomers think that their faces look younger than the faces of other
64 See Brad Edmondson, The Facts of Death, Am. DEMOGRAPMCS, Apr. 1997, at 47.
65 See Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg and Quill Amicus Briefs: Verbatim Argu-
ments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 5 (1997).
66 See Diane Crispell, Lucky to be Alive, AM. DEMOGRAPmCS, Apr. 1997, at 25 (discuss-
ing research of Kevin M. White and Samuel H. Preston).
67 See Mary Leonard, Boomers Try to Stop Time at 50, Many Deal with Aging by Seek-
ing to Redefine it, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 1997, at El.
68 See Pearl S. German et al., The Role of Mental Morbidity in the Nursing Home Experi-
ence, 32 GERONTOLOGIST 152, 156, 158 (1992).
69 See Tamara Henry & Karen S. Peterson, Academic Standards Agency to be OK'd,
USA TODAY, July 16, 1996, at D8.
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people their age.70 So you can imagine how boomers feel about chronic
illnesses and disabilities and the things that go along with aging.
Assisted suicide advocates talk about offering assistance to the ter-
minally ill, but two-thirds of the people whom Jack Kevorkian has
helped die were not terminally ill. Instead, they had chronic conditions.
They had things like Multiple Sclerosis, Alzheimer's and spinal cord in-
juries. According to a recent survey, at least seventeen of the forty-seven
people he has helped to die could have lived indefinitely, and in thirteen
cases the people had no complaints of pain whatsoever.71
So I want to talk a little bit today about the myths about physician-
assisted suicide, public myths, media myths, what they are, why those
myths exist, and if they are myths, then what is the reality. So let me
identify four public and media myths about assisted suicide. Myth
number one, I think, is the legend of the heroic individual. By this I'm
referring to the notion of the terminally ill person being seen as some-
body who is making a deliberate choice in seeking assisted suicide; and
in doing so she or he is seen as taking a courageous and a heroic action to
control dying. This is an American archetype, not just a journalistic one.
This is the American hero, the American individual making sense out of
the lawlessness, out of the wilderness of death; the American, the rugged
individual, standing up for himself, standing up for what's right, standing
up for freedom and the civil rights of others, standing up against a cold
and uncaring medical system, and taking on what is most fearsome to
others.
So Kevorkian casts himself as one of these heroes on the edge of the
law, but correcting an unjust and corrupt medical system, and Americans
are inclined to agree. There's this belief we have in that kind of individ-
ual. Journalists play into this notion. We play into it in the way we
present right-to-die patients. So let's talk a little bit about why that myth
exists and how journalists and the public miss the reality.
First, the journalist is a witness. We tell stories; we look for stories
that are moving, stories that are compelling. We depend on case studies.
Jack Kevorkian understands this. He understands the need of journalists
to bear witness, to see what they portray, particularly television or news
magazines which depend very much on images, pictures.
That's one reason why Jack Kevorkian tapes; he videotapes the peo-
ple who come to him asking for death. He will tape them carefully or
passionately explaining why they have come to him, why they feel their
lives are not worth living, why they want this extraordinary act of as-
sisted suicide. The first trial that Kevorkian faced was for his role in
70 See id.
71 See Dr. Death's Chronology, UNITED PRESS INT'L, May 14, 1996; The Kevorkian
Files, NEWSDAY, Sep. 8, 1996, at A49.
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assisting a thirty year-old man named Thomas Hyde who had ALS-Lou
Gehrig's disease. Just before the trial, Kevorkian released tapes of Hyde
to some filmmakers, and it led to an extraordinary moment on the PBS
documentary program Frontline.
Here was Thomas Hyde, this man that we had seen in pictures, rug-
gedly handsome, athletic, an all-American hero. Now he was gaunt and
paralyzed. He was barely able to speak; and he choked out his words
very slowly on the videotape. He said, "I want to end it. I want to die."
There was something epic about Thomas Hyde's story. Here was
this young man and now he had ALS, this horrible disease. Thomas
Hyde, we learned, liked to work outdoors; liked to work with his hands.
He was a construction worker; a landscaper. He enjoyed rock climbing,
hiking, and camping. Then one day at work he has trouble holding onto
his hammer, he starts losing his balance, he falls off his motorcycle. The
disease progresses quickly. He can't lift his infant daughter. Within a
year he lost the ability to walk. He lost the ability to speak clearly, and
he knew he faced a difficult death. Even in death, Thomas Hyde turned
out to be Jack Kevorkian's strongest witness because at the trial they
played this videotape of Thomas Hyde requesting death, and several ju-
rors wept openly in the courtroom. There was no sign in the videotape
that Thomas Hyde was being coerced. There was no sign that he was
asking for something he really didn't want. He said he had given the
matter careful thought and that he wanted to die.
What is more mysterious than the act of killing oneself?. Suicide is
considered a sin, a crime, a sickness; and now here was somebody claim-
ing it as his right. Thomas Hyde was cast as taking this heroic stand
against death. But there was something less than heroic in the way he
died: on a mattress in the back of Jack Kevorkian's rusty Volkswagen
van parked in an alley behind Kevorkian's apartment. At the trial,
Kevorkian played into these public views about heroes who defy the law.
Kevorkian got on the stand, and he compared himself to Ghandi, willing
to go to jail to win freedom for others. Kevorkian's lawyer drew paral-
lels between Kevorkian and the heroes of the civil rights movement. He
drew parallels between the prosecution of Kevorkian and the persecution
of Jews, Catholics and gypsies in Nazi Germany. But mostly Kevorkian
and his lawyer talked about Thomas Hyde and his right to the death of
his choice; and these arguments resonated with the jury. Kevorkian was
very quickly acquitted. One juror said, "I believe Dr. Kevorkian is doing
the right thing, but he's not necessarily going about it the right way."
There's King's epigram again: "Nobody agrees with what Jack Kevor-
kian does, except the majority of the U.S.A."72
72 King, supra note 63, at 2D.
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So the myth is that we've got these heroic individuals fighting so
that all of us can control death, fighting for the right of all of us to choose
how we die. That plays into these very celebrated American models of
American individualism, and it plays into journalism's need to witness
compelling stories.
So what's the reality? Well, I think it's very different. Thomas
Hyde was an exception. He wasn't a model. What got lost at Kevor-
kian's trial was the rarity of Thomas Hyde's choice. Dr. John Bach
teaches at the University of New Jersey Medical School, and he studied
people like Thomas Hyde. He studied people with the most debilitating
and frightening disabilities. Dr. Bach did a study of eighty-nine people
with ALS, the same disease as Thomas Hyde's, but Dr. Bach talked to
people whose ALS was even more advanced than Thomas Hyde's. He
talked to people who were already using a respirator. Of the eighty-nine
people with advanced Lou Gehrig's disease surveyed by Dr. Bach, only
two out of those eighty-nine said that they regretted being alive, only two
out of eighty-nine said they regretted being on that respirator.73
So exceptional cases like Thomas Hyde's end up spreading miscon-
ceptions that people with chronic conditions and disabilities want sui-
cide. These case studies that we love as journalists and we love as
readers, spread the misconceptions that the desire for death is logical and
it's usual and that, therefore, the most compassionate thing that society
can do is to provide people like Thomas Hyde with a way to end their
lives.
Now, Dr. Bach conducted another fascinating study. He found that
doctors almost always underestimate their patient's desire to live. In the
second study, Dr. Bach surveyed six-hundred adults with advanced neu-
romuscular conditions that required them to use a ventilator. All the six-
hundred respondents were people on ventilators. He asked them whether
they were satisfied with their life as a whole. Then he went to the doc-
tors and nurses who worked with these six-hundred adults on ventilators
and asked them: what would you predict these six-hundred patients said
about whether they were satisfied with their life as a whole? The results
were surprising, and they fly in the face of this idea of the heroic individ-
ual facing disability and wanting death, the image of assisted suicide
that's portrayed by Kevorkian and a compliant press. In Bach's survey,
82 percent of the severely disabled people said, "Yes, we're satisfied
with our life as a whole."74 That is 82 percent. But only 24 percent of
the doctors and nurses guessed or predicted such positive answers.7 5
73 See Joesph P. Shapiro & David Bowermaster, Death on Trial: The Case of Dr. Kevor-
kian Obscures Critical Issues - and Dangers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Apr. 25, 1994, at 35.
74 Id.
75 See id.
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Here's what Dr. Bach concluded. He told me: "Doctors assume that
because they wouldn't want to be disabled themselves, their patients
wouldn't want to be disabled, and that therefore their patients are better
off dying." But Dr. Bach added, "Patients almost never feel that way
themselves." It's often assumed that it's the elderly and the disabled
who clamor for assisted suicide; but if you look closely at the polling, it
turns out it's the young and the healthy who support this. One Harvard
study showed that 79 percent of people age eighteen to thirty-four be-
lieve a physician should be allowed to give lethal injections to the termi-
nally ill, but only 53 percent of older Americans agree. 76 As Dr.
Rodriguez noted yesterday, the right to die is a matter of civil rights for
white affluent people. He said that the poor and minorities worry more
about not getting access to health care.
So when journalists present compelling case studies like the story of
Thomas Hyde, we often fall into the stereotype that to be severely dis-
abled is a fate worse than death. Journalists reflect the reality of our own
fears rather than the true wishes of people who face chronic illness or
even a difficult death.
Myth number two: We fear that death is inevitably painful and inev-
itably undignified. What's the image of the dying process that we get in
the press and in the popular media, television shows and movies? Well,
either you get shot by some crazed gunman or you die a natural death,
which frequently means being hooked up to some beeping, wheezing
life-support machine. It means being kept alive by a machine for months
on end in the intensive care unit of some cold and sterile hospital. Why
does this myth exist? Well, partly it's because medicine today can and
sometimes does needlessly forestall natural death. It exists because some
people do die in pain. But most do not die in pain; that so many do is a
reflection of poor medical practice.
One survey of patients with metastatic cancer found that of those
that had pain, 42 percent were undermedicated. 77 There are many rea-
sons that doctors fail to control pain. They are not taught how to use
drugs effectively. They fear falsely that they're going to turn their pa-
tients into drug addicts. Or they fear falsely that they will knock them
into drug-induced stupors. Or they fear that their use of pain control
medicine will get them in trouble with the law.
Much of the journalism about the rare people who seek assisted sui-
cide depicts these people as being in a race against pain; it depicts them
as being in a race against an undignified death. The most recent case
was the story of a man named Noel David Earley, another younger man,
76 See id. at 39.
77 See Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying?, 267
JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992).
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forty-seven years old, with Lou Gehrig's disease. His death became a
public spectacle. He invited ABC's Nightline and other reporters to
watch him die. The first newspaper story about Noel Earley's plan car-
ried this headline: Fatally Ill Man Wants Freedom to Choose Death.78
This first story in Earley's hometown newspaper in Providence,
Rhode Island started out predictably. It started by talking about the pro-
gression of his ALS, how he first noticed something was wrong when he
tried to stand on tiptoes to get a book from a bookshelf and couldn't
stand on his toes. The story then went on to talk about how he lost the
ability to play the piano and how he knew that soon he would have
trouble moving. Let me just quote a bit of the story:
Through it all, his maverick mind will remain alert.
Now Earley, 47, wants to make his choice: He wants to
choose the moment and method of his death. He wants
to avoid the last stages of his disease, the drooling, the
indignity, the total dependence. He wants, at a certain
point in the coming months, to kill himself with a doc-
tor's help. 79
So again, the story of Noel David Earley gets told in these epic propor-
tions. Dying man has a simple request: He wants the freedom to control
his death. He wants a death free of pain. He wants a death that's free of
the indignity of disability.
Now, a couple of things made this tale a little different than the way
it was depicted. First of all, Earley didn't really need a right to suicide.
Like many people who insist on assistance in dying, they do find willing
medical professionals, doctors, nurses, and others, who privately help
them die. In this case, an unnamed medical professional had provided
Noel Earley with a needle, syringe, and drugs. A second thing that made
this case different from the way it was portrayed, is that Earley never
exercised his right to die. Perhaps it can be argued that having the lethal
drugs by his bedside gave him some peace of mind, but Earley died
peacefully in his sleep.
So we hold this belief that death is inevitably painful and undigni-
fied, and this belief persists in part because of advances in technology
and in part because of the failures of doctors to provide adequate pain
control. It exists partly because of the way that journalists and the popu-
lar media depict death. But once again, the reality is very different.
Most people spend the bulk of their final days in their own home in the
company of friends and family. I'm referring to a study that was done of
78 Felice J. Freyer, Fatally Ill Man Wants Freedom to Choose Death, PROVIDENCE SUN-
DAY J., Mar. 3, 1996, at Al.
79 Id.
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older people dying in Connecticut. About one-third died at home, and
almost half were transferred to a hospital or a hospice shortly before
dying. Nine out of ten saw their family, friends, relatives within the last
three days of their life. Most died fully aware of their surroundings;
most died without pain; more than half died peacefully in their sleep.80
In most cases, their health did not decline until close to the end of
their lives; more than half were in good or excellent health a year before
their death; about one quarter were in good physical condition in the
month before their death; 61 percent had no pain the day before they
died; 52 percent could breathe freely the day before they died; and 69
percent needed no medication the day before they died; 62 percent were
upbeat, not depressed in the last month of life.81
So when journalists write about dying as something inevitably pain-
ful and undignified, once again, we're speaking more to our own fears
than to reality. The problem with such writing about death is that we end
up arguing the wrong point. There's a danger when public attention be-
comes so focused on whether there should be a right to socially-assisted
dying. There's a danger that we end up debating whether we should help
people commit suicide when what we really ought to be discussing is
how do we take the physical pain, the emotional suffering, and the finan-
cial ruin out of dying. There's a danger that in our rush to establish a
right to assisted suicide, we overlook or we underfund or we stall these
important first solutions: providing better access to health care, develop-
ing good hospice and home care, and understanding aggressive pain
control.
Public policy ends up getting driven by a handful of compelling and
extreme cases. We have policy by case study, some extreme compelling
cases of sick people, people perhaps who are depressed declaring that
they choose death. Instead we should make policy based on the more
common cases that speak to more universal needs.
Myth number three: Seeking death is a rational choice. Now, this
fits in again with our image of the heroic individual choosing death. We
think, "I wouldn't want Lou Gehrig's disease," or "I wouldn't want to
have Alzheimer's disease," or "I wouldn't want to live in a nursing
home"; so we assume that somebody who is facing disability or illness
who wants to die therefore is making a rational choice.
One of the first criminal charges, by the way, against Jack Kevor-
kian was dropped. The Detroit trial judge felt that it made sense that
Donald O'Keefe, a seventy-three year old man with terminal bone can-
cer, would want assistance in dying. The judge termed O'Keefe's ac-
80 See William Booth, Most Elderly Go Gently, WASH. POST, July 22, 1991, at 43.
81 See id.
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tions rational, and he ruled that the state law banning assisted suicide was
too broad. Journalists, judges, and the public assume that when someone
is disabled or terminally ill, and they say they want to die, that a rational
decision is being made. But that's usually not the case. In fact, some-
times it takes a person with a disability to see that someone who is asking
for assistance in dying is often depressed.
Historian Paul Longmore has pointed out things about Elizabeth
Bouvia's case that journalists miss.82 She was one of the first cases of a
disabled person seeking a right to die. This was a woman with cerebral
palsy. Hundreds of thousands of people live with cerebral palsy and live
good lives, but she said that it was too much for her and that she wanted
to die. Now, Paul Longmore points out that her marriage had broken up.
She was financially troubled. She had been forced to withdraw from
graduate school. A judge said she should be helped to die, given what he
called her helpless condition.83
But Bouvia was far from being helpless. She was far from being
this helpless woman that is described by the court. As Longmore noted,
Bouvia was "a woman who operated a power wheelchair and was on her
way to a master's degree and a career in social work. This [was] a wo-
man who married, made love with her husband and planned to become a
mother." 84 This was a woman who still could and might do all those
things if she had been given appropriate psychiatric and medical treat-
ment. Instead she was given a right to die.
Do you know what happened to Elizabeth Bouvia? She apparently
never got the psychiatric and medical treatment that she could have used.
She's still alive. She never exercised that right to die. She has spent the
years since 1983, most of them, apparently miserable living in a dark-
ened hospital room.
Now, journalists are not trained psychiatrists; but often reporters
when writing about people who say they want to die, turn up details that
I think suggest depression. Like Bouvia, Noel David Early had been
judged competent. He had been judged rational by mental health profes-
sionals. He said, "I'm not depressed," and he said, "Depressed people
should not seek to die." But was he depressed? I don't know. I couldn't
tell; but I always wondered about this man who seemed to have very
little support as he lay dying. His parents were dead. He had one
brother, but they were estranged. He was divorced. He had no children.
Many of you may know that for me a quadriplegic named Larry
McAfee did a lot to change and influence my thinking on these issues.
82 See Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Good Prejudice, 3
IssuEs L. & MED. 141 (1987).
83 See id. at 156.
84 Id. at 158.
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In my book No Pity, I wrote a chapter about Larry McAfee. 85 He was a
thirty-eight year old man who had gone to court in Georgia to get the
right to die. He wanted to turn off his respirator. The court said that was
a rational decision. But once McAfee got that right, like Elizabeth
Bouvia, he chose not to commit suicide. When I went to visit him, I
found somebody who was very different from this right-to-die champion
as he had been depicted in the media. Yes, Larry McAfee was very
angry about the loss of control over his body, but he was more angry
about the loss of control over his life.
As I wrote in No Pity, McAfee had been moved from one nursing
home to another with no say over where he lived or how he was
treated-no say in when he got up, when he got dressed, when he was
fed, when he was shaved, when he went to bed, or what he could do.
Against his wishes he was sent to nursing homes far away in Ohio and
Alabama, far away from the little support he had, far away from his fam-
ily, far away from his friends. When he went to court seeking the right
to die, he had been stuck in the intensive care unit of a public hospital.
He was in stable health. He didn't belong in a hospital, much less in the
intensive care unit. In the hospital he had no privacy. He didn't even
have a television. Nurses rarely got him out of bed.
When McAfee's parents brought his electric wheelchair to the hos-
pital, the staff locked it in the closet. They just let him stay in bed for
eight months. He was at the hospital because no nursing home would
take this quadriplegic who needed more care than some of the ambula-
tory elderly patients they had. He was at the hospital because Georgia
had no program to provide personal assistance service and independent
living to younger people with disabilities. That's why Larry McAfee
went to court for the right to die. He'd been in the intensive care unit for
so many months, dying was the last thing that he thought he could con-
trol. But we didn't look at those social reasons as to why Larry McAfee
wanted to die. We saw a man, a quadriplegic, very unhappy with his life,
and we said, "That's a rational decision. We'll give you the right to die."
Larry McAfee told me that he understood the stigma of being dis-
abled. Larry was from rural Georgia. He was known as Bubba to his
family. He was not a particularly introspective man, but he understood
the stigma of disability. He told me, "You're looked upon as a second-
rate citizen. People say, 'You're using my taxes. You don't deserve to
be here. You should hurry up and leave."' 86 The judge, journalists, and
the public saw a man who was making a rational choice to die. They
wouldn't want his life so they figured he had a right to end it.
85 JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No Prry: PEOPLE WITH DisA~mrrms FORGING A NEw CxVIL
RIGHTs MovExmENrr 258-88 (1993).
86 l. at 262.
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The reality is that people are almost always depressed when they
ask for assisted suicide. Psychiatrist Yeates Conwell has studied this is-
sue. He says, "there is rarely, if ever," such a thing as a rational sui-
cide.87 In one study of forty-four end-stage cancer patients, Conwell
found that only three had seriously considered suicide.88 Each of them,
he said, had clear clinical depression.89
What makes an expanded right to suicide so dangerous is that physi-
cians rarely spot depression in patients, particularly in older ones. The
depression of the elderly or the terminally ill is not like the psychotic
disorders that are more common in younger people who commit suicide.
Depression in the elderly is among the most treatable kinds of depres-
sion, something that's often easily treatable with therapy and drugs.
Also contrary to conventional wisdom, the terminally ill are only slightly
more likely to commit suicide than those without terminal illnesses.
Americans with terminal illnesses make up about 1.4 percent of the pop-
ulation and only 2 to 4 percent of suicides.90
Myth number four: We believe that safeguards will prevent a right
to die from being abused. There's an important difference between
Kevorkian's vision of assisted suicide and the vision in the two federal
court cases that are currently before the Supreme Court. Lawyers in
.those cases argue that assisted suicide should be a right only for terminal
patients in the final stages of their illness. They argue that we can put
safeguards on assisted suicide.
Most Americans have this great faith in the law and great faith in
rationality. We agree that there should be some built in safeguards, for
example, that people who get assistance should be truly terminally ill or
their choice must be demonstrably free. But there is experience to make
us question the reliability of safeguards. Larry McAfee's case showed
that courts often confuse terminal illness and disability. Here was a man
who had been using a respirator for five years. He was in stable medical
condition. Yet the court ruled that to turn off the respirator was the
equivalent of declining medical treatment.91
In this country efforts to create state statutes have made a distinc-
tion. They allow a doctor to provide a lethal prescription, but they leave
it to the person to take it. That's attractive because it's really one step
removed from euthanasia. The terminally ill person, not the doctor, con-
trols the moment of death. But control is often ambiguous.
87 See Shapiro & Bowermaster, supra note 73, at 38.
88 See Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die, 15 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1101 (1991).
89 See id.
90 See Flora Johnson Skelly, Don't Dismiss Depression, Physicians Say, AM. MED.
NEws, Sept. 7, 1992, at 28.
91 See SHAPIRO, supra note 85, at 275.
19981
Consider what happened to Lisa Belkin, a reporter for the New York
Times Magazine. She wanted to write about assisted suicide, and she
hooked up with a group called Compassion in Dying and the Reverend
Ralph Mero. This is a group that advocates for assisted suicide and
members of Compassion in Dying counsel people who are terminally ill
and who want assisted suicide. They try to get doctors involved, and
they will support that person who wants to die. They will help them
through the assisted suicide process.
So through Compassion in Dying, the New York Times reporter is
put in touch with a woman named Louise Jay. She is a woman* with a
degenerative neurological disease, and she wants assistance in dying.
The reporter flies out to Seattle, interviews Louise, and then returns
home.
A few days later she gets a phone call from Mero who asked her to
go back to Seattle as soon as possible. Mero said that Louise was "rap-
idly deteriorating" and that "her physician [felt that] if she [didn't] act
before the weekend, her window of opportunity [would] slam shut."92
So the reporter flies back across country: suddenly she finds herself in
the uncomfortable position of dangerously skirting the line between be-
ing an observer and being a participant in assisted suicide. The reporter
finds that it's not so clear that Louise really wants.to die. The reporter
sees her in her bedroom, and just blurts out: "Your doctor feels that if
you don't act by this weekend you may not be able to .... -93
It turns out this was news to Louise. There's what the reporter de-
scribes as a wrenching silence. Louise shoots her mother a sharp look,
and it's clear that Louise had not been told of the doctor's diagnosis.
Louise suddenly looks very frightened, and her mother tries to calm her
and says, "It's O.K. to be afraid."' 94 At this point Louise says, "I'm not
afraid. I just feel as if everyone is ganging up on me, pressuring me." 95
Now, Dr. Herbert Hendin, a psychiatrist and an expert on suicide,
read this account and concluded: "Like many people in extreme situa-
tions, Louise expressed two conflicting wishes-to live and to die-but
only for death did she find support.... Although those around her acted
in the name of supporting Louise's autonomy, Louise began to lose her
own death."'96 Eventually Louise decided to go ahead with the suicide;
and with her mother and friend, and members of Compassion in Dying
present, she took a fatal mixture of sleeping pills. But something went
92 Lisa Belldn, There's No Simple Suicide, N.Y. Tnvms, Nov. 14, 1993, § 6 (Magazine),
at 48.
93 Id..
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 HERBERT HENDIN, SEUCED By DEATi: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND TE DuTCH CuRe
39 (1997).
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wrong, and after six and a half hours she had not died. Later Mero sug-
gested that he was ready, if necessary, to use a plastic bag to suffocate
her. Now, that would have made those present, witnesses not to a volun-
tary suicide, but to a homicide, to euthanasia.
The reality is that this was a death that was not easily controlled. It
wasn't easily controlled for the reporter; it wasn't easily controlled for
the dying woman. It's good to talk about safeguards, but we have to
remember that they are rarely a sure thing when it comes to something
like death. Death cannot be controlled.
Belkin wrote what I think is maybe the best account that I've seen
about an assisted suicide, and it showed that there are no perfectly ra-
tional decisions. In fact, there's a real danger that a right to die becomes
a duty to die. As they tried to support Louise, her doctor, her family, her
friends seemed to be suddenly encouraging her, encouraging her fears
that she had become a burden. Louise felt lonely; she felt useless, and
she was ashamed of her disability.
I've indicated that I would say a little bit about the Dutch practice of
assisted suicide and what we can learn from the Dutch. For starters we
can talk about the Dutch experience with safeguards. Euthanasia techni-
cally remains illegal in the Netherlands. However, since the 1970s
there's been this informal agreement between physicians and the govern-
ment. Doctors who follow certain procedures will not be prosecuted.
The guidelines were drawn up by doctors, and then they were endorsed
by the government.
The patient must be mentally competent; the patient must request
death voluntarily and repeatedly; the patient must be suffering without
the prospect of relief, and the doctor must consult with another physi-
cian. But what started out as a right for people with terminal illness grew
into something very different. Euthanasia is now allowed for people who
face mental anguish. One doctor provided suicide pills to a twenty-five
year old woman who had a history of anorexia. 97 In another case, a
woman grieving over the death of her two sons was given lethal
medicine by a psychiatrist. 98 Because the Netherlands is the only coun-
try in the world that allows euthanasia, Holland is seen as a model for
good or for evil by both sides of the debate over physician-assisted
suicide.
Jack Kevorkian went to the Netherlands; Dr. Timothy Quill, who
was the lead plaintiff in one of the cases before the Supreme Court, went
to the Netherlands. Kevorkian and Quill found a compassionate model
97 See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 27.
98 See Suicide, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, Before the House Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on the Constitution, May 1, 1996, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Prepared Statement of
Herbert Hendin, M.D.).
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for death where patients can speak honestly about dying to supportive
physicians.
But critics have gone, too, and they've found something different,
critics like Dr. Hendin, who is the author of a new book, Seduced By
Death. He describes Dutch practice as irreversibly tumbling down a
morally slippery slope, where involuntary killing goes unpunished and
the courts grant ever-dubious acceptance to whom can be euthanized.99
So I went to the Netherlands in December to talk to the advocates-
not to the opponents, but to the advocates of this system. I wanted to ask
them, "Do you think this is something that we should do in the United
States?" I was surprised that every one of them said; "No." They said,
"We like what we do here in the Netherlands; we think it works for us,
but it would be a disaster for you."
I talked with Dr. Herbert Cohen, who is one of the leading practi-
tioners of euthanasia in the Netherlands. He said, "Look, unlike the
United States, we have universal access to health care here. Nobody
seeks euthanasia because they can't get access to medical care." Ninety-
nine percent of the Dutch have health insurance. 1°0 They have access to
comprehensive care including long-term care. In the United States, forty
million people, 15 percent of the population, have no insurance at all. 1 1
In the Netherlands, said Dr. Cohen, "Euthanasia is not a way out of
social misery.... You don't have to request euthanasia because you
can't get any medical attention."' 0 2 Indeed, the most common reason the
Dutch seek euthanasia (56 percent of cases) is to avoid what is called
"useless suffering."' 0 3 Americans, however, are more likely to be moti-
vated by another reason. They don't want to be a burden. They fear
being a burden on their family and their friends.
In a study in Washington State last year, not wanting to be a burden
was the reason given by 75 percent of people requesting assisted sui-
cide.' 04 That's very different. That reason doesn't exist in the Nether-
lands, or at least the polling I saw did not show it. In the United States,
hospitalization and nursing home costs can impoverish people. The
Dutch face virtually no out-of-pocket expenses at the end of life.
I also spoke to Dr. Gerrit Kimsma, another family practitioner in the
Netherlands, and indicated that unlike in the United States, doctors in the
Netherlands have a personal relationship with their patients. Sometimes
you, or maybe even a family member, have seen the same family practi-
99 See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 24; HEIODiN, supra note 96, at 60-75.
100 See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 26.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See Back et al., supra note 41, at 922.
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tioner for decades. Kimsma visited one man, one patient of his who was
dying. He visited him every day during the final weeks of this man's
life, and he never charged him a cent for these end-of-life activities. He
said, "Some activities have no price tag." Can you imagine in the United
States doctors spending that much time with somebody and not charg-
ing? We have different bottom-line pressures here.
I spoke to Petra Visscher, the legal advisor to the Dutch Voluntary
Euthanasia Society. It's the group that advocates expanding the right to
assisted suicide. She suggested that unlike the United States, Holland is
a small secular and homogenous nation, where it's easy to come to con-
sensus. The Dutch pride themselves on being able to carry out a respect-
ful public discussion of the difficult issues without the kind of shouting
from the extremes that marks debate in the United States.
I asked Eugene Sutorous, the attorney who has defended most of the
doctors who have been prosecuted in the Netherlands. He said: "Unlike
the United States, the Dutch are not litigious. Malpractice suits are very
rare. A Dutch family doctor may spend about a hundred dollars a year
on malpractice insurance." In this country a family physician spends
about $10,000 a year on that insurance.'0 5
I asked Dr. Johannes Van Delden, a physician in a nursing home.
He said: "Unlike the United States, we don't see assisted suicide as a
right. It's something private, personal to be worked out between a doctor
and a patient. We don't have the rights-based society that you have in
the United States."
There are still problems with the Dutch system. Contrary to the
law, three-fifths of assisted suicides go unreported. 10 6 This includes
about one thousand cases each year that are particularly vexing where a
doctor acts on his own. 107 The doctors say that in about 80 percent of
those cases, they knew what the patient's wish would have been, but the
person had gone into a coma and couldn't express that wish. But there
are cases where doctors just act on their own.
Carlos Gomez, an American physician, went to the Netherlands and
interviewed doctors. He discovered cases that seem to suggest that once a
doctor has the authority to end life, he will use it. He will do so even in
ambiguous cases. One doctor told Gomez that he had killed a child born
with Down's syndrome. The child's parents had refused life-saving sur-
gery, so the doctor ended the life of the child. 10 8
105 See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 25-26.
106 See id. at 26.
107 See id. at 27.
108 See id.; CARLOS F. GoMEz, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NTmHERLANDS (1991).
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Another doctor said he had ended the life of a man in a coma fol-
lowing an accident. The doctor said, he wanted "to spare the grieving
family any hard decisions about treatment."' 0 9 Yet, what was surprising
was despite these problems, I didn't find much of a backlash against
assisted suicide from groups representing people with disabilities, or the
elderly. The opposition still tends to come largely from pro-life advo-
cates. Now, maybe it's the differences in culture, in politics, in history
that explain why there's not this backlash.
I talked to a disability activist named Bas Treffers. He's one of the
leaders of the independent living movement in the Netherlands. He had
been to the United States recently because he was doing a report for the
Dutch government about the Americans With Disabilities Act. He said
the number one issue of disabled people in the Netherlands is to try to get
spime kind of legal protection against discrimination, a law like the ADA,
but he said assisted suicide was not an issue among the disabled in the
Netherlands. I went to a nursing home. I asked older people, and I asked
younger people with disabilities, "Are you afraid of the practice of eutha-
nasia?" They looked at me sort of blankly. It was not an issue for them.
The place where I did find the most concern about euthanasia,
though, was at a hospice. Dr. Zbigniew Zylicz, who runs the
Rozenheuvel Hospice, told me that the easy availability.of euthanasia
had made it hard for them to spread the notion of hospice care. Hospice
care in the Netherlands, was years behind that in the United States.
Dutch doctors didn't understand it. The patients didn't understand it. I
talked to a woman named Ineka Verloop. She was a sixty-five year old
woman; she was dying of cancer. She made an appointment to go to her
doctor to request euthanasia. She was in great pain, and her doctor didn't
know how to stop her pain. She had never heard of hospice, and only by
accident did she find out about Dr. Zylicz.
At the doctor's hospice, he found a way to resolve her very tricky
pain. He actually got on the Internet and he described the problem.
Overnight he had an answer back from a doctor in South Korea. When I
met Mrs. Verloop, she was pain-free, and she was accepting of death.
She told me, "Here they take away your pain and they put you at peace.
They give you a sense that you are a person, not a patient."
I have to say that when I left the Netherlands, I was feeling sort of
wistful about that country's ability to have polite discussion about even
the most difficult issues. It truly is a rational society where they like to
sit down and talk things out. In the United States we've got the exact
opposite. Extreme voices are raised. You have to shout to be heard.
109 Shapiro, supra note 55, at 27; Gomz, supra note 108.
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People call each other names. They scream; they yell. Well, that's the
American way. That's just the way we do things.
I think that explains the Kevorkian phenomenon. The Dutch can't
understand Kevorkian. They're much more comfortable with someone
who is more deliberate and thoughtful like Dr. Quill.
Yesterday historian Paul Longmore, criticized the media coverage
of Kevorkian. He asked, "Why does the press portray him as some kind
of an eccentric folk hero?" Paul asked, "Why doesn't the press call him
a Neo-Nazi bigot against people with disabilities?" Perhaps part of the
answer is that Kevorkian plays a role in our society. In some ways he's
done a service. His zealotry has forced us to consider death and dying.
His zealotry has forced us to confront an issue that traditionally we have
avoided, doctors and the rest of us.
Kevorkian doesn't sugar-coat assisted suicide with talk of making it
safe. He talks very bluntly and directly. Kevorkian argues that if we
allow assisted suicide as a right, then we have to accept it as a right for
anyone-the terminally ill or not-who says she or he is suffering and
that she or he wants to die. So in no small measure, it is due to Jack
Kevorkian that we're having a national debate about socially-assisted dy-
ing. It's a noisy, angry, impolite debate, but it's a very American debate.
One positive result, I think, is that journalists for the first time are
writing seriously about alternatives to physician-assisted suicide. I've
seen some very thoughtful, in-depth reporting about hospice care for the
first time from newspapers in St. Paul, in St. Petersburg, in Boston. Re-
porters for the first time are starting to ask, "Should doctors do a better
job of controlling pain so that people wouldn't feel the need to legalize
assisted suicide?" At U.S. News & World Report, my colleagues
Shannon Brownlee and Joannie Schrof did a very good cover story last
month asking just those questions. 110
Finally, this conference is on disability and assisted suicide, so I
want to close with a point about the role of the disability community. I
spent the last several months on a fellowship from the Kaiser Family
Foundation studying long-term care and aging issues. The disability
community is light years ahead of the aging community in providing the
type of long-term care settings that most people want, settings that are in
the community, assistance that maximizes independence. The disability
community is light years ahead when it comes to talking about stigma.
In January, when the United States Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ments on the right-to-die cases, the lasting television image was of a
band of disabled protesters on the Supreme Court steps. It wasn't the
110 Shannon Brownlee et al., The Quality of Mercy, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 17,
1997, at 54.
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AARP with its thirty million members saying, 'Wait a minute. Is this a
good thing for older people to have this expanded right to die?"
It was Not Dead Yet, a disability group on a shoe-string budget, that
dominated the newspaper and television images forcing us to think about
what an easy right to die might mean during an era of health care ration-
ing and increased bottom-line pressures.
I liked Dr. Betts's phrase yesterday. He talked about the "filthy
rumblings," the comments of well-meaning people who say, "Why do
you spend all this money to keep old people alive? Aren't they better off
dying?" The aging community has a lot to learn from the disability
community.
I have been thinking a lot about images of aging. We celebrate
George Bush jumping from an airplane at the age of seventy-two; we
celebrate the Delany sisters at a hundred, writing books and sharing wis-
dom."' Why do we celebrate them? We celebrate them because they
calm our fears about aging. They calm our fears about what it means to
grow old.
What's the new buzz word in the aging field? Productive aging.
That's the idea that we're living longer and we're living in better health,
that there's a new middle age, that to be sixty or seventy is what being
forty or fifty used to be.
Now that's a nice sentiment. There's a lot of truth to it, and it's
supposed to be an attack against ageism. It says, "See, getting old isn't
so bad." You can jump out of an airplane, if that's what you want to do.
But to disabled people in the audience, doesn't this sound a little famil-
iar? The disability rights movement was a reaction against society's two
dominant images of disability: one, a disabled person was supposed to be
pitied; or two, a disabled person was supposed to be an inspiration.
We cheer a paraplegic who climbs a mountain or a blind sailor who
attempts to sail an ocean; and people with disabilities have a pejorative
term for these superachievers, these overachievers. They called them:
Supercrips.
They say, "Sure, extraordinary achievement is laudable." But dis-
abled people tell us, "Look, we're expected to prove that our disabilities
are meaningless. Before society gives us common respect, we are forced
to show that we can overcome our disabilities. But this requirement is
not to benefit us, it's not to benefit disabled people. It's simply to assure
nondisabled people. It's to calm their fears about disability."
Disabled people say, "Our challenges are much more basic than
that. They're much more basic than climbing mountains. We have daily
I11 See SARAH DEi.AY & A. ELIzABEm DmANY, HAVING OUR SAY: THE DELANY Sis-
TERNs' FST 100 YEARS (1993).
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challenges we have to climb. We have to climb over prejudice. Two-
thirds of us are unemployed." Suppose a person in a wheelchair can
convince an employer to hire her or him; then she or he has got another
challenge: just getting into that building, getting up the steps into the
front door of that workplace.
The disability movement gets very little recognition. Yet it has so
much to teach America. For one thing, it teaches us the danger of believ-
ing that there's a right way or a wrong way to age. If we celebrate pro-
ductive aging, then aren't we also further stigmatizing the seventy-two-
year-olds who don't want to jump out of airplanes, who can't jump out of
airplanes? Don't we end up stigmatizing those who don't live up to this
fantasy of what old age should be?
So disabled people are teaching us that disability is a part of life.
It's something to be accommodated more than feared. Disabled people
also teach us to accept the value of all people. The disability movement
warns us of the danger of using subjective standards of quality of life,
especially when it comes to deciding who should live and who should
die. Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How can we more effectively get the
whole story about Kevorkian into the media and the whole story about
people with disabilities into the media? I think that we need to use the
media to let people know what our lives are really like.
MR. SHAPIRO: I think that's right. You have compelling stories
to tell. They get told when people present another side. We also know
that this is a large community and it's a mixed community with many
different points of view even on this issue. I think maybe you need to
fight compelling stories with other compelling stories of your lives and
what you've done.
We heard many of these stories yesterday, people saying that dis-
abled people of all faiths were being told that they were expected to die
or not to have productive lives. Those are stories that I think do have an
impact. I think journalists are starting to pay attention to these things.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It hasn't been answered yet.
MR. SHAPIRO: I have found that often when you talk with people
in hospice care, they talk about the importance of dealing with spiritual
matters and how important it is to deal with dying. I think just about
everyone I've ever met in a hospice, whether it was in the Netherlands or
here-and I was in some hospices recently in Florida-says they're sur-
prised at how many people still have never heard of hospice care. They
haven't heard of it until they've reached that terminal condition. Some-
body mentions it to them and they don't know what it is.
It's very common for people when they face a diagnosis to consider
briefly something like assisted suicide. They're very surprised by what
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else is out there. Journalists and all of us do need to write more about
some of these alternatives that exist.
But the spiritual side I find is often a very important aspect of it.
There are actually some interesting studies that show the importance of
prayer and spirituality in helping people not only to cope, but actually to
improve the level of their lives.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How does the religious community show
up in these polls?
MR. SHAPIRO: Well, we know that a state like Oregon, which did
narrowly pass a law that would allow assisted suicide, is one of the two
or three most secular states in our country, a state where the fewest
number of people go to church regularly. We know that the Netherlands,
outside of some of the former Eastern European countries, is the most
secular country in Europe. There is a correlation between secular places
and an acceptance of assisted suicide.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Joe, I have a question. I think there's
some kind of irony in the name Hemlock Society, given the historical
precedent for how assisted suicide occurred. Throughout the country this
year in forty-nine of the fifty states there's been an introduction of a bill
about assisted suicide. I find that incredible as a grass-roots effort and
wonder if there's been any research on how funding for that occurred-
to have such a concurrent and persistent effort in forty-nine of the fifty
states. I mean, I haven't seen such an effective effort to mobilize around
an issue since the attempt at health care reform.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Follow the money.
MR. SHAPIRO: I wasn't aware that bills had been introduced in
that many states. A lot of it is grass roots. It does come from sort of a
grass roots level. I know there's been a more coordinated effort on the
West Coast, but I don't know what's going on nationally in that way. A
lot of people are concerned about this, and I think, as I said, the fight will
end up at the state level.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a concern in part of the discussion
as I heard it both yesterday and today: I seem to hear you running to-
gether the issues of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. I don't
understand those as being the same thing. Could you clarify your defini-
tions on that issue?
MR. SHAPIRO: Well, I was referring to euthanasia in the Nether-
lands. That is why this conference is titled Socially-Assisted Dying, to
make the distinction. By the way, in the Netherlands, there are two op-
tions: you can have a physician actually inject you with a lethal mix of
drugs or you can have the physician prescribe it to you and you take it
yourself.
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The method of choice, the choice for death, overwhelmingly, is for
a doctor to do it. They have found in the Netherlands that in many cases
where people take the pills themselves, it doesn't go right. There's a
problem. The person ends up living. That is a botched assisted suicide,
which is why the book Final Exit actually talks about using a plastic bag
to help people die if it doesn't go right.
In this country, because there's something so loaded about having a
physician actually be there and be involved, we've talked more about
assisted suicide, whether it's a medical professional who provides the
drugs and who may be present, or whether it's some friend or family
member, or a group like Compassion in Dying, who is there to follow
somebody through this process.
DR. KIRSCHNER: We're going to take one more question. We'll
take one more question from Mr. Batavia.
MR. BATAVIA: But my question to you is: What would you say
to my friend Mike whose situation I described in some detail yesterday?
He was not a depressed individual. He was an individual who was facing
a situation that was very dire, and he decided for himself that he did not
want to keep going on. He was a thoughtful, introspective individual
with a disability. He had a disability for a number of years. He was
from a supportive family. He had access to psychological services. If he
was depressed, I would say it was very rational depression in response to
his physical situation. What would you have told him?
MR. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Drew. I did hear you describe him yes-
terday. I don't know enough about him to know exactly what to say.
Somebody yesterday suggested that now, thirty years later, there might
be better pain control, better things to help him live a better, more in-
dependent life.
MR. BATAVIA: That was not on this point.
MR. SHAPIRO: Okay.
MR. BATAVIA: He would still be on his stomach for the rest of
his life with terrible, terrible bed sores.
MR. SHAPIRO: It may have been Paul Miller who pointed out yes-
terday that there's danger in making this a legal right. In extreme cases
something will end up being worked out between a patient and a
physician.
MR. BATAVIA: In which case it goes underground where it is
right now and where people are hanging themselves. Desperate people
are taking drugs that they're prescribing to themselves. Sometimes they
end up in comas; sometimes they impose brain damage upon themselves.
This is a horrible thing for our society to do to its citizens.
MR. SHAPIRO: This is where we were yesterday, where this con-
versation, what this debate comes down to. How do you deal with a few
1998]
extraordinary cases like that, which do exist, but also protect others
against the subtle stigma that very quickly arises when we create a right
to die? How do we prevent a right to die from becoming a duty to die? I
think it's very, very difficult in this society to prevent that from
happening.
MR. BATAVIA: I think that we can define the right to die nar-
rowly, and we can provide safeguards. I just want you to know that there
is another side to their safety, another disability rights perspective on this
that's legitimate. I believe they're actually the majority in the disability
community, once you get beyond the leadership to the rank and file in
the community. We have support for that. Not strong support because
there haven't been adequate surveys on this issue. One Harris poll, with
admittedly small numbers, indicates 66 percent of people with disabili-
ties support the right. I have two much more significant studies of peo-
ple with AIDS that say that between 63 percent and 90 percent of people
with AIDS who are affected by this disease want this right.
MR. SHAPIRO: We also heard from Dr. Rodriguez yesterday that
the people who he counsels with AIDS are poor people, Hispanic people
who have trouble getting access to services and who have a very different
view than other people with AIDS. They're much more suspicious of
getting the right to die.
MR. BATAVIA: I respect that.
MR. SHAPIRO: One thing that the disability movement teaches us
is that it's a very diverse movement. We've heard that in your presenta-
tion and in Hugh Gallagher's presentation yesterday. It's a diverse
movement. In its diversity I think it does allow for these differences of
opinion. It says to other civil rights movements that we shouldn't expect
that there's one way of viewing things, or that there's one dogmatic thing
that you have to believe to be part of the disability movement, or to be
part of the civil rights movement.
I think that this is a movement that generally does have pretty good
conversation and communication among the people in it. I think that
there's a lesson for all civil rights groups and all minority groups to see
the disability community and how it generally does accept difference.
DR. KIRSCHNER: I'd like to thank Joe for his brilliant and rivet-
ing talk. We've been honored to have him with us today.
IV. SESSION FOUR: MONEY, LAW AND
SOCIAL CONTEXTUAL ISSUES
DR. KIRSCHNER: I'd like to introduce to you Dr. Peter Budetti.
I've had the pleasure of working with Dr. Budetti as a member of the
planning committee for this conference.
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Dr. Budetti came to Northwestern University in 1996 from George
Washington University where he founded and served as the Director for
the Center for Health Policy Research. He currently holds a similar posi-
tion at Northwestern University as the Director of the Institute for Health
Services Research and Policy Studies. He is also a Professor of Health
Services Management in the Kellogg Graduate School of Management
and holds professorships in the law school and the Department of Pre-
ventive Medicine in the medical school.
Dr. Budetti served as a member of the Legislative Drafting Group
for President Clinton's Health Security Act throughout 1993 and was on
leave from George Washington University to serve as a member of the
professional staff for health reform of the Senate Committee on Finance
during 1994.
He was appointed to the Advisory Committee on Health Care Ac-
cess and Quality for the Commonwealth Fund in 1994 and was elected to
membership in the National Academy of Social Insurance in 1996.
DR. BUDETITI: Thanks very much, Kristi. Like all of the panelists
this morning, I'm very pleased to be here. I think it really is an outstand-
ing conference, and I was very privileged to have been involved in the
planning.
Our first speaker, Kathryn Tucker, is an attorney with Perkins, Coie,
the Northwest's largest law firm. She was lead counsel for the Plaintiffs
in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, the first cases brought
to the United States Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of
state statutes that prohibit assisted suicide." 2
Ms. Tucker served as counsel to the sponsors of Proposition No.
119, the first legislative initiative to legalize physician aid in dying for
mentally competent, terminally ill patients. She provides counseling and
handles litigation on a wide variety of issues that are of concern to physi-
cians, patients, and health care institutions and organizations. She is also
an affiliate professor of law at the University of Washington School of
Law.
MS. TUCKER: I feel that I will be a bit of a lone voice today, and
I'll just mention for any journalists that may be in the audience that I
think that the presentations are speaking largely to the anti-choice per-
spective. I will be speaking in favor [of socially-assisted dying] because
my clients have been physicians, patients, and nonprofit organizations
who believe that this is a choice that mentally competent, terminally ill
patients should have.
I do hope that in my short time I'll be able to give some comfort to
those of you who are concerned about how broad the scope of what
112 See supra note 2.
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we've tried to achieve through our lawsuits is: it's really quite limited.
Because this conference has focused on disability perspectives, I will just
say at the outset that these lawsuits really have nothing to do with the
disabled community or disabled individuals, as such. I'll talk about that
a little bit more when I get into who is within the scope of the claims of
the lawsuit.
In both Washington and New York and in many, many states there
exist criminal statutes prohibiting, in just a very general sense, assistance
with suicide. Those statutes have been understood to include within their
ambit the conduct of a physician providing assistance in dying to a pa-
tient who, confronted by death and what that patient finds to be intolera-
ble suffering, would desire a more humane, hastened death. Because
those statutes would operate on that patient's choice and that physician's
conduct, we challenged two of those state statutes in federal district
courts in Washington and New York.
The scope of the claims has been limited to mentally competent
individuals, and that, of course, assumes within it patients who are not
suffering from depression. These are terminally ill individuals. These
are individuals who are confronted with imminent death and who do not
have the choice for a life with dignity. These are patients who have lost
their life due to the progress of terminal illness and are now facing death.
They are on the edge of death. So the possibility of a life with dignity is
not among the possibilities for this group of patients. Therefore, the
group of patients we're talking about does not include disabled persons
per se.
A person with a disability would not be empowered to make a
choice for an assisted death merely by virtue of having a disability. If a
person with a disability became terminally ill and was in the final phases
of dying and would choose to make that choice, our view-although it's
not covered in the lawsuits in any explicit way because we did not have a
disabled person who came forward as a plaintiff-would be that that dis-
abled person should have the same right to make that personal choice as
another similarly situated person. Perhaps additional safeguards in the
context of a person with a disability who would be making this choice
may well be appropriate.
I'll briefly talk about the lawsuits. There are really two theories in
the cases. The Fourteenth Amendment is the source for both theories.
The first theory is a liberty claim. Our federal Constitution protects lib-
erty. The reproductive rights cases have, through a long series of cases,
respected and recognized the right of individuals to choose whether to
bear children, and whether to conceive children. The early cases dealt
with contraception. The later cases, of course, have dealt with abortion.
But through a long line of cases, our federal high court, the United States
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Supreme Court, has respected and protected the right of individuals to
make this decision for themselves. It is because it's a personal decision;
it involves one's own body, one's future life course. That kind of a deci-
sion, such a life-shaping decision, is viewed as one that should be re-
served to the individual and not usurped by a surrogate decision-maker
or by the State.
That kind of reasoning has bearing, we contend, at the end of life
where a profoundly personal, momentous decision is being made about
one's own body and one's own future course of life, although, of course,
that remaining course of life will be short. But the argument from the
federal reproductive rights cases is that this is the same kind of momen-
tous, life-shaping decision.
The Cruzan1 13 case is a separate source of authority supporting our
liberty claim. This is the one decision where the United States Supreme
Court considered the withdrawal of life support. In Cruzan, the Court
upheld a state law which ultimately prevented the withdrawal of life sup-
port from a patient because the Court found the end-of-life decision to be
so momentous and so personal, and because the information about what
the patient herself would have wanted was not well-known. She was a
permanently, irreversibly, unconscious patient. The Court found that it
was appropriate for the State to impose a high standard to ensure that the
patient would want withdrawal. 114
Recognizing that the decision is a personal one and should be re-
served to the individual also bears very much on the question of whether
a patient can express his or her wishes regarding the end of life.
Shouldn't that decision be reserved to the individual? Those were the
two lines of precedent that we urged to the Court in support of a liberty
claim.
The second line of argument was also from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Our Fourteenth Amendment protects all citizens equally, and the
Equal Protection Clause forbids arbitrary discrimination among classes
of persons. Because citizens have the right to direct the withdrawal of
life support, be it from a ventilator or a feeding tube or what have you,
and thereby bring about a hastened death with attendant medical assist-
ance, to deny a patient who does not happen to be on life support the
right for equivalent medical assistance in acquiring a lethal dose of medi-
cation to hasten death is discrimination that's really quite arbitrary.
Those are the two theories to give you the ballpark overview of what the
legal theories have been.
113 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
114 See id. at 284.
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.1 think that the focus on Dr. Kevorkian is sadly misplaced. Kevor-
kian is very much the back-alley provider. I think the reason why he's a
folk hero, and the polling data reflects that, is because most citizens in
this country believe this is a personal choice, that the State shouldn't
make it, the Catholic church shouldn't make it, and right-to-life groups
shouldn't make it. It should be the individual's choice.
Unfortunately, that sentiment carries over to Jack Kevorkian who, I
think, really does have disturbing practices. I think that the back-alley
provider is only necessary because we don't permit this to go on in an
above-board manner between patients and their treating physicians. I
think Jack Kevorkian would quickly be put out of business if patients
could turn to their own doctor.
Of course Kevorkian is flamboyant, but it's well known that there is
quite an extensive covert practice from time immemorial of physicians
assisting their patients in dying. Many say, why isn't that sufficient?
Why not let it be a decision reached quietly and privately with that doc-
tor and that patient? I'll just throw out a couple of problems with that
response.
When it's covert, it's utterly random. You don't know when you
desire this whether you'll be fortunate enough to find a physician who is
sympathetic. So it's utterly random. It tends to be something that only
the very aggressive consumers of medical care are able to access because
they will seek it out; and those tend to be more affluent and more edu-
cated consumers, making it a very elitist sort of thing.
The abuses that go on with the covert practice are rampant, and I
think Kevorkian illustrates some of those. The problem is that when you
have a physician acting covertly under the onus of a criminal statute, that
physician is not going to call for a second opinion. We're talking about
establishing this as an option only for the mentally competent, terminally
ill. It may well be entirely appropriate to have second opinions on both
of those prongs. Let us have a second opinion, and perhaps a specialized
psychiatric opinion, on whether this is indeed a patient who can make a
rational decision as opposed to a depressed individual. Let us have a
second opinion on whether the patient is, in fact, in the final phases of
the dying process. Let us have an additional consultation on palliative
care. Let's make sure that no patient is motivated to make this choice
because they have inadequate pain care or because they have not been
offered hospice.
Dr. Timothy Quill, who is my lead client in the New York case, is
himself a director of a hospice facility. He has deep roots in hospice.
His view is that hospice should be the standard of care. And it absolutely
should be! Every patient who is dying should be offered hospice, and
they should be offered it much earlier than it's offered now.
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What Tim Quill will say when he speaks on this subject is that a
patient who, in his or her own estimation, is dying a death that cannot be
made comfortable or bearable even with the most excellent hospice care,
and who would make this choice, is experiencing a medical emergency.
That patient must not be abandoned by his or her doctor, but must be
able to work through this question with his or her doctor.
I watched Dr. Emanuel from the AMA present the long flowchart of
steps to be taken by doctors if a patient raises this issue: "First see
whether he's competent; and then the question, see if he's depressed;
next whether he's rational." She went all the way through this long
flowchart. When you actually worked your way to the bottom of the
flowchart, if the doctor had answered "yes, competent," "yes, rational,"
"yes, terminal," "yes, still desires the choice," the final box said, "tell the
patient forget it and offer more palliative care."
That flowchart is absolutely wonderful; everyone should employ it.
But when you get to that box at the bottom, don't just disregard or over-
ride your patient's wishes. Those patients who meet all those criteria,
who want to exercise this choice, need the assistance of a physician in a
humane and dignified manner.
The notion that all of these patients who would make this choice are
depressed is false. I think it's appropriate to have differential diagnosing
to make sure that you don't have a depressed patient. You will end up
with a fraction of patients who are not depressed despite the speculations
of some of the other speakers. The McAfee case was discussed earlier, 115
and the comment was made that it was really sad in some sense that this
patient was given the right to direct the withdrawal of his life support.
This was a patient who was not terminally ill; it was a patient who had a
long life span but had a disability. He was given the right to direct the
withdrawal of his treatment.
For nonlawyers the distinction between withdrawal of treatment and
assistance in dying gets a little bit fine. I think you have to keep in mind
that the right to direct the withdrawal of treatment is a much broader
right than the right to seek affirmative assistance in hastening death
through a lethal dose of medication. That's partly because the sources of
the right to direct withdrawal of treatment are twofold. The right to di-
rect withdrawal involves not just the autonomy and individual decision-
making issues that we have been discussing with regard to assisted sui-
cide; it also has deep roots in battery and informed consent law. The
right to be free of an unwanted bodily invasion is viewed as almost abso-
lute by the law. So, an individual directing the withdrawal of life support
really has an additional legal ground that does not exist where a patient is
115 See supra note 85 & accompanying text.
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seeking the lethal dose that we're talking about in an assisted death situa-
tion. That is why patients like McAfee are empowered to do that.
Certainly, there should be suicide intervention where a patient is
directing withdrawal of life support and has depression as a motivating
factor. I think that the disabled community and other right-to-life groups
that are concerned about these end-of-life decisions should really be
looking carefully again at the end-of-life decision-making that relates to
withdrawal of life support. I was involved in a terribly troubling case in
which I represented a disabled man who was a stroke survivor. He could
not move; he could not speak, but he did communicate with an eye-gaze
board and a letter board. His family directed the withdrawal of his feed-
ing tube because they thought it was merciful to bring about the end of
his life. He had been active and athletic. Now he could not move; they
didn't think he would get better. They directed the withdrawal. They
didn't direct the withdrawal based on any information that he was termi-
nal or permanently unconscious. It was simply that they thought his
quality of life was low.
The hospital where he was a patient acceded to that request and
withdrew the life support. His friend, who was his former spouse, visited
him and told him this had happened. He communicated to her that he
wanted continued life support. We had to go to court and get a court
order to have him hooked back up. We couldn't get it for five days. So
he laid there for five days with no food or water, not knowing whether he
would be rescued. We did succeed in rescuing him.
The defense from the medical community-the doctors and their
experts in a subsequent medical malpractice case that I brought on the
patient's behalf against the hospital and the doctors who withdrew this
man's life support-was that it was permissible for surrogates to direct
the withdrawal of treatment from such a patient without following any of
the Washington State Supreme Court's procedures that governed the
matter.
The medical community did not believe that the procedures em-
braced by the state supreme court, which had considered withdrawal of
life support in this context, needed to be incorporated into medical com-
munity standards, and they weren't. That was the defense. The jury
never had any instructions that the law of Washington required that cer-
tain procedures be followed before treatment be withdrawn, and they re-
turned a verdict for the defense. The patient subsequently died, and the
case was dismissed as moot, so there will never be appellate review of
the case. 116
116 This case is discussed in detail in Kathryn L. Tucker, Surrogate End of Life Decision-
making: The Importance of Providing Procedural Due Process, A Case Review, 72 WASH. L.
Ray. 859 (1997).
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The lesson I take away from that case is that any end-of-life deci-
sion, be it through a withdrawal or through a lethal dose, is enormously
momentous and profound and should be carefully and deliberatively
made and should be subject to safeguards. There really aren't any safe-
guards on the withdrawal decision today, and those decisions are much,
much more common than the lethal dose decisions that we're talking
about in a physician-assisted suicide situation.
Turning to the safeguards issue, I do think that there are a number of
excellent models that have been published in the legal and medical jour-
nals. They tend to overlap enormously, and I think that overlap is a good
sign. I take it to mean that there's quite a bit of agreement on how this
practice should go forward, if it is to go forward. What you see are a lot
of regulations to assure voluntariness, competence, and that the decision
is informed, reasoned and reflective. Again, I think all those safeguards
should apply in the withdrawal of treatment context also. Those can all
be addressed through regulation as well.
Some people who don't favor the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide favor keeping it covert because they don't want all those regula-
tions. Certainly Kevorkian would not want all those regulations. I think
that the regulations are essential protections.
I will say a couple of things about what will happen depending on
how the pending cases come out. Even if the Court does reject the lib-
erty and equal protection claims, at a minimum it is going to indicate, as
the states have argued, that this is something appropriately left to the
state legislative processes. We've seen Oregon pass a law that's quite
restrictive. I think that the reality of going through the political process
is that you will see quite restrictive laws. There's such an active right-to-
life movement. The Catholic Church, in particular, has participated in
these campaigns, aggressively seeking to thwart the enactment of laws
regulating physician-assisted suicide. What happens in the course of
political campaigns, then, is that proponents make a narrower and nar-
rower, more stringent law to make it palatable to more voters. So what
you see in Oregon, for example, really is an extremely limited law.
One interesting thing to keep in mind is that if you went the legisla-
tive route, you would not have to, in theory, limit the universe of patients
for whom this option would be available to terminally ill patients. I think
as a practical and political matter you would, but legally you wouldn't
have to. Whereas in the judicial forum, when crafting the constitutional
argument, it was important to our argument and the constitutional bal-
ancing that the patient, in fact, be terminally ill; that is not so in the
legislative forum.
Some of the proposed legislation was not limited to the terminally
ill, including, I think, the proposed model statute published in the
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Harvard Journal on Legislation,1 17 drafted by a number of distinguished
legal and medical professionals associated with Harvard University. It
referred to incurable cases and suffering. A broader universe could be
addressed through legislation as opposed to judicial reform. I don't think
that the issue is going away. I think that whatever the Court does, there
will be a lot of activity regarding how assisted suicide should be regu-
lated through state legislative processes. Certainly the disability commu-
nity can and should be involved in the lobbying and crafting of that
legislation.
If the right is rejected, and the Court basically sends it back to the
state legislatures, I think it's quite clear, as one of the members in the
audience pointed out, that there are many pieces of legislation being in-
troduced. Oregon passed a measure that is apparently destined to go into
effect. I think that is likely to be the trend. If the Court rejects the con-
stitutional arguments, we will see state legislative activity. Then, that
will open up the process to the political realm.
I think a couple of comments are in order to follow up on what
some of the earlier speakers had to say. The notion that the portion of
society that is "clamoring," to the extent that there's a clamor for assisted
suicide, is young and healthy is really not so. If you look at the polling
data, it is true that certainly among the young and the educated segments
of society, the more highly educated tend to favor assisted suicide in
greater numbers.
My clients have been only dying patients who are not young and
healthy. They were not elderly persons, however, so the issue is not
whether the elderly would automatically be eligible. It's really patients
who have, at whatever age, progressed through a terminal illness to the
point where they are now on the edge of death.
On the question of semantics, one of the questions asked at the last
panel was, "What's the difference between physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia?" The reason why physician-assisted suicide is a term that I
embrace is that it does include within its ambit the notion that the patient
making this choice takes the final act him or herself. That is all that's at
issue in these lawsuits and all that's at issue in the pending legislation
that I'm aware of. I think that's important. I think that the patient taking
the final act is an additional indication of voluntariness which is
important.
On the other hand, while I embrace the term physician-assisted sui-
cide for that reason, I don't think that the term "suicide" has application
here at all because we're not talking about an individual cutting short a
117 See Charles H. Baron et al., Statute: A Model Statute to Authorize and Regulate Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. LEGIS. 1 (1996).
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life that could otherwise go on. The baggage that comes with the term
"suicide" is very heavy indeed. I would just remind people that as we
hear the term "suicide" we are not talking about suicide in any classic or
definitional way. We're really talking about a patient at the end of life
who seeks a humane death and believes that hastening imminent death
with a lethal dose is an appropriate choice for him or herself.
DR. BUDETTI: Thank you very much. We are continuing to put
things into a societal context, and barraging you with a panel of nothing
but doctors and lawyers. Next is Diane Coleman, also a lawyer, who
comes to us from the Progress Center for Independent Living in Oak
Park, Illinois, where she is the Executive Director. Before that she was
in Tennessee as the Client Assistant Program Coordinator for Tennessee
Protection and Advocacy, assisting people with disabilities in obtaining
employment-related training and services. She also served as the co-di-
rector of Technology Access Center and as Policy and Funding Analyst
for the Tennessee Technology Access Project.
Her other appointments have included serving on the Tennessee
State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the Ad-
visory Committee to the Tennessee Human Rights Commission, the State
Independent Living Council, and the Board of Directors of the Tennessee
Health Care Campaign.
In 1996, she co-founded Not Dead Yet, a national disability rights
organization opposing the legalization of assisted suicide. She has writ-
ten and lectured extensively on issues of disability advocacy, physician-
assisted suicide, including being lead counsel on an amicus brief oppos-
ing the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the cases before the
Supreme Court.
MS. COLEMAN: I first became involved in this issue in 1985,
when I was invited by fellow board members of a center for independent
living to participate in a rally and protest outside the offices of the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in Los Angeles. At the time I was a
proud member of the ACLU, which I thought would be defending my
civil rights as a person with a disability. Instead, I found out that the
ACLU was involved in defending the request of Elizabeth Bouvia, a wo-
man with cerebral palsy, to receive social assistance in starving herself to
death with pain and comfort care in a hospital setting.
Not only had Miss Bouvia experienced the break-up of her marriage
and been forced out of her master's level program due to financial aid
problems, but in addition, her brother had died and she'd had a miscar-
riage. As a child her parents had institutionalized her. She'd had a pretty
rough life.
I went to the protest and said, "You know, if a nondisabled woman
were asking for this kind of help, it would not be offered to her, so why
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is Elizabeth getting it? Why do people think that her desire to die is
rational?" I couldn't even get the reporters to understand the question.
As a woman asked earlier, "How can we get the disability community's
concerns publicized?"
Ever since the Bouvia case, I've been writing articles, testifying in
legislatures, and filing amicus briefs in court cases involving people with
disabilities who have requested a so-called right to die, and they've al-
ways been granted that right to die. The press has consistently ignored
the concerns of both minority and disability communities about the op-
pression in our society.
Well, what a number of us finally figured out is that the only way
we were going to bring our concerns to the public's attention was to form
a protest group. That group is Not Dead Yet. After getting five hundred
of us to the steps of the U.S. Supreme Court in January, people are more
and more beginning to pay attention to the possibility that the assisted
suicide issue is not just the pro-choice progressives versus the religious
right. This is not just a two-sided issue. There's a third perspective, a
civil-rights based, minority-based, oppression-concerned perspective on
this issue, which must be considered.
People with disabilities are concerned about the legalization of as-
sisted suicide, first, because of ableism. Ableism, like racism and sexism
and ageism, is the word for the bias that this population feels towards
people with disabilities.
The court in the Bouvia case made a very complete statement about
how people feel when it gave Elizabeth Bouvia a right to die that it
would not have granted to a nondisabled woman who was in a similar
state of despair. The court wrote:
Petitioner would have to be fed, cleaned, turned, bedded,
toileted by others for 15 to 20 years! Although-alert,
bright, sensitive, perhaps even brave and feisty, she must
lie immobile, unable to exist except through the physical
acts of others. Her mind and spirit may be free to take
great flights, but she herself is imprisoned and must lie
physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrass-
ment, humiliation, and dehumanizing aspects created by
her helplessness. We do not believe it is the policy of
this... to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone. 118
That decision is the first in a long line of existing court decisions which
have concluded that the State does not have the same interest in preserv-
118 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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ing the lives of people with disabilities that it does in preserving other
lives. 1 19
Assisted suicide is not about autonomy. Any one of you here today
could go to a physician or health care provider and say, "I want assisted
suicide." The question is, which of us would have that right granted?
It's the doctors-the medical professionals who decide. They decide
whether you're on the assisted suicide track, or you're on the suicide
prevention track. It's not about your autonomy; it's about their decision-
making. They make their decisions based on biases; the same biases that
prevail in the culture at large.
In addition, they're increasingly making their decisions based on
economics. It's now the day of managed care. It's not only voluntarily
through your employer anymore. This year in Illinois-and this is hap-
pening all over the country-the publicly funded health care systems of
Medicaid and Medicare are converting to managed care. Ableism is a
concept that isn't even understood by the culture. When managed care is
about to hit us all, this is not the time to legalize an easy way out.
I'd like to talk a little bit about safeguards because I really think
these laws are about legal presumptions-burdens of proof. The Bouvia
line of cases, including Rivlin, Bergstedt, and many others, involve some
people with disabilities who are dead now; dead because the court case
didn't take quite long enough for them to get over their suicidal urge.
Bouvia and McAfee at least chose not to exercise the right they were
given, but many others did because they feared being incarcerated in
nursing homes and other factors. This line of cases has already con-
cluded, on this issue, that people with disabilities are about the same as
terminally ill persons for legal purposes. So how can we have any confi-
dence that prosecutors, juries, and courts are going to protect us as they
would nondisabled people under some proposed set of regulations or
safeguards?
Over two-thirds of Kevorkian's victims were not terminally ill,12 °
but you can't get prosecutors to prosecute, or juries to convict, Kevor-
kian. In fact, I feel that we people with disabilities are like the African-
Americans of the '50s or '60s. People are being killed because of their
minority status, but the prosecutors won't prosecute and juries won't
convict. It finally took the federal government to go into the South to do
anything about the problem.
It doesn't give me any comfort to know that the majority of this
culture believes that assisted suicide ought to be legalized; it doesn't give
me any comfort that Mr. Batavia, who is arguing on the other side of this
119 See e.g., Mckay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
120 See The Kevorkian Files, supra note 71, at A49.
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issue, allegedly from a disability community perspective, continually
brings up his nonterminally ill friend Mike as someone who somehow
ought to have had this right. He clearly does not intend it to be limited to
the terminally ill. In fact, most of the proponents' words, the people who
argued for aid in dying for years, intend the slippery slope and to expand
its application. They count on legalization to create a more tolerant
attitude.
For example, Derek Humphry in his book Final Exit says, "What do
most of us who sympathize with a justified suicide by a handicapped
person do to help? When we have statutes on the books permitting law-
ful physician aid in dying for the terminally ill, I believe along with this
reform, there will come a more tolerant attitude to the other exceptional
cases."'?' This gives me little comfort.
I'd like to look also at the safeguard of voluntariness. I think choice
is an empty slogan in an environment where we have limited support for
living. As an independent living center director, I've got a job, a decent-
paying job; I can "make it." But most of the people with whom my staff
works do not have the choices that economic security brings. They're
living on $474 a month.
What are they going to do when managed care tells them, "No, I'm
sorry, we aren't going to pay for that motorized wheelchair. No, you're
going to have to leave the hospital the day after surgery. Sorry, we can't
pay for any more prescriptions." Medicare doesn't pay for prescriptions.
A lot of older people have to choose between food and medication.
What kind of world is that? What kind of choices are we offering?
Then there are well documented medical journal studies reporting
about involuntary Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) orders. I don't have any
confidence that the medical system is going to function very nicely based
on voluntariness. Then there's the Netherlands, a thousand involuntary
assisted suicides a year.122 Well, that's in a small country. Let's trans-
late that figure to the U.S.
In fact, Joe Shapiro, in his article in U.S. News & World Report in
January of 1997, pointed out that if you extrapolated the number of as-
sisted suicides there in proportion to the size of the population here, the
number in a year, by the time this gets underway, would equal the
number of vehicular deaths and homicides combined.123 I'm very doubt-
ful that investigators and prosecutors are going to have the time, energy,
and resources to carefully make sure that every assisted suicide of a dis-
abled or terminally ill person was done with all of these regulations care-
fully observed.
121 HuMPHRY, surpa note 6.
122 See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 27.
123 See id.
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Let me just mention two more points: First, the threat to incompe-
tent individuals. It's interesting that Ms. Tucker talked about the gen-
tleman who was almost starved and dehydrated to death for five days.
Luckily, he had her to save him in a healthcare system that obviously
wasn't very careful about all the rules and regulations about withdrawal
of treatment that we're supposed to have, i.e., two doctors' opinions,
voluntariness and all the rest.
Already regulation is not working. But we don't have a lot of infor-
mation. Withholding and withdrawal of treatment studies are not being
conducted. We don't know who's having treatment withdrawn, or why,
what their socioeconomic status is, their insurance status. Those studies
need to be conducted.
Finally, I don't see how enforcement is realistic in the context of the
current social pressures when the primary witness to what really went on
is dead. When you weigh the risks of abuse against this desire for a
"right," supposedly for a narrow few, maybe the rest of society thinks
those risks are acceptable, but my brothers and sisters are already dying.
Kenneth Bergstedt, Wallace Spollar, Christine Busalacchi. The list is
very long. I object. People with disabilities need to object, and we need
to be heard.
DR. BUDETTI: Our next speaker is Sallyanne Payton, a Professor
of Law at the University of Michigan. She's a graduate of Stanford Law
School. She has practiced law in Washington D.C., both in private prac-
tice and in the goivernment. At the University of Michigan, she has
taught administrative law and regulation.
She became involved in health care, in health care reform, and she
served on the Task Force in the early days of the Clinton Administration,
which is where I came to know her when I was involved with the draft-
ing team. She continues to advise the United States Senate on health
care reform. She joins us now to speak about the state deregulations.
MS. PAYTON: I want to come back and pick up after Kathryn
Tucker and talk a little about how we got to where we are. For all the
rhetoric about a personal "right to die," the real issue is the role of the
State, the duty of the State, in ensuring that persons on the edge of life
have access to medical care and some control over what can be done to
them.
This problem starts, in the law, with the case of Karen Quinlan.
Remember that before Quinlan'24 it was understood that to want to take
one's own life under any circumstances, including resisting medical
treatment, was a sign of the inability to make rational decisions, and
therefore, of mental incompetence. So it was quite normal for resistant
124 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
[Vol. 7:267
CONFERENCE TRANscRnwr
patients in hospitals to have the hospital staff petition for guardianship
and then treat the patients over their objection.
By the 1970s, the public was having a backlash against high-tech
dying in modem hospitals; and patients and their families turned to the
law to resist. In order to do so they needed to persuade the courts not
only not to authorize treatment against the will of the patient, but actually
to put the patient's family or surrogate in a position to control the pa-
tient's care. This was a radical challenge to medical authority.
Now here is the problem for the State, as it was presented in Quin-
lan. Karen Quinlan was permanently unconscious. The State has the
ultimate responsibility for such a person under its parens patriae power.
The probate court appoints a guardian to look after the person, the ward,
but the power the guardian exercises is the power of the State and the
State is accountable.
One of the historically unequivocal duties of the State or guardian to
the ward is to provide the necessities of life, including appropriate medi-
cal care. A guardian has both the duty to furnish and the power to con-
sent to medical care for the ward. Karen Quinlan's family, after much
consultation with their spiritual advisers in the Catholic Church, at-
tempted to withdraw consent for the aggressive life-supports that were
keeping Karen alive. The hospital resisted, and Karen's father, Joseph
Quinlan, petitioned the court for the guardianship, announcing that if he
were appointed guardian, he would refuse "extraordinary care" for Karen
and let nature take its course.
The Quinlan challenge therefore forced the New Jersey Supreme
Court to answer this question: when, if ever, is it permissible to allow a
guardian to act in a manner that the guardian knows is almost certain to
bring about the ward's death? The answer to that question turns out to
be, as we know, "when the patient is permanently unconscious and the
doctors and the patient's family and the hospital administrators all agree
to give up on treatment and there is no substantial threat of lawsuit by
others who disagree," but the court could hardly put it quite that way. So
what it invented was a new way of talking about patients' rights.
What the New Jersey Supreme Court said was, "we're going to talk
about this as an individual right, that belongs to Karen." Karen, while
conscious, would have a right to refuse treatment; therefore she has the
same right while unconscious. The pivotal point in the reasoning was
when the court said that it could understand why someone who was to be
permanently unconscious might want to stop the treatment, that the treat-
ment itself might be a burden more than a benefit. The guardian there-
fore has the power to refuse treatment on the patient's behalf.125
125 See id. at 663-64.
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But wait. Guardians cannot be given this power unsupervised, be-
cause this line of reasoning authorizes simple murder, first-degree mur-
der in every state. On the other hand, it was important to allow the
medical profession to decide how to stop treating patients where there
was no more medical point to the treatment. The solution the New
Jersey court devised was to give guardians power to withdraw consent,
thereby eliminating the physicians' duty and power to treat; but to regu-
late the guardians by forcing them to respect medical authority and insti-
tutional norms. 12 6
So if you read the order in the Quinlan case carefully you will see
that it requires that the physicians be the ones who decide to terminate
treatment, after consultation with the family and guardian. The guardian
may not act on his own, and the physicians are not required to obey the
guardian. The guardian is given a carefully hedged, regulated power that
must be exercised in the context of professional standards applied by a
regulated, publicly accountable profession and only in the relatively pub-
lic setting of a hospital, itself a regulated institution. The real oversight
power of the state is just a telephone call away.
After Quinlan there were more than twenty years of litigation before
the United States Supreme Court addressed refusal and withdrawal of
treatment in the Cruzan case, 127 in which it affirmed the general ap-
proach of Quinlan, but allowed the states to put some safeguards on the
withdrawal of treatment to make certain that the patient would have
wanted it done. So now we have this odd situation in which the language
of the law is about individual rights while the actual practice is
euthanasia.
But the euthanasia is accountable third-party decision-making under
regulation, not the kind of unconstrained, eccentric, arbitrary, non-ra-
tional, expressive decision-making that is the right claimed by those who
advocate the right to physician-assisted suicide as a right of personal
autonomy.
There we have the problem. Is committing suicide the kind of ac-
tivity in which the power of the autonomous person ought to be allowed
to have its full expression? If so, there are many ways to exit this life
that are more interesting than being poisoned by one's physician, and
autonomous individuals and their willing collaborators can be expected
to think of them. It is hard to understand why, if there is really a right to
autonomy at the core of this, the right ought to extend only to the assist-
ance of physicians.
126 See id. at 665-69.
127 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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In point of fact, the assistance of physicians points to another set of
problems that makes the assisted suicide issue look a lot more like the
refusal and withdrawal of treatment problem. There is every reason to
worry that the patient's right to assisted suicide, just like the patient's
right to refuse treatment, will become in practice a license for physicians
to kill their patients. The word "suicide" means self-killing, but we un-
derstand from the experience of the Netherlands that administration of
what kills is not always by the hand of the patient, and that some patients
will prefer that way. The difference between "assisted suicide" and eu-
thanasia blurs.
Who is to prevent the blur? The medical profession? Managed care
is rearranging the physicians' incentives in ways that make it hard to be
sure that individual physicians will be able to resist their own interest in
hastening the deaths of some of their patients. For many of the patients,
being alive is not cheap, and the State and the insurance carriers may be
paying huge bills and pushing some of their financial risk off onto the
physicians. The days when physicians were reliable protectors of life are
over.
So where are we? Physician-assisted suicide needs to be regarded,
realistically, as physician-assisted dying on the part of those whose medi-
cal condition is not yet so hopeless that they qualify for treatment under
the refusal and withdrawal of treatment cases. It needs to be regulated in
much the same manner, for the protection of the weak, toward whom we
owe the greatest duty.
It is not realistic, however, in the economic crisis of the health care
industry, to expect the medical profession to do the regulating. Partly
because of economic competition, the medical profession has lost the
professional infrastructure that once allowed it to stand up collectively
for high standards of care and ethical behavior towards patients. Its pres-
ent weakness translates into the inability to assume reliably the role of
monitor for physician-assisted suicide.
Under these circumstances it seems dangerous to plunge ahead.
The advocates of physician-assisted suicide have formulated their posi-
tion in the context of a world that is passing away, a world in which the
medical profession could be trusted with the instrumentalities of death
because they could be trusted to use them only for the purpose of heal-
ing, a world in which physicians were rewarded for treating their pa-
tients, not for withholding treatment from them. In this new world the
physicians are no longer in charge. Perhaps we ought not put them in the
paths of temptation when it comes to their most vulnerable patients.
DR. BUDETTI: Our next speaker, Dr. Charles Von Gunten, is the
Director of the Center for Palliative Medicine, Education and Research
here at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. He serves as the Group Leader
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for the Program in Palliative Care and Rehabilitation of the Robert Lurie
Cancer Center of Northwestern University, which is a National Cancer
Institute designated Clinical Cancer Center. He also serves as the Medi-
cal Director of the Hospice/Palliative Medicine Consultation Service, the
hospice program at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. He's a recognized
expert and has written extensively on the subjects of hospice care, pallia-
tive medicine, pain education, and the palliative care of AIDS.
DR. VON GUNTEN: I have been asked to speak to a physician's
perspective on the slippery slope issue, providing the point of view of a
physician at the bedside. I'm speaking primarily as a physician who spe-
cializes in palliative medicine. Although I'm trained as an oncologist
and as a general internist, I mostly care for patients within an acute care
hospital in a large metropolitan city. I see patients throughout the hospi-
tal for whom palliative care is at least being raised as an issue.
First, let me define palliative care for you and describe how it is
implemented at Northwestern. Then, let me make a couple of remarks
about general issues that come up around questions of assisted suicide,
and then let me finish with one clinical vignette that we're currently car-
ing for.
Palliative medicine has been defined as the total care of patients
with progressive, far-advanced disease for whom the prognosis is limited
and the focus of care is quality of life. When you define quality of life, I
think the hospice literature and Cicely Saunders are so useful. Quality of
life, meaning the absence of suffering, has four domains: physical, psy-
chological, social, and spiritual.
In providing palliative care consultation I work with nurses, social
workers and chaplains, and we are trying to bring palliative care to the
general hospital setting. As we are an academic service, fellows, resi-
dents and medical students rotate on the service as well. We see patients
in the intensive care units, general medical wards, surgical wards, emer-
gency room, and on our acute palliative care hospice unit. We are asked
to see fifty to eighty new patients per month, comprising 750 to 800
patients a year. About half of the patients have cancer. The remainder
have a variety of non-career diagnoses such as congestive heart failure,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, stroke, trauma, gastrointestinal
bleeding, AIDs, and dementia. That's a large volume, and I would also
observe that we are the only hospital in Chicago that has a service like
this.
My first general comment is that around times of crisis and when
suffering is acute, it is always compelling to me how much time and
effort it takes to work through, not just the physical suffering, which is
sometimes the easiest to take care of, but also the psychological, social,
and spiritual suffering. That is because each individual and that individ-
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ual's family, care givers, close associates are all at different places, have
different needs, and identify problems differently.
Often it takes days of close attention and hard work with patients
and families who are questioning and trying to cope with the acute hospi-
tal setting, trying to weigh the burdens and the benefits of therapy.
Should we go with the therapy? Should we try the chemotherapy?
Should I have the operation? Should I not? Can this pain be under better
control? If I go home, how am I going to afford this? What am I going
to go home to? Why do I have this illness? Why did it happen now?
Tremendously time-consuming questions in a health care system that re-
ally isn't set up to deliver palliative care.
My second general comment concerns the financial aspect since this
is a session on money and its effect on the law and social contextual
issues around assisted suicide. The grief that we get from insurers as
soon as the word "palliative" appears on the chart, or the word "hospice"
is whispered, or a Do Not Resuscitate status is instituted is unbelievable.
The insurer says, "Well, they don't need to be in the hospital any
longer." Now, that stuns me. These are the sickest patients in the hospi-
tal, but every day of our life in the hospital, our team deals with the
financial pressures to discharge patients. That is both in the general hos-
pital setting as well as in our acute hospice/palliative care unit.
Let me finish with a clinical vignette of one patient for whom we
are currently caring in order to describe how, from my perspective as a
physician, the issues being discussed here get played out. We were
asked to see a gentleman with widely metastatic stomach cancer. He's a
highly educated, very involved man, who has been married for a few
years to a professional woman. His wife is away from home for two or
three days at a stretch for her work, and she is back close by for the rest
of the time. He lives in a rural area of Wisconsin, on a farm which he
loves dearly, and he has had very aggressive chemotherapy.
When we met him, he wanted to live pretty much at all costs even
though he was clearly bed-bound and no chemotherapy could be admin-
istered because it would kill him in his condition. He was experiencing
constant nausea and vomiting. His bowel was obstructed due to his tu-
mor. In addition, he was experiencing a considerable amount of abdomi-
nal pain as well as diffuse body pain. He's being cared for by a group of
oncologists in the hospital who are generally very good at pain control
and symptom control.
After we were consulted it took several days to work through the
issue of why palliative care was being suggested to him in the first place.
As you can imagine, having someone from the palliative care/hospice
service come to see you is often perceived as a sign that the doctors are
giving up. We often go through a process of saying, "Palliative care is
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not about giving up. Our goal here is to help improve your quality of
life."
Physicians' goals, historically, are to relieve suffering and to pro-
long life. Too often, physicians and patients focus on the prolonging life
part. We can relieve the suffering and prolong life. The two can go
together. What we said to this patient was, "Our goal here is to help you
live better. We can't change where your cancer is right now. We can,
though, help you with how you're feeling."
Northwestern has more than one thousand physicians on staff,
twenty medical oncologists, multiple surgical oncologists; and quite a
few people had already been involved in this patient's care. It just so
happens that because of my interest and involvement in palliative care
and my reading of the rather obscure literature, I knew of a way that
could make this man's physical suffering less, by relieving his obstruc-
tive symptoms. He agreed to move to the palliative care unit just for a
couple of days where his symptoms got better. Then he said to me,
"Well, this is it, right? I mean, the cancer. All right, I agree, I under-
stand the cancer is advanced. There's no more chemotherapy available.
So why not end it? Doctor, end it." He said this to me when I was
seeing him with our whole group on rounds. His physical symptoms
were much better than when we first saw him but certainly not under
complete control. A nurse said to him, "Aren't there other reasons to
continue to live? Aren't there other things that are important to you?"
He answered: "Well, I'm no longer able to be productive. I can't do
what I was doing. Let's just end it." He was clearly competent to make
that decision, the decision to end his life.
Then he reflected and said, "Well, you know, my wife, she'll be
upset if I'm gone." Over the course of the next three or four days, com-
bining aggressive use of medications along with team approach to the
non-physical aspects of suffering led to a change in his point of view.
When I saw him three days later, after a lot of work by the nurses, doc-
tors, social workers and chaplains, he said these days were probably the
most meaningful time in his life. He had reached a sense of connection
with his wife and a sense of himself that he had never thought possible
and would never have imagined. He was so grateful for that period of
time. If you had asked me at the time what his prognosis was, I would
have said two days, maybe three; and I see dying patients every day.
That was a month ago.
I'm not quite sure why this patient is still alive. He is still receiving
the therapy; as far as I can tell, he is still obstructed. He is not getting
much in the way of nutrition. He's certainly not getting much in the way
of fluids. He's very happy in the hospital setting. This is therapy that
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could not be administered anywhere else because of the complicated
medical regimen and the nursing expertise required.
His wife is now able to work. She leaves and is able to come back
in and visit him. He's feeling very comfortable with the people at the
hospital, the volunteers, and the nurses. The nurses say that he's speak-
ing more slowly, or sort of dragging things out in order to keep people in
the room as long as possible because he's enjoying the attention.
It is very expensive for this man to be in the hospital, and I cannot
tell you how great the pressure from the insurer- is to have this man move
on. Yet, he clearly is experiencing relief of suffering, and wholeness of
life. It is only because of a relatively unique set of circumstances: my
interest in this area, my hospital's support of me and our palliative care
service in the hospital, that we were able to achieve this. There are only
four other units like ours in the entire country, and there are maybe
twenty-five or thirty palliative care consultation services in the country.
My experience is that when a patient, like this man, requests help in
dying, the patient is suffering on multiple levels. When the suffering is
relieved using a broad model of care, the request is withdrawn. In our
experience the most common source of requests for assistance in dying is
from family members and sometimes the medical staff, and it always
involves projection. "Oh, can't we relieve his suffering: it is going on
and on and on. Can't you see? Can't you see the patient is suffering?
What's the use of all this? Can't we just be done with it? We would all
feel so much better. He would feel so much better if you would end all
this." But when you ask the patient he says, "Oh, I'm fine, comfortable."
Severe illness in the hospital affects everyone in the family.
"Should I be at the bedside? Should I go to work? If I don't work, I
can't pay the insurance premiums to keep him here. I've got other fam-
ily, other people elsewhere who also need me." There's a pressure to
have this be over. It is easier, and cheaper to end life than to work to
relieve the suffering of patient and family. The other aspect that's often
left out is physicians. Physicians suffer terribly when their patients are ill
and when they can't make them better. I can't tell you how often my
role as a consultant is to help the attending physician cope with the loss
of someone with whom the physician feels very close and with whom he
or she has built a relationship over time. In this case I've presented to
you, if you had asked for a second opinion from any of the rest of the
medical staff, save one or two other people, none would have known
about the way to treat this man's intractable nausea and vomiting. The
safeguard was the prohibition against euthanasia and the drive to relieve
his suffering.
From my point of view, the safeguards and the push to do more, to
do better, to offer better palliative care, and to take the time brings in-
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credible benefits that I think are not always apparent to people prospec-
tively. I can't tell you how many patients and family members who have
asked for assistance in dying have a totally different view once the pa-
tient begins to receive palliative care. The family has a very different
view when it is over and the patient has died.
DR. BUDETTI: Now I come at this from a very different perspec-
tive, the perspective of somebody who spends a lot of time thinking
about health care insurance and health care coverage. I'm going to try to
focus on an economic issue that has come up repeatedly throughout the
conference. I want to focus on managed care in a very specific way. I
want to focus on how it is a potential threat to the very concept of the
physician. What are we thinking about when we think about what a phy-
sician is, and who that physician is, that could be asked to or expected to,
assist with suicide?
Most of the discussions so far have focused on traditional ethical
conflicts facing physicians-the physician's duty to do whatever is pos-
sible to help cure the patient contrasted with asking that physician to do
something actively to shorten the patient's life. Even if we get to the
point where some people might agree that it might conceivably be that it
was in somebody's best interests to die, we're still left with the question
of whether it should be a physician who, in fact, assists with bringing
about death.
Many aspects of that dilemma are being discussed during this con-
ference, and I think that a prior question really needs to be, what are our
assumptions about the physician? What are our assumptions about the
role of the physician and the physician-patient relationship in our soci-
ety? Are they changing in a way that affects this discussion about physi-
cian-assisted suicide? Is that relationship undergoing such a profound
change that our traditional ways of analyzing these ethical dilemmas are
now missing the mark? Is the concept of a 'physician' being compro-
mised by the financial interests of physician employers or by third-party
payers such that their own decision-making is not taking place within the
framework which we otherwise might have thought it was?
We talked a lot about financial considerations in the nonmanaged
care setting, in the traditional fee-for-service indemnity setting. People
always questioned whether physicians were acting in their patient's best
interests by ordering every test and performing every possible procedure
and administering every possible treatment, as long as the patient was
legally alive. The question then, was whether physicians were merely
acting out of the patient's best interests in offering them any hope, how-
ever slim, or whether their decision-making might have been compro-
mised somewhat by the fact that administering all these treatments and
keeping the patient around long enough to sustain the course of therapy
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was financially lucrative to the physicians. So there's always been this
question about the financial conflict of interest.
However, in that setting, at least what the physicians were doing
was consistent with their fundamental obligation, our fundamental obli-
gation, to do everything possible for patients, and we analyzed the ethical
conflicts in that context. Now the question is whether that setting has
changed. Nowadays, of course, there's concern that HMOs and other
managed care organizations, create incentives to do so little for patients
that we really need to rethink what it is we're asking of physicians.
In an antitrust case a couple of years ago, the Marshfield Clinic
case, judge Richard Posner, echoed these sentiments. He said, "Many
people . . . fear that HMOs skimp on service. . . . From a short-term
financial standpoint.., the HMO's incentive is to keep you healthy if it
can, but if you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state
involving few medical expenses, to let you die as quickly and cheaply as
possible."128
Concerns such as these have now been taken into the physician-
assisted suicide context. Mary Grayson, in an editorial in the Journal of
Hospitals and Health Networks under the headline Knockin' on Heaven's
Door: Public Debate Over Physician-Assisted Suicide, requires managed
care companies to explain their policies. Grayson says, "Managed care
leaders are downright furious that people think that they would withhold
treatment or deliberately encourage the terminally ill to end their lives
just to save money.... And fairly or unfairly, there is a growing unease
in this country about what managed care firms might do, particularly in
the wake of drive-through deliveries and 24-hour hospital stays for
mastectomies."' 129
Now, this is at one level. This discussion really focuses on the cor-
porate interest of the managed care entity and the pressure that you've
heard about from other speakers that can be put on physicians. My con-
cern goes one step further: whether the physicians themselves are being
put into situations in which their decision-making is now being compro-
mised, not just by the managed care plan's bottom line, but by the physi-
cian's own personal financial interests. In other words, are the
physicians themselves now highly conflicted to the point where their de-
cision-making is questionable?
A recent Harris survey conducted for the Commonwealth Fund ad-
dressed the issue of physician incentives and found that among physi-
cians with patients who needed approval for specialty services, 10
percent reported that they had a financial incentive not to refer patients to
128 Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995).
129 Mary Grayson, Knockin' on Heaven's Door: Public Debate Over Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 70 J. HOSPiTALS AND HEALTH Nm-woRss 7 (1996).
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specialty or subspecialty care in cases when they had some doubt about
the necessity of such services. Ten percent doesn't sound like much, but
this is a rapidly growing side of the equation; and the point here is that
doctors used to be expected to do whatever they thought might offer
some hope. Now in legal terms it's turning around the burden of proof.
If there's some doubt, now doctors seem to consider whether there is a
financial incentive not to administer the treatments.
Moreover, physicians' working arrangements are changing. That
same Harris poll indicated that less than half of physicians actually own
their practices, or were owners in their own practices, and more than half
were on salary for all of their practice income.
This is a startling development. Physicians now are largely salaried
employees and not employees of professional corporations that they
themselves own. So they are now employees who have to respond to
some sort of corporate interest. Physicians are also put into positions
where they get extensive bonuses based upon their performance, and in
large part, that's a financial performance.
Another related development, of course, that you've heard a fair
amount about is the breakdown of the continuity of the relationship be-
tween the physician and the patient. At the same time that physicians are
developing these financial interests that conflict with their decision-mak-
ing, they are also losing touch to some degree with their patients. A lot
of the plans average a complete turnover of all the enrollees in health
plans every three years, and with that turnover there is a turnover of
physicians as well as patients.
Judge Reinhardt, in the Compassion in Dying case when it was
before the Ninth Circuit, acknowledged that the day of the family doctor
who made house calls and knew the frailties and strengths of each family
member have disappeared, but he went on to say, in an optimistic state-
ment: "We believe that most, if not all, doctors would not assist a termi-
nally ill patient to hasten his death as long as there were any reasonable
chance of alleviating the patient's suffering, or enabling him to live
under tolerable conditions." 130
This is an optimistic view, but I think it hearkens back to a narrow
view of the physician as someone who, in fact, is there exclusively for
the patient's interests. I'm concerned that our concept of the physician is
not adequately reflecting the complexity of the situation in which physi-
cians now increasingly find themselves. Thus, my question is whether
either the tradition of physicians discreetly helping patients to die or the
emerging question of physicians actively helping their patients to die
130 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 827 (9th cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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should still be viewed in the context of our traditional assessment of their
ethical obligations, given the emergence of these firsthand financial in-
centives that I believe could compromise their position.
These financial incentives, by the way, have themselves been sub-
ject to intense scrutiny in a number of states. The question is whether
physicians are violating their ethical obligations and their obligations
under licensure statutes by signing contracts that: call on them to with-
hold treatment from patients under financial pressure; or prohibit them
from discussing with patients the availability of alternative treatments; or
that bar the patient from knowing what the financial incentives are that
the physician works under. A number of states are looking into the eth-
ics of those situations wholly outside of the question of physician-as-
sisted suicide. The ethics of physicians entering into these kinds of
employment relationships is itself being questioned.
If society is questioning whether physicians, whom it educates and
licenses, should be allowed to enter into these arrangements, what does
that say about our concept of the physician when we turn to issues as
difficult as assisting suicide? I believe that this is a question that needs
to be factored into the debate: What is the relationship between the tradi-
tional concept of a physician and the role of the physician in assisting
suicide?
Our next speaker is Leigh Bienen. Leigh Bienen is a Senior Lec-
turer in Law at Northwestern University and a criminal defense attorney.
Her areas of expertise include capital punishment, sex crimes, and rape
reform legislation. She directed a study of all homicide cases in New
Jersey after the reposition of capital punishment and drafted the model
sex offense statute, which was the basis for rape reform legislation in a
number of states and was enacted in New Jersey in 1979. She has been
intimately involved in the planning and organization of this conference,
and she also has another professional life as a published author of fiction,
but that's for a different conference.
MS. BIENEN: My comments are about assisted suicide as a subcat-
egory of homicide. We've been hearing about assisted suicide as a legal,
medical, moral, philosophical, religious, and ethical question today; but,
of course assisted dying is also a circumstance, a set of actions by indi-
viduals and groups, which has the potential to land some in the middle of
the criminal justice system.
Assisting suicide is a crime under almost all state criminal codes,
but it is not the same crime in every state. The penalty structures vary
greatly. Not only are there over fifty independent legislative bodies-
that's omitting the United States Congress-demographically dominated
by older white men, but there are also literally thousands of independent
prosecutors in the states whose jobs are to enforce these laws, and
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thousands upon thousands of criminal trial and appellate judges whose
jobs are to administer and interpret them.
The state legislatures have the power, first, to continue to criminal-
ize assisted suicide for doctors and others; second, to enact statutes regu-
lating physician-assisted suicide-basically decriminalizing or legalizing
assisted suicide under certain restricted circumstances as the individual
legislature sees fit; or, third, to abstain from the issue, leaving the ex-
isting criminal statutes prohibiting assisted suicide or the common law in
place, as they exist in all but a few jurisdictions.
The traditional state statutes prohibiting assisted suicide are part of
the states' homicide provisions. Statutes such as the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act13' either repeal these criminal statutes or create a defined
exception to them. Some of the recently enacted statutes combine
decriminalization with some legalization or regulation.
The New Jersey law is a typical traditional statute: "A person who
purposely aids another to commit suicide is guilty of a crime of the sec-
ond degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide,
and otherwise of a crime of a fourth degree."'132 These statutes carry
over a common law offense. They are essentially a variation on man-
slaughter provisions and stipulate a legally imposed punishment for caus-
ing the death of another.
Causing suicide, that is, harassing a person to the point where he or
she kills him or herself, is in most jurisdictions a form of murder. At-
tempted suicide is usually not a crime, but a misdemeanor. Suicide is not
a crime, although there may be legal consequences for the heirs, and this
issue should be discussed in the policy debate over assisted suicide. Life
insurance policies may prohibit heirs from inheriting from a suicide, and
these consequences can influence the decision of a patient or a family.
In 1979, in New Jersey when the criminal code and common law
offenses were being revised, the principal legislative committee came
close to eliminating the provision criminalizing assisted suicide. In
1979, the legislature was not envisioning its application to the circum-
stances primarily talked about in this conference. There was a general
feeling that the preferred policy choice was to leave the provision in
place. The statute would then be there should circumstances arise in
which a prosecution was appropriate. I was in the Committee room at
the time, and I was struck by how close the Committee came to
decriminalizing assisted suicide, and also, incidently, solicitation for the
purposes of prostitution. In fact, the discussion of the two issues was
similar: Why have a criminal statute which is never used?
131 OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800-897 (Supp. 1996).
132 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-6 (West 1995).
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The existing statutes in the states create ample opportunity for
prosecutorial discretion. Any one of the thousands of county or local
prosecutors in the states has the authority to decide whether or not to
prosecute a case. Then, one of the thousands of trial court judges, who
regularly sit in criminal court hearing cases of robbery, assault, credit
card theft, or murder, will have an unusual day and preside over a trial
for assisted suicide, and perhaps decide upon the sentence. Of course, in
most cases it's the judge who sentences even though the jury will decide
guilt, or perhaps the judge will also decide guilt.
Criminal statutes are not self-executing. The county prosecutors in
all but two states are elected. In those states where local or county prose-
cutors are not elected, their appointment is a very political process. In
the elections of prosecutors and judges, their appearance in the evening
news and in the press influences voters. The election and appointment of
prosecutors and judges are governed by numerous factors, including
political, legal, and geographical considerations. A widely reported pros-
ecution in an assisted suicide case under a new or traditional assisted
suicide statute has the potential for a large positive or negative effect
upon a prosecutor or local judge and court. In many states all judges,
including appellate judges and state high court judges, are elected. The
judges will be mindful of the potential, favorable or unfavorable, media
exposure.
In a direct confrontation, such as when Dr. Kevorkian presents the
county prosecutor with a proven factual basis for a prosecution for as-
sisted suicide-a dead body and a videotape-the local prosecutor finds
his discretion preempted, or at least severely tested. The publicity gener-
ated by the actions of another, take Dr. Kevorkian, for example, forces
the local prosecutor to prosecute, or to explain why he is not prosecuting.
These are exceptional circumstances, however. Ordinarily how
would a local county prosecutor know about a circumstance of assisted
suicide? Only if the doctor reports or if the family reports. If a nurse or
observer reports, none of these could force the prosecutor to prosecute
for the crime of assisted suicide. The family or observer could put public
pressure on the prosecutor, but the local prosecutor would decide
whether, when and how to prosecute. Or, a prosecutor wishing to act on
this issue can seek out a case by asking those who might be in a position
to know of such circumstances to inform him or her. Cases do not get
into court by themselves. How the case is prosecuted can also vary
greatly.
Suicide has traditionally been studied by criminologists, using anal-
yses of cause of death, circumstances of death, and observations of pat-
terns by age, race, sex and geographical distribution.
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Of course, suicide has also been analyzed by lawyers and criminolo-
gists in terms analogous to a homicide: what is the actus reus, the act-
causing death; what is the mens rea, the intent to cause death. The ques-
tion of intent is particularly interesting in the assisted suicide context
because in theory you have an intent to cause death on the part of the
person who is being killed, and you also have an intent to cause death on
the part of the person assisting in the suicide. Two people have the crim-
inal intent, and one is the person killed.
Let's look at some traditional analyses of suicide, in comparison to
analyses of homicide. The number of deaths by suicide for February of
1996, was 2,050, for a suicide rate of 9.8 per 100,000.133 That compares
with 1,620 homicides for February of 1996, and a homicide rate of 7.7
per hundred thousand. 134 In other words, there are many more suicides
than homicides, a fact surprising to many. The majority of suicides,
more than 60 percent, were gun suicides, more than the actual number of
homicides committed with guns. 135
A person is more at risk from dying of suicide than from many
serious diseases. The rate of suicide among whites was close to twice the
rate for blacks, and the rate for white men was more than four times the
rate for white women.136 Suicide was the ninth leading cause of death in
the United States in 1994, right after deaths due to HIV. 137 The official
data on suicides in 1994, show a total of 31,142 suicides in 1994, and
31,102 in 1993, in comparison to approximately 22,000 homicides in
1996.138 In contrast, the number of deaths for the same period from mo-
tor vehicle accidents was 44,040 or 16.7 per hundred thousand. 139 The
number of deaths in motor vehicle accidents was about the same as the
number of deaths of women from breast cancer. 140
The number of deaths from homicide including what are euphemis-
tically called "other legal interventions," meaning the police killing a
person, was about the same as the number of deaths from chronic liver
disease.141 The number of deaths from suicide was more than the
number of deaths from cancer of the pancreas and only a few thousand
less than the total number of deaths from prostate cancer, and about 75
percent of the number of deaths ascribed to HIV or AIDS during the
133 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Births, Marriages, Divorces,
and Deaths for March 1996, 45 MONTHLY VrrAL STATISTICS REP. 14 (Sep. 26, 1996).
134 See id.
135 See id. at 15.
136 See id. at 10-12; John L. McIntosh, U.S.A. Suicide: 1994 Official Final Statistics, at 2
(visited Feb. 12, 1998) <http://sunl.iusb.edu/-jmcintos/Suicidestats.html>.
137 See McIntosh, supra note 136, at 7.
138 See id. at 2; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 133, at 14.
139 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 133, at 14.
140 See id. at 13.
141 See id. at 14.
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same period. 142 The majority of suicides were gun suicides. So what are
we to make of this? There are more suicides than homicides and more
and a greater proportion of gun suicides than gun homicides, although
you wouldn't have that impression from reading the newspapers.
Breaking down the comparison of suicides and homicides by age
and gender, homicides and suicides trade rankings back and forth.
Homicides are greater than suicides as a cause of death for the ages fif-
teen to twenty-four, and especially for men between those ages. 143
There's relative parity between homicide and suicide for women between
the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. For women between twenty-four and
forty-four, more die from homicide than suicide, whereas more men die
of suicide than homicide in the twenty-five to forty-four age group. 144
Those over sixty-five disproportionately killed themselves with
guns, but, again, more than 60 percent of all suicides were gun sui-
cides.145 Suicides are far more likely to be committed by men than by
women, although women attempted suicide three times more often than
men.146
There are strong regional variations among the incidence of suicide,
with Nevada having the highest rate and the mountain states having a
rate almost twice as high as those for New England and the Middle At-
lantic states. Washington D.C. had the lowest rate which may or may not
reflect the racial demographics or the generic optimism of those in poli-
tics. 147 In the category of persons aged sixty-five to seventy-four, the
suicide rate per hundred thousand was 15.3, rising to 21.3 for the ages
sventy-five to eighty-four, and 23.0 for those eighty-five and older.148
For the equivalent age groups the homicide victimization rate was much
lower.
Is suicide a public health problem? The discrepancies for men and
women and between blacks and whites are particularly provocative. Of
the more than fifty Kevorkian people, well over forty are women. Why
are women overwhelmingly asking for help in dying, especially from Dr.
Kevorkian? What is the age and gender distribution for the diseases
from which people are suffering when they request suicide? Little or no
data are available to answer this question.
Do we know how many of the reported suicides are assisted sui-
cides, similar to those in the circumstances discussed today? No, but it's
142 See id. at 14-15.
143 See 1996-97 INJURY CHARTBOOK, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 155,
158 (1997).:
144 See id.
145 See McIntosh, supra note 136, at 4.
146 See id. at 3, 6.
147 See id. at 8-9.
148 See id. at 8 (figures from 1994).
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a good guess that 60 percent of the suicides-gun suicides-are not phy-
sician assisted. Typically doctors, even Dr. Kevorkian, do not go march-
ing into the patient's room with a handgun. It seems there are no data on
the number of "assisted suicides" or even on "possible assisted suicides."
Presumably, some subset of the 40 percent of the 31,000 plus sui-
cides a year are potentially "assisted" suicides. That would be approxi-
mately 12,400 nongun suicides, which could potentially be "assisted"
suicides.
Should suicides be analyzed as a subcategory of violence? Cer-
tainly. Perhaps gun sellers should be viewed as facilitators with a theory
of transferred liability applied to them, such as that applied to bartenders
or social hosts in some jurisdictions. There's an eerie similarity between
the way assisted suicide is perceived by the public and the form legalized
capital punishment takes in America in the 1990s, death by lethal injec-
tion. After all, if we're going to give our worst criminals a "lethal injec-
tion," and perceive it as an easy and predictable death, why shouldn't we
be doing the same for our nearest and dearest? Isn't it the same as taking
your old cat or dog to be put to death and sent to pet heaven? Isn't it the
humane thing to do? Perhaps, if pet cats and dogs were being killed the
way we kill our criminals under the authority of capital punishment stat-
utes, there would be more public outcry.
Why not a "lethal injection" for those whom society no longer
wishes to care for, or pay for the costs of institutionalization? One fa-
vored argument for capital punishment, after all, is the argument that it's
cheaper than keeping the bad guys, worthless members of society, in
prison. So what about the old, the infirm, the less than perfect? As Dr.
Betts noted, there is some darkness there. People's attitudes, or their
expression of opinion, may seem, or be, cynical, until the issue comes
close to home.
The suicide rate has been declining from 1989 to 1994.' 49 Surpris-
ing to me, was that the suicide rate has declined since 1933, although
there has been an increase for men, but not for women, or the country as
a whole in the past decade. 150 The rate for whites has declined dramati-
cally since 1933, and has increased a small amount for nonwhites. The
suicide rate for those sixty-five and over has declined precipitously since
1933, from forty-five per hundred thousand to about nineteen per hun-
dred thousand, which allows me to end this brief statistical profile on an
optimistic note. 151 A small group of people may be asking for help in
killing themselves, but a smaller number of people are committing sui-
cide than at any other time in this century.
149 See id. at 13.
150 See id. at 12-13.
151 See id. at 13.
CONFERENCE TRANscRIPT
DR. BUDETTI: Our next speaker is a nationally and internationally
distinguished physician and scholar, James Bowman. Dr. Bowman is
Professor Emeritus in the Departments of Pathology and Medicine and
the Committees on Genetics and African-American Studies at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. He's a Senior Scholar of the MacLean Center for
Clinical Medical Ethics and is a Fellow at the Hastings Center in New
York. He was the Director of the pathology laboratories of the Univer-
sity of Chicago from 1971 through 1981, having served as Professor and
Chairman of the Department of Pathology at Shiraz Medical Center in
Iran from 1955 through 1961.
He's a recognized expert and scholar in hematological population
genetics and general human genetics. He's won a number of awards and
honors including the Alumni Award for Distinguished Post-Graduate
Achievement in the fields of medical research and education at Howard
University and the Gold Key Award from the University of Chicago Bio-
logical Sciences Alumni Association. He's the author of over ninety
publications and is currently writing two books with very provocative
titles, one entitled Eugenics Never Died and the other entitled Standing
on the Shoulders of Giants: The African-American Legacy of the Univer-
sity of Chicago.
DR. BOWMAN: Thank you very much. I would like to first thank
the organizers of this conference for inviting me, and I would like to
personally thank Professor Sallyanne Payton, who was my daughter's
mentor and favorite professor at the University of Michigan Law School.
This is the first time that I have had the opportunity to meet her.
I speak with some expertise because I have been disabled many
times through my seventy-four years of life. I had a coronary twenty-
four years ago. They said it was mild, but there's no such thing as a mild
coronary as far as I'm concerned. I had a bleeding ulcer, aspirin-in-
duced. I had a radical left adrenalectomy and nephrectomy for cancer of
the kidney nine months ago; I have ocular hypertension; and I have had
hearing aids for the last month. So I'm an expert in all these fields, too.
There are over 800,000 references to assisted suicide on the In-
foseek web site alone. On the same web site there are over one million
references to health care, United States. Someone from Mars who ac-
cessed these would have surmised that assisted suicide is almost as much
of a public policy issue as health care.
Ethical problems with socially assisted dying, however, pale along-
side the problems of our health care system, which is inferior to that of
all of the other major industrialized countries. Our infant mortality rate
is higher than that of twenty-two other countries, even Cuba's infant
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mortality rate is lower than ours. 15 2 We castigate President Castro about
freedom, but a larger proportion of our infants is also free: free to'die.
We parrot the shibboleth: health care resources are scarce, but we should
append this catchphrase. Health care resources are scarce for poor
people.
I have termed our health, educational, economic and social inequi-
ties, "Passive Eugenics."' 153 Passive Eugenics is societal hypocrisy about
an inequitable health care system that is inferior to that of all other major
industrialized countries, even though politicians and leaders of our com-
mercial and so-called-and I emphasize that-not-for-profit health care
industry persist in proclaiming the hoax that our health care system is the
best in the world. It is not.
Passive Eugenics is the societal acceptance of infant and other mor-
tality rates, which are extremely high. Passive Eugenics is a society that
countenances homeless mothers and children living on the streets in sub-
zero weather while academic poverty pimps make tenure and fortunes by
investigating why poor children have lower test scores and achievements
than their classmates, who have extensive libraries at home, parental
assistance, computers with educational CD-ROMs, and access to the
Internet.
For the purpose of this panel, I place Passive Eugenics with so-
cially-assisted dying, or suicide with socially sanctioned dying, or, to put
it bluntly, active and passive euthanasia. For example, several years ago,
a working poor black father and mother attempted, at about two o'clock
in the morning, in the winter, to obtain emergency care for their very sick
two-month-old child at a medical center in Chicago. Several other hospi-
tals had turned them down, and eventually the parents had to take their
child to Cook County Hospital, where he died. Can you imagine your-
self in that situation? If the child had been that of a member of the board
of trustees or the medical staff, or a faculty member, or anyone who was
distinguished or important, the child would have been admitted with
alacrity. The parents knew why their pleas were in vain. The next day
the parents were interviewed on television and said that if they had not
been poor, their child would be alive. They were never heard from
again.
These are the defenseless, silent, working poor who believe in our
so-called democracy, the salt of the earth, whom we dump on daily. If
they had been drug dealers, rapists, child or wife abusers, or wife killers,
they would have had daily episodes about them on television, radio, and
152 See 1997 ALMANAC ATLAS AND YEARBOOK 173, 288 (Otto Johnson ed., 50th ed.
1997) (listing the infant mortality rates for Cuba (8/1000) and the United States (8.3/1000)).
153 See James E. Bowman, The Road to Eugenics, 3 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 491-
517 (1996).
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in the newspapers and numerous magazines, and defense lawyers would
trample on one another to proclaim their rights.
Tragically, I heard no one from the right-to-life movement who op-
posed assisted suicide but claimed this child's right to life. This working
poor black family was not news, even though they had fulfilled all the
precepts of our market democracy. Both of them worked; they had never
been on welfare; they may have even had the ultimate keys to the king-
dom: Churchgoers. But I'm not certain of this. Even so, passive, not
active euthanasia had been perpetrated on this innocent infant. The spec-
ter of socially-assisted dying is an absolute disgrace.
We pontificate while there are forty million uninsured in the ne-
glected class-I hate the word "underclass." These Americans in this the
most affluent of societies face societal euthanasia, but perhaps they are
fortunate. No one would allocate thousands of dollars a day to keep
them forcibly as living dead on machines. We say that they are free and
we are free, unlike the freedom in our enemy countries. Oddly, we never
mention the lack of freedom and human rights atrocities in our friendly
countries. Yes, our neglected class is free. To paraphrase Anatole
France, the neglected class has, like the wealthy, the same freedom to
live under bridges and beg in the streets.
Our health care establishment, with a few exceptions, is loudly si-
lent about executives of managed care systems who individually siphon
millions of dollars yearly from their captive health care subscribers by
denying access to appropriate medical care. This is unabashedly pre-
meditated murder. They apply cost-benefit analysis to human life, which
is disgraceful.
Now, it has been inferred that a major objection to assisted suicide
is that it will be disproportionately practiced on poor minorities and lead
to genocide. I think this is nonsense, because the denial of health care
which is practiced every day is cheaper. They would not even get in the
door. The specter of genocide is waved to dupe poor people into believ-
ing that society cares for them, but they know better. Poor people are
daily on the front lines of health, economic, social, and political discrimi-
nation, where there are no trenches or bomb shelters to hide.
But please do not wave the Constitution in my face. Slavery, lynch-
ing, school and racial segregation, the denial of voting rights to women
and blacks and other atrocities were all at one time constitutional, and
many of these inhumanities are still with us today.
The awesome power of the State is also now descending with un-
speakable horror to deny health care to Mexican immigrants and health
care and schooling to their children. These much maligned immigrants
are merely recouping lands that we stole from their ancestors and taking
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jobs that U.S. citizens shun. This is my final example of active societal
euthanasia, but the examples are endless.
When health care workers, physicians, theologians, academicians,
politicians, jurists, and legislators who oppose assisted suicide become
ethically consistent and also challenge socially sanctioned dying, and ac-
tive and passive euthanasia by our inequitable health care system, I will
then respect their position, but I will still dissent.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would just like to follow up on Professor
Payton's remarks by saying that another consequence of the withdrawal
of treatment cases has been the withdrawal of treatment from infants
with disabilities that, in fact, are not inconsistent with a normal life span
and a reasonable quality of life. That's another very drastic fall down the
slippery slope.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A question for Professor Bowman. Since
persons with disabilities were the ultimate victims of euthanasia in Nazi
Germany and the ultimate victims of eugenics, do you believe that since
eugenics never died, this is the continuance of that sort of philosophy,
that the passive euthanasia that you were talking about is a continuance
of that policy for persons with disabilities?
DR. BOWMAN: I think that eugenics is alive and well in the
United States, and we can talk another couple of hours on that with re-
spect to prenatal diagnosis. But I still will defend the woman's right to
make her own decision as far as what's going to happen to her body with
respect to prenatal diagnosis and abortion.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm a member of Not Dead Yet, and I
would like to make a point for the audience's benefit. Not Dead Yet is
emphatically not a part of the right-to-life movement. We have nothing
to do with the right-to-life movement; we don't want to be identified
with them; we are a specialized group of persons with disabilities that
have organized around this one issue because we agree with Dr. Bowman
that eugenics never died.
I would like to address a question to Ms. Coleman. Ms. Tucker
talked about the constitutional right to assisted suicide in her legal re-
marks, and I would also address this question to her if she were here. Do
you see a problem with confining a constitutional right to assisted suicide
exclusively to people with terminal illnesses, or is there a danger of ex-
pansion, and if so, how and why?
MS. COLEMAN: I think that if there is a constitutional right found,
it would be difficult to limit that right. That's basically the nature of a
constitutional right: if something is declared a constitutional right, then
limitations on it are very heavily scrutinized.
I suspect that the right-to-die proponents who brought these cases
not only hand-picked their plaintiffs to be the very extreme cases that Mr.
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Shapiro was alluding to this morning, but also that they have the strategy
of asking for a constitutional right, knowing that that is a completely
absurd concept. In fact, they intend in effect to negotiate the second
point. If it is declared unconstitutional, then it's a states' rights issue. I
feel, frankly that the so-called right to die should be found unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause as it's currently being proposed,
because some people, based on health status, would have this so-called
right to live which would not, in fact, be granted to people who don't
have that health status. So it is, in fact, a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to create the kind of supposedly narrow right to die that pro-
ponents are talking about.
MS. PAYTON: In the interest of balance, I would respect the char-
acterization of the proponents of the right here. I think a good many of
the proponents and a good many of the people in Michigan who are in-
volved in litigation are the able-bodied elderly and persons with a termi-
nal illness, persons who were never disabled, and persons who were
probably not thinking about the disabled community when they filed
their lawsuit. What they are concerned about is their own control. They
are people who have historically had mastery over themselves and they
wish to continue that. I know that the question of death with dignity is a
matter of grave concern for many high-status elderly people.
MS. BIENEN: I would like to add that I assume that the lawyers
who have been arguing the cases pro bono for the right to die would say
that: 'Well, that's what courts are for, to make distinctions. Yes, it's not
an easy bright line distinction, and equal protection has been something
which has been interpreted by the courts for hundreds of years. Yes, it's
changed. Yes, there are contradictions, but that's what courts are for." I
think that's how the proponents would respond.
Of course they hand-pick their cases, but anyone who brings that
kind of litigation always does that. I don't know whether the decision
deliberately to have plaintiffs who do not include anybody who could be
classified as disabled was part of that choice or not. Sometimes these
lawsuits develop and you don't have as much control as you thought you
would.
V. SESSION FIVE: REFLECTIONS BY MARCA BRISTO
MS. RYAN: Good afternoon, I am Shirley Ryan. I am the Chair-
man of Pathways Awareness Foundation in Chicago, Illinois and the
President of Pathways Center for Children in Glenview, Illinois [and a
member of the National Counsel on Disability]. I have the great pleasure
of introducing Marca Bristo. Marca has also asked me to say a few
words on the issue of youth and children with disabilities.
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Let me start by saying: "Happiness is a thing called hope," and
"Where there is life, there is hope." As a mother of a child with a disa-
bility, whom I love as I do my other two sons, and as a person who has
helped co-found a center where thousands of children with physical disa-
bilities have come for physical and speech therapy with their parents, I
am encouraged by this conference focusing on the personal worth of a
person with a disability.
A few minutes is not enough time to cite Marca's biography, for she
is a unique and distinctive leader in the world of disability rights. As
President and Chief Executive Officer of Access Living, Marca is nation-
ally recognized for her innovative and entrepreneurial attempts in every
direction to open doors and to open minds to the potential of persons
with disabilities.
In 1979, Marca helped found Access Living, Chicago's only non-
residential independent living program for people with disabilities.
Marca is a past president of the National Council on Independent Living,
which she co-founded. She served on a congressionally appointed task
force on the rights and empowerment of Americans with disabilities,
which helped create the ADA. Marca was the 1993 Henry B. Betts lau-
reate, which many of us know and recognize as the Nobel Prize awarded
for outstanding work in the field of disability.
It is through serving with Marca, who is our Chair on the National
Council on Disability, that I have come to know Marca well and admire
her work. The National Council on Disability is a presidentially ap-
pointed committee of fifteen whose mandate is to advise the President
and the Congress on a myriad of public policy issues related to disability.
We began working together several years ago when the ADA first
was passed. I at the Chicago Community Trust and Marca at Access
Living helped create the first publication in magazine format that ex-
plained to the Chicago general public the Americans with Disabilities
Act in 1990. We attempted to create a supplement which would help
educate the public about the hopes, the history, and the rights of children
and adults with disabilities.
My personal focus in disability is on issues concerning children and
youth. It is very interesting to see the way that Marca has taken on the
issues of children and youth and understood them, although these issues
were not her original concerns. What Marca has understood is that chil-
dren, youth, and adults encounter the same barriers; that children and
youth are a powerful voice for waking the American conscience in order
that many adult members of the society can learn to understand the po-
tential of persons with disabilities.
In 1985, we created Pathways Center for Children, where children
work hundreds of hours on state-of-the-art physical and occupational
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therapy to learn the language of physical movement. We soon under-
stood that it was "the stares, not the stairs which are harder!" We realized
there was a need to create an organization that would reflect the parents'
vision of the potential of a child with a disability.
People stare at children and talk to their parents instead of the child.
Worse, people often ignore the parents and the child, or worse still, ex-
press pity about the child to the parents. On this I can speak on my own
behalf and on behalf of many parents who I have known personally
through Pathways Awareness and Pathways Center: how much the par-
ents appreciate that child's life. They may have other children, but they
are so grateful for the joy that child has brought them. The parents are
grateful for that child's life!
Pity is an uninformed response. Parents know that their child with
the disability has raised their conscience to the potential of each person.
Parents are grateful for they understand the quality of life that has been
brought to their life by their own child who has a disability, how much
the experience has cemented their entire family by elevating family func-
tion beyond that of simple coping. The family attitude becomes one of,
"Let's pull together as a team, and let us appreciate what each can do."
Children and youth have three major issues, and it is the purpose of
Pathways Awareness to address all of these issues. Pathways Awareness
provides education for and about early detection, early intervention, and
inclusion of children with physical differences. Early detection is some-
thing we all understand. Early intervention is physical therapy and ongo-
ing support so that the child will be able to function fully to his or her
maximum potential. Inclusion for children and youth deals with inclu-
sion not at the employment level, but inclusion into school and neighbor-
hood activities with the proper supports, so that inclusion can be
successful for everyone.
Inclusion means that my child will be able to participate in after-
school activities, karate, scouting, dance, music, sports, not in a "separate
and equal" environment, but in an inclusive environment with other chil-
dren in order that all can share gifts. It is not what I will do for you, but
what we do for each other by increasing each other's understanding of
life that matters.
Inclusion also involves health care. How many times have parents
with children, who happen to have disabilities, come to a physician who
is both nervous and/or pitying? What inappropriate responses when, in
the eyes of the parents, love raises the child beyond barriers. Life and
hope are the questions that we are talking about.
I must compliment the conveners for their vision, for their courage,
and for the enormous effort that they put in to present the balanced per-
spectives before us. All of us walked in here with a point of view and
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many of us walked in with an emotionally charged point of view. We
have heard many perspectives, many voices talking about things that are
important. What is more important to us than our own life and our own
ability to affect the quality of our life? Life has many levels of wisdom.
Marca understands the balance and the importance of each person's
contribution to the disability movement. She understands the children,
the youth, the adults and the multi-disability perspectives. My own
mother was a public health nurse and Marca is a nurse. Marca ap-
proaches these issues with the judgment and experience of a fine medical
practitioner, someone who understands the special quality in each of us
and the gifts that each of us have to bring to each other.
So I present to you Marca Bristo.
MS. BRISTO: I was asked to reflect on the previous discussions
and that's a different role for me. I spent the last two days or the last day
and a half really listening to all of you, listening for elements of this
issue that I may have missed. So I came into this without notes, without
knowing what I was going to say. I'd like to ramble a little, if I may, and
help you understand why the National Council on Disability has reached
the very difficult position we did in the paper on physician-assisted sui-
cide that I hope all of you picked up.
First, to Drew Batavia and Hugh Gallagher, I said to them a little
while ago, "This is a first. This is the first time I'm able to look at a
'crip' and call him truly courageous." You were. Thank you. As I
watched the film of the little baby learning her independence, I reflected
back on one of the first employees of Access Living, a woman named Jill
who was hired to run our personal-assistance program. Much like the
baby in the film, she was born without arms and legs. When Jill was
born, the doctor threw her away. She was breathing; she was living, but
he threw her in the trash. The nurse recovered her and brought her to her
mother. Her mother made certain she knew that story. She didn't shield
her from the truth. She turned that truth into that girl's strength.
My mind wandered on after that to reflect on the deaf woman who
came to her priest after an operation where both breasts had been re-
moved in a bilateral mastectomy, which she did not know she was under-
going because an interpreter had not been provided. She was
embarrassed to tell the practitioner she couldn't read his notes. Or, the
young woman with severe cerebral palsy who came to see me-when I
was a nurse-with a Ouija board pointing out her message to me. The
tears started to flow, and she told me she just had a hysterectomy that she
didn't want. No one had taken the time to listen to her.
I thought of my family member who is living with AIDS right now,
defying all the odds for twelve years, twelve years. I thought of how
when he first told us, he talked about helping him end his life, and how
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grateful I am that he did not elect to do that. He's held out for all those
twelve years for this right, and now he's beginning to change his think-
ing because of signs that technology has put drugs on the market that
extend the lives of people with AIDS. But that technology is out of
reach for so many because they can't afford it.
I thought how similar that discussion was to the people you've
heard from today, people who talked about how they want to live in the
community, but they are forced into institutions. For example, my cur-
rent employee, Ann, developed a respiratory complication post-polio,
and just adjusted to a ventilator. Her doctor called me to say, "What are
we going to do? The managed care plan will send her to the nursing
home but won't give her the limited period of time she needs with a
skilled practitioner to help her learn vent care until she can do it herself."
I thought of my best friend who yesterday had a second, "Hail
Mary" bone marrow transplant that is not likely to work. I thought of
how many times he and I sat in the most painful discussion talking about
the issue of physician-assisted suicide, he trying to convince me that was
the most important act of empowerment he had before him, and me try-
ing to convince him that he just hadn't looked at it the right way yet.
We've sat here for two days talking about these things. We are at a
moment in time, a moment in time framed by a vote that yesterday over-
whelmingly passed in the House of Representatives, which no one has
mentioned, that bans federal funding for assisted suicide. I shared that
with someone. He said, "But they are jumping the gun. They are look-
ing at the funding before they've asked and answered the question,
Should we do this?"
I thought of Drew and his friend Mike, and many questions came to
my mind. Number one, why did Mike have so many repeated requests to
die. Maybe he did; maybe he didn't have access to the $400 cushion that
I sit on to avoid the kind of sore he suffered from. Maybe he did; maybe
he didn't. Why was he giving up when the leader of the disability polit-
ical computer network, Fred Faye, has been lying on his stomach for the
last twenty years mobilizing all of us into action. I don't think it's be-
cause he desperately needed the right to die. I think it's because no one
had helped him get inside himself to believe in his ability to have a
meaningful life whatever the challenges were. Why?
When we organized ten years ago and passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act, I have to say to you from my heart: Physician-assisted
suicide is not the right for which I thought we were fighting. It is not the
right for which people went to jail. It is not the right for which people
wrote hundreds of diaries, telling the world and the Congress what it
means to be disabled in America. This is not what we had in mind. We
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had in mind the reversal of discrimination, not the perpetuation of it
through stereotype.
So I say to myself, how is it that friends like myself and the gen-
tleman I referred to, friends such as Drew and Hugh and their friends,
why is it that we can work so closely and so hard together on this issue
and yet fundamentally disagree? I don't really have the answer. I have
confidence in our belief in each other and that we will come through this.
But when they speak to me of choice and self-determination, to me that
choice is subterfuge. Death should not be our choice. Life should be our
choice. Somehow I feel like we've gotten sidetracked.
The ADA was a tool for us. Yes, it was a tool, a legal tool, and as
such it helps us fight discrimination. But it was so much more, is so
much more than that to us. Have we forgotten the symbolism of what
this law has meant? Have we forgotten the statement embodied in this
law: for the first time in the world, a statement that disability is a normal
part of life? Have we forgotten how important this message has been all
around the world? The universality of disability happens to all of us
everywhere. Have we forgotten that we embrace those values?
What would it mean if we took this path, right now, as a nation?
What would it mean to all those millions of disabled people, 500 million
plus and growing all around the world, who have looked into this country
and have seen what we have seen, that is, the hope that there can be a
different and better future?
Only last year, or the year before, the UN finally began the process
of labeling discrimination against people with disabilities as a human
rights violation. For the first time in history, we deplored China's treat-
ment of disabled girls in the "dying rooms" where they put those little
disabled kids to starve and die. We deplored it and called it a human
rights violation, and yet here we are talking about legalizing that and
calling it assisted dying.
We are at a fork in the road, and we can't have it both ways. We
can't embrace the hope that the ADA embodies and choose a course that
leads our people to death. Liberty interests? What liberty? What liberty
for the 70 percent of the 49 million disabled people who are unem-
ployed? 5 4 For some of my friends here who are black and female, that
number goes up significantly. 155 What liberty? The ADA was about
changing all of that.
So I then say, Why now? Why now seven short years after the
world has begun to tackle the most difficult type of discrimination? Be-
154 See Blanck, supra note 25, at 873 n.95.
155 See id. at 876 n.106.
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cause it does take more than an attitude change. It sometimes takes some
money. Why now?
I'm not a conspiracy-theory person, but I am a person who learns
lessons from history, particularly from other movements that have pre-
ceded us. I'd like to tell you something about another moment in history
that began when the women's movement was just about to claim some
victories.
Pulitzer Prize-winning author Susan Faludi in her book, Backlash,
talks about the movement. 156 Although the backlash is not an organized
movement, that doesn't make it any less destructive. In fact, the lack of
orchestration, the absence of a single string-puller only makes it harder to
detect and perhaps more effective. A backlash against women's rights
succeeds to the degree that it appears not to be political, that it appears
not to be a struggle. Faludi goes on to say that the backlash adopts dis-
guises. I want you to think about the discussion we have had here today
as I tell you what those disguises look like and see if you recognize any
of them.
The backlash pursues a divide-and-conquer strategy pitting working
women against homemakers, middle against working class, married
against single women, pitting us against each other. It remarkets old
myths as new facts. Joe Shapiro told us about myths, lots of myths.
They go underground in us. The backlash points the finger inward where
it does its greatest damage, where we begin to believe we are the burden.
We are the burden.
Someone talked to us about the studies in the Netherlands. We
heard that the greatest reason people turn- to this course of action is be-
cause they don't want to be a burden.
So when we say "why now," I think we need to remember that the
year before last they were not disguising the effort. Amendments were
being put up to derail, remove, and eliminate the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act. They were fighting health care reform. They were devolv-
ing Medicaid and letting the states decide who is disabled and who is not.
They found many more direct ways to try to turn the clock back in time.
When they realized that the American people didn't like such a di-
rect attack, maybe, maybe they shifted our attention from the civil liber-
ties to this discussion. You've heard so much about the costs of living
with disability. You've heard so much about the wasted lives of people
who are not given the opportunity to live independently.
There is a certain irony that the debate we've been having carries
the same acronym, PAS, physician-assisted suicide, as the lifeline for the
disability dommunity, another PAS, personal-assistance services. I have
156 SusAN FALUDI, BACKLASH (1991).
1998]
390 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:267
to believe that if the Rehabilitation Institute hung up a poster in North-
western's law school and medical school that said, we are going to have
a major meeting on personal-assistance services, this auditorium would
have been empty. Why? Why? I can't answer that. You have to answer
that.
I'm left, however, feeling that there are too many unanswered ques-
tions. In light of all those questions that haven't been asked, the discus-
sions that haven't been had, how can we move down this path?
Questions like, if self-determination is the ultimate litmus test, are you
willing to deregulate it completely so that my friend Ray, a psychiatric
survivor, who I might point out under current proposals would not have
this civil liberty because she's crazy, would have this right. It's as if we
are all on different lines: the crazy line, the able-bodied line, and the crip
line. We all get routed into different directions. In the civil rights move-
ment, they called that redlining. What a type of redlining.
When the National Council sat down to have this discussion, I had
neatly and tidily in my own little mind asked and answered the questions.
I knew exactly where to go, thank you very much. Then my friends
started challenging me, my family members, my dear friends, all of these
people, and I went all the way back and started over again, as I'm sure
many people in this room have done. I came full circle, not without a lot
of difficulty and pain. We reached a consensus on the Council, although
not always for the same reasons.
My friend who represented the psychiatric survivor community re-
jected this so-called choice because it wasn't a choice for them. It was
not equal. They also rejected this "choice" because of how much power
we would be putting in the hands of the medical profession.
Is it really a matter of choice and power when you have to get per-
mission to do it? Though we came at it from very different places, we
ended up together, able to say: the liberty interests of the few, who are
not able to afford this course of action on their own right now, are far
outweighed by the risks to the many, seven short years after the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act was passed.
I'd like to close not on a note of despair because that is not where I
am. I and my colleagues here are motivated by a very strong sense of
purpose exemplified by one of my new-found heroes, Deval Patrick, the
former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. He says that the
unifying theme of our work is very broad. The real and ultimate agenda
is to reclaim the American conscience. Our true mission is to restore the
great moral imperative that civil rights is all about. This nation, as I see
it, has a creed. That creed is deeply rooted in the concepts of equality,
opportunity, and fair play. Our faith in that creed has made us a prideful
nation and enabled us to accomplish feats of extraordinary achievement
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and uplift, and yet in the same instant we see racism and unfairness all
around us. In the same instant we see acts of unspeakable cruelty and
even violence, based upon race or ethnicity or gender or disability or
sexual orientation. These present a legal problem to be sure, but they
also pose a moral dilemma. How can a nation founded on these princi-
ples, educated to such a creed, sometimes fall so short? Let me assure
you that is a question asked not just by intellectuals and professionals, it
is asked by simple, everyday people of each other and of themselves
every day.
To understand civil rights, you must understand how it feels: how it
feels to be hounded by uncertainty and fear about whether you will be
fairly treated; how it feels to be trapped in someone else's stereotype, to
have people look right through you. You must understand that the vic-
tims of discrimination feel a deep and helpless pain and ask themselves
the very question of morality I have just posed. What will be our answer
as a society? Will we sit back and claim that we have no answer, or that
it is not our business to devise one? Will we shrink from the moral
dimension of our work? The answer is no. We will not shrink. There is
a moral dimension, and we will assert it. Thank you.
VI. SESSION SIX: A FORUM FOR PRESENTERS AND
AUDIENCE TO INTERACT
DR. BLANCK: Why don't we reconvene. What a fabulous two
days so far, and one thing that we always hear when we do conferences
of this sort is that we need a lot of time and opportunity for interaction
and free discussion with the participants, and by the participants I mean
not only the speakers but the audience as well.157
This is your time to convey your opinion, to address anybody in
particular. We will have basic town-hall type meeting rules. Common
courtesy will prevail. Those of you in the front, if you raise your hand, a
microphone will be brought to you, or to those of you who cannot get to
the assistant half way up. There are no formal remarks here. Why don't
we begin the discussion.
157 During the conference, audience members received questionnaires asking for general
biographical information. The audience consisted of 82 men and 119 women. In attendance,
there were 6 lawyers, 16 ethicists, 14 physicians; 29 disability advocates, 39 medical students,
6 law students, 18 allied health professionals, 24 nurses, 15 specialists in rehabilitation, and 21
religious leaders. People filling out the surveys were also presented with nine scefiarios in-
volving palliative care, withdrawing and withholding life sustaining treatment, physician-as-
sisted suicide, and active voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. For each scenario,
respondents were asked to mark whether they believed the scenario was: 1) clearly an example
of physician-assisted suicide, 2) clearly not an. example of physician-assisted suicide, or 3)
perhaps an example of physician assisted suicide. Dr. Carol Gili and Dr. Kristi Kirschner will
release the results later in 1998.
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First question. Please tell us who you are addressing it to. If you
want it to be a comment, that's fine as well. We ask that you be as brief
as possible.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm here as a health care professional.
I'm a physical therapist, and I'm also a part-time, fill-in personal attend-
ant and a student of bioethics, so my question is to everybody in general.
I try to understand the perspective of individuals with disabilities, but at
this conference I've heard such different views expressed. One person
says, give me the choice. Another seems to say, continue to look for
another way. How do I distinguish among opinions?
DR. GILL: I think in some ways you are in a position that a lot of
men are in with respect to women and women's rights groups, versus
women who are not in women's rights groups. It isn't just the disability
community in which there is a range of opinions. There is also, however,
consensus about rights.
I know even when I interact with women who don't consider them-
selves feminists, who don't identify with some of the ideas that I have
about being a woman, part of me has to respect the difference; and yet I
still feel that I have to listen to their experience and what they say about
it through a rights perspective.
As far as interacting with people with disabilities who are despair-
ing, I think it's always appropriate to ask why: What's going on? I think,
in fact, it's not only appropriate, I think it's our responsibility wherever
we encounter anyone in despair to try and find out why. The next ques-
tion is, What can we do? The individual, himself or herself, doesn't al-
ways have the answer.
I think we also have to realize that with asking why, there comes a
responsibility not only to try to understand what the individual knows to
ask for, but also to try to present additional options for that individual.
Then, at some point, you have a responsibility to yourself, too, not to go
beyond what you feel is right in doing what an individual asks you to do.
It's complicated.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Are you saying that assisted suicide
should be an option, so that they have more options available, or that it
shouldn't be considered as an option because then you are feeling that we
are offering it because they are disabled? Do you know what I'm
saying?
DR. GILL: Say it again.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You say that more options are better, but
some people say that assisted suicide shouldn't even be an option.
DR. GILL: I think that one of the areas lacking in clarity has to do
with suicide as a personal option versus legalizing assisted suicide,
which requires changing our laws and changing protections that vulnera-
[Vol. 7:267
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ble classes have now. By "vulnerable," I don't mean people who are
passive and unable to practice self-determination. I mean people who are
devalued to such an extent in society that they are endangered.
There are some alternatives that are not good. There are alternatives
that would endanger other people. As Marca indicated, perhaps the priv-
ileges that would benefit a few people have to be weighed against the
danger and the deficits that those privileges would bring to the majority.
I think that's a situation that we need to assess with our own conscience
and our own sense of morality, but always bearing in mind the values
and the rights and the dangers that other people in our society
experience.
DR. BLANCK: Leigh Bienen, you wanted to jump in.
MS. BIENEN: I just wanted to say that this issue emphasizes,
again, for me how much we live in a polity. We live in a large and
diverse community. These decisions govern the lives and futures, and
behavior and health of all of us. Of course, these are political decisions,
and we expect easy answers.
We think it's going to be: Well, are you for it or against it? If one
thing has emerged in this conference, which is quite shocking, it is how
little of a factual basis we have for making these decisions. We have no
reliable data.
You know, we don't have a good, sound factual analysis of our
health care system. We can't possibly have an open and informed debate
on access to medical care, availability of long-term care, without a fac-
tual basis for the discussion. These issues are not on the agenda for seri-
ous discussion by the electorate. And we live in this society. We all live
in it, and it's going to be the kind of society we allow it to be, because of
the way we behave, the way we do what we do. It's not going to be
someone else who decides it. It's going to be us.
DR. BLANCK: Diane Coleman?
MS. COLEMAN: Responding to your comment about the perspec-
tive and the various perspectives of the disabilities community, I've had
the opportunity since co-founding Not Dead Yet to speak to many
groups, particularly groups of people with disabilities about this issue.
What appears to be true, although I can't say I've taken any formal sur-
vey, is that most folks over the last decades have been shaped in their
opinion by the kind of media coverage that Joe Shapiro alluded to and
described this morning, which is full of myths. Pretty much the debate
so far has been framed as that of progressive, compassionate folks who
favor legalization and expansion against folks who really want to hold
the line based on primarily very rigid religious views. I feel that there
has not been a lot of attention paid to the issues of oppression, prejudice,
and economics.
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Ironically in a way, I think, that what Haavi Morreim said yesterday
about "follow the money" is really one of the most significant avenues to
pursue in this context. But what I have found when I present the factual
information is that most folks with disabilities have a different view after
they hear about the Bouvia case, hear the court quotes, hear what differ-
ent folks have said about the issues, when they learn about the medical
profession.
DR. BLANCK: Thank you.
MR. BATAVIA: This whole issue has been absolutely fascinating
to me because it disclosed to me something I hadn't realized about the
disability community before. That is that different people with disabili-
ties have entirely different views of themselves, their society, and other
people with disabilities. I hadn't realized that there was this much of a
divide. It's almost analogous to what we've discovered from the O.J.
Simpson trial and the division between how blacks and whites view O.J.
Simpson's guilt or innocence.
I recently had a debate with Paul Longmore. I thought at the begin-
ning of our debate that we were going to be able to find significant areas
of agreement. As we discussed this issue for about an hour and a half, I
came to realize that Paul Longmore and I looked at this issue and our
society in a fundamentally different way. Paul regards people with disa-
bilities as an oppressed minority. I don't.
We obviously have had very different life experiences. I think in
some sense we may well be talking about two entirely different disabil-
ity communities here: that community of people who consider them-
selves autonomous and not oppressed-Paul Miller called us elitists the
other day, maybe we are, I don't know-and the other community; and I
acknowledge that there is a significant group of people with disabilities
who are in institutions and may consider themselves oppressed.
In addressing this issue and the multitude of disability issues that
come before us, we have to address the concerns of both of these groups.
I have heard the arguments on the other side. I have great respect for
Marca and the other opponents of this right. I hear, loud and clear, what
they are saying. With respect to myself and that group of people with
disabilities who don't consider ourselves oppressed, I'm simply not will-
ing to give away that right to autonomy, which is still the way I define
this issue.
When I went to Berkeley back in 1975, I was among those at the
very initial stages of the disability rights movement who were asserting
our right to autonomy, and I listened to the leaders back then. They told
me that I should take control of every aspect of my life. I bought into
that idea, and I think that is one of the reasons for my success and happi-
ness in life.
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Now twenty or so years later, I'm told that I should take control of
every aspect of my life except control over my death should I become
terminally ill. I can't agree to that, and I'll never agree to that. I do
agree, however, that in recognizing this right, we do need to protect those
vulnerable people with disabilities who are, in fact, vulnerable; and we
need to recognize that there is this great diversity in the disability
community.
DR. BLANCK: Thank you. Let's take some more questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Having been in a vegetative state for two
weeks and knowing people who have been in that state for much longer,
I believe that for another person to decide that a person's quality of life is
not going to be any good is a poor way of judging quality of life. I
wouldn't be here today if somebody had decided and convinced my hus-
band that I had no quality of life. The issue that we are dealing with is
not a matter of dying. Dying is easy, folks. Living is the challenge.
Living takes a lot of struggle, a lot of effort.
I wasn't born disabled. I was disabled later on in life, so I know
both sides of the coin. If anybody thinks there is a safety net out there
and that anything is going to help you when the time comes-and that's
every able-bodied person in this auditorium-the time is going to come
when you are going to get hit in the face like I was. And like a lot of
other people, you are going to find out that the people sitting around you
who call themselves disabled know full well what the issue is.
To make a broad statement that 60 percent of the population of the
disabled community wants assisted suicide is absolutely wrong. Before
you say that, you have to go into the nursing homes. Go and talk to the
people working in the independent living centers, the people that I work
with on a day-to-day basis.
People with disabilities want to talk for themselves. You are enti-
tled to your opinion. I'm entitled to mine, but globally we have to come
together. Thank you very much.
DR. BLANCK: Any responses to that? Or, another question?
DR. GILL: I was just going to say that Drew Batavia was talking
about the split between people who support legalizing assisted suicide
and those who don't, but there is another split in our community. I think
that's a split between people who are seeking an individual or personal
right-and this comes right off of your comment-and those who are not
just coming from a personal perspective and personal experience, but are
trying to also take into consideration the collective, the right of the com-
munity or the concerns or benefits of the community.
I don't think Paul Longmore's personal experience is all that differ-
ent from Drew Batavia's, except that he was disabled, of course, early in
life. But I do think that what he represents every time I hear him speak is
1998]
396 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:267
what he reads about and hears about as the dynamics affecting our entire
community.
MR. BATAVIA: There are those of us who believe that the best
way to pursue the interests of the community is to do so through the
individual rights of every person with a disability within the community.
By guaranteeing those rights to autonomy, we best enhance the situation
of the community. It's just a different perspective and a different ap-
proach toward disability rights.
DR. GILL: Right. I think we agree on how we disagree.
DR. BLANCK: Another question?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I come from the hospice profession.
Mine is more of a comment than a question. I want to applaud Mr. Sha-
piro for his awareness of and advocacy for the hospice movement be-
cause I believe that in the cases of terminally ill patients that we can
provide a very viable and enriching alternative to physician-assisted
suicide.
MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you for that comment. I just want to say
that I've written recently about something that is really sort of a threat, I
guess, to the hospice providers, and that is the issue of the audits from
Operation Restore Trust. The Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices is basically cracking down on hospices. The federal regulation for
providing Medicare payments for people in hospices requires that they
have life expectancies of six months.
We know that it's almost impossible to predict how long somebody
is going to live, and the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Inspector General's Office have gone around and conducted audits at
various hospices and have asked for a repayment in many cases where
people are living for longer than six months. In a majority of cases they
are saying that these people were admitted too soon.
The Inspector General's Office sees a health care benefit that has
grown substantially in recent years. If it's grown that fast, there be must
be some abuse; there must be some fraud involved.
Hospice providers are saying: look, we are expanding. We are pro-
viding important care that people need, and this kind of auditing will
have a chilling effect on doctors referring patients to hospices. We've
seen that effect already in states where these audits have gone on. It's an
interesting case, for it shows, again, this tension between providing ser-
vice and trying to limit health care expenditures.
DR. BLANCK: Thank you.
DR. BOWMAN: I think the most important thing is for us all to
fight for health care for all because if we allow ourselves to be divided
up, then we will be split and conquered. Many of those problems could
be resolved if we had an equitable health care system with access for all.
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The other statement I'd like to make is that I hate the term "limited
resources." We've been brainwashed. We say "limited resources," and I
see billions of dollars being spent on airplanes that don't fly and many
other things. That, I will not accept, just like I will not accept the notion
that health care resources are scarce; they are not. The important thing is
that if we were to reach a consensus about everything, then I'd be
worried.
Somebody once asked me, Dr. Bowman, why don't you all have a
leader-one leader amongst the African-Americans? I said that's the
most dangerous. He would either be shot or infiltrated or bought off; and
that's what will happen.
The important thing is to stick together, all of us, because we are all
potentially disabled or disabled or going to die. There is no doubt about
that. If we could get equitable health care for all and get each organiza-
tion to fight for it and not take no for an answer, then many of our
problems that we've been discussing would be resolved.
DR. BLANCK: Hugh Gallagher, are you going to die?
MR. GALLAGHER: I was going to say that we are the wealthiest
country in the history of the world. We have, I believe it to be true, the
lowest personal tax rate of any of the industrialized countries. We have a
national budget that is closer to balance than any of the major industrial
countries.
We are the only industrial country in the world-aside from South
Africa-that does not have universal health care. It's a matter of prior-
ity. This nation happens to be going through a very selfish phase. It's a
problem larger than this conference.
. I'd like to say to the woman who was talking about the diversity of
disabled people: We are as diverse a group as America itself. We are
left wing. We are right wing. We are rich. We are poor. We vary from
people like Fred Faye who has lived on his stomach for twenty years to
0. J. Simpson who has a bad knee.
It's difficult for us to speak on behalf of the disabled community
because there is no consensus of view. It is no more possible than to say
America thinks this or America thinks that. But then I'd like to get back
to the point that I am an American. I am a human being. I'm a Chris-
tian. I am a disabled person, but I am not only a disabled person. I am
not only a Christian. As an American, I take great pleasure, pride, and
value in the rights that I have in the Bill of Rights and the right to run my
own life, my own individual decision-making. I will not presume to in-
trude on anyone else's decision-making, but I will not let anyone else
intrude upon mine.
I feel that suicide is a sin, but God allows man to sin. I must retain
my personal rights, but I do not want to break with the disability move-
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ment. I believe in everything it has stood for, and I will continue to work
for it.
DR. BLANCK: Let's take some more questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In the last seven weeks, I've personally
had five deaths in my family. I have not heard anyone say anything
about support to families coping with death.
DR. BLANCK: Very good point.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My comment on that is that often we
don't have family support because our family may not share our view of
disability with us. As you've seen, there are some very strong opinions
about disability in this room and how we see ourselves, and I was sharing
with Joe earlier that my family and I disagree on nearly everything.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is an important question, and I
think it ties in to what the woman who is studying to be a physical thera-
pist asked earlier. We look to the medical community a lot when people
become disabled, when people acquire disabilities, to tell us: How are
we going to be able to live the rest of our lives? What resources are
available?
I think part of the problem, if you will, with physician-assisted sui-
cide or physician-induced dying, as I started to call it-because every-
thing else is a misnomer-the fact is when we talk about physician-
induced dying and disability, one of the problems is that the medical
community as such is woefully misinformed, disinformed, uninformed,
however you want to put it, about the resources for people with disabili-
ties to live in this world, whether they are physical therapists or
physicians.
If you are lucky enough to have a medical plan that will allow you
to get into the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago and if you're lucky
enough that they happen to have a bed for you at the time, then maybe
you will be one of that small percentage of people with disability who
will get decent rehab care. But even then, you may be discharged into a
nursing home or, as we more often call them, nursing prisons.
Marca Bristo talked about PAS in terms of personal-assisted serv-
ices. The real issue is, What are the resources to live? Rather than, What
are the resources to die?
Ignorance is the problem that we bring to the medical community.
We say, "You can have palliative care for people who are terminally ill."
We think that's wonderful. We think that all these other things you are
putting in place are great, but you don't know about the resources that we
need to live. And you are not doing anything to inform yourselves, and
that makes us mad. You are out there offering us the option to die with-
out offering us any options to live. That's what formed Not Dead Yet.
Thank you.
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DR. BETTS: I'm Henry Betts and I'm a doctor, and the previous
speaker really touched on part of what I wanted to say and that is, offer-
ing the option to live rather than to die.
First of all, I'd like to say that I think Hugh Gallagher is correct. I
think that the largest embarrassment in the country is that in the richest
country in the world, there are people who really can't get care. And the
people who need care are struggling through the most incredible degree
of bureaucracy.
The other thing is that-and remember I'm a physician-disabled
people have a pretty bad deal in finding a physician who can help deter-
mine whether there is a way you can live reasonably and with a high
quality of life. There is no problem finding a physician who can help
you die. But you will not find a physician very easily who can help you
determine whether there are ways to help you want to live. The reason is
that in medical schools, I would say only five percent of medical students
ever get exposed to someone who has a disability. But don't attack the
doctor too badly.
Just to add to what was said earlier about coming out of vegetative
states, I want to tell an anecdote. We have a medical student here who
saved a lot of people in a burning building and inhaled a lot of smoke
and went into a coma, and he was in a coma over at Northwestern Me-
morial Hospital. Perhaps the most famous neurologist in the country, not
a very agreeable one, but the most famous one in the country, arrived in
town having written a great deal-he eventually wrote a book on coma.
He got to the bedside of our medical student with his residents and other
students and said, "Now, here is an example of what's wrong with mod-
em health care. Here is somebody who is being kept alive, lots of money
being spent on him to no end result that is going to be worthwhile. He
should never have had his life saved after that burning building, and he
just isn't allowed to die. And here you are keeping him alive, spending a
lot of money on him here in this expensive hospital." That's what he
said. That's what he chose to say to the medical student.
Well, that medical student came out of his coma. He came to the
Institute. He was rehabilitated. He went back to medical school, and he
became a neurologist. Then he read that this neurologist wrote the book
on coma; and my medical student wrote him and said, I can't believe that
you have written a book on coma. I remember your standing by my bed
and I remember what you said. If there is anyone in the world who
should not write on coma, it is you.
DR. BLANCK: Thank you, Dr. Betts.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: At least two or three people on different
panels addressed the issue of Elizabeth Bouvia who is the first person
who went to court to ask for the right to die.
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There were some aspects of the case that were not spoken about,
and I know because I became very interested in it wondering, why would
a woman want to go to court and ask to be given permission to die?
Elizabeth Bouvia married a man who was just out of prison with
whom she had been a pen pal. When she got married the services that
had been provided to her were taken away. She lost her personal care
attendant. She lost transportation. She also lost a baby. Her brother
died. Her husband, who was underemployed, did not know how to take
care of her, and he left her.
I became interested in Elizabeth Bouvia because I wanted to under-
stand the circumstances that led up to her not wanting to live anymore.
So the point that the young woman made is that it's easy to die in this
county, but it can be very hard to live. There are many Elizabeth
Bouvias in this country right now who are dealing with services that are
inadequate and who lack support. So, for me it's not about the right to
die, but, again, going back to Elizabeth Bouvia it's about saying, I want a
right to live, but I want to do it with dignity and not have to fight these
systems in order to make sure that I can have the services I need.
DR. GILL: The point is Elizabeth Bouvia didn't say, "I want re-
sources to live." The point is that she said, I hate my body and I want to
die. And that's all that anybody heard, and that's all her case was de-
cided upon. You heard Ms. Coleman today talk about how the court saw
her. They didn't see all those factors you just mentioned. All they heard
was one thing, "I want to die; I'm tired of being disabled." That's the
danger here.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I want to say two things: The first is that
I think that we've been speaking sort of interchangeably about two very
different things. Whether any of us agree with either, neither, or both of
these things, I think that we have to speak very carefully about the dis-
tinction between saying that people who are imminently, terminally ill
ought to have access to physician-assisted suicide, whether or not they
have disabilities, and saying that people who have disabilities and find
life intolerable ought to, in the absence of terminal illness, have access to
physician-assisted suicide.
The other thing is that one speaker very wisely said that we've
learned a lot here today both about what we do and don't know. I think
that one of the things that I have noticed is that we don't know much
about why it is that some people have found the lack of access to suicide,
in fact, empowering.
Many people with disabilities and other very serious life situations
said to me, when I worked in health care, that they were glad that they
had no choice but just to go on one day at a time because it got them
through things. Other people have said that they wished they had had
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access to suicide. We don't know enough about that. We don't know
enough about the different ways that people adjust not only to disability
and terminal illness, but to all kinds of adversity.
Among those of us who agree with physician-assisted suicide and
those of us who don't, I think the common thread is that we all want to
do the best we can for people who are in desperate circumstances, the
best that we think we can. If that's true, then I think we need to know a
lot more about that question, about the differing ways that people adjust
to adversity, disability, terminal illness, and imminent death.
MS. COLEMAN: I think you are very right that it's important to be
clear about the differences between people with terminal illnesses and
people with significant disabilities; but the next question is, "What is our
culture going to do about that?"
The fact is that courts are not clear and that courts have already
ruled that they are, for legal purposes, one and the same thing virtually.
In addition, I think that it's important to look at what the proponents are
saying about the reason why they support the right. The reason isn't
terminal illness. They are concerned about "dignity."
Let me read a quote that came up yesterday because I know there
are a lot of people who are here today who weren't here yesterday. This
is a quote from Janet Good, who has been collaborating with Kevorkian
and who is founder of the Hemlock Society in Michigan. Her quote is
typical of proponents' comments in more recent times:
Pain is not the main reason we want to die. It's the in-
dignity. It's the inability to get out of bed, or get onto
the toilet, let alone drive a car and go shopping without
another's help. I can speak for literally hundreds of peo-
ple whose bedside I've sat at over the years . ...
They've had enough when they can't go to the bathroom
by themselves. Most of them say, I can't stand my
mother, my husband wiping my butt. That's why every-
body in the movement talks about death with dignity.
People have their pride. They want to be in control.' 5 8
We are insulted by this. Many people with disabilities need somebody to
wipe their butt, and that does not mean that they're not in charge, and it
does not mean that they're lacking in dignity. Yet, the press has over and
over again supported these kinds of comments as fact. It is based on this
representation of disability and so-called "dignity" that society is making
this move to legalize assisted suicide.
MS. BIENEN: I just want to comment that I think it's so important
that we all continue to first ask the question, Who is deciding for us?
158 Leiby, supra note 10, at Fl.
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And then, to push the people who are saying that they are deciding for us
to make their decisions upon the facts; to make a serious compilation of
facts, an analysis of the facts, and not just rely upon anecdotes, one per-
son's statement. We need to subject these views to scrutiny. This is
supposed to be a democracy, and we are here to ask questions and con-
tinue to push people.
One of the most troubling things to me is the extent to which politi-
cians are allowed to get away with just relying upon the polls. Polls are
wonderful and they tell you a lot of things, but they certainly don't tell
you everything important. What they tell you is how somebody answers
a poll on a particular day and a particular time, and that may or may not
reflect a lot of things.
DR. BLANCK: Joe's point about what the Supreme Court is going
to do is also very interesting because next year we are going to be sitting
here grappling with fifty different decisions from fifty different states.
Other questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm a hospice nurse. I am from southwest
Michigan. I am here today because I think that the discussion we are
talking about affects my work. And I have been so impressed with the
quality of the speakers. Everyone has been so eloquent.
I would like to clarify and also to reinforce the distinction that was
made earlier. We are talking really about two different issues: disability
versus terminal illness. I'm one of those nurses who goes into the home
of someone who has been diagnosed with a terminal illness, and I have to
sit there and tell that person this is not about dying; this is about quality
of life; and live each day to your fullest.
Then, this gentleman brought up the issue of family-when some-
one is diagnosed with a terminal illness, you are looking at tremendous
stress, not just on the patient. You are looking at the family. You are
looking at how everyone interacts with that person. I do not dispute your
right to self-determination. This is directed at Hugh. I think you have
the right to control your life, and it is very simple just not to eat. Okay.
No one says that you have to live. You can be made comfortable.
My problem is when you say you want my help or you want a phy-
sician's help-and I can tell you when I go into homes and I monitor
morphine drips for pain control-and we can get the pain under control
easily, okay-it's a challenge, but it takes time and we monitor wherever
the patient is at.
My problem is when you ask me to cross the boundary. The bound-
ary is: You are asking me to help you end your life. I know of no
hospice nurse and no hospice physician who will willingly take on that
responsibility. So you have a right to maintain control, but you have no
right to ask another individual to do it for you.
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Dying is like birthing. You all know it takes nine months for a
pregnancy. Labor and delivery are not pleasant. It is painful, and the
pain can be under control now; but birthing is a process, and the whole
family needs that time to get ready for this baby.
Well, the whole family needs time to let that individual that they
love; let them go. The patient needs to hear a family member tell them
how much they love them. You need the time because the analogy about
the butterfly and the cocoon was so perfect. That butterfly needs time to
get stronger.
That's the process, the dying process: letting go of your life, letting
go of your friends, letting go of your family, and finally letting go of the
last breath. It is a process that needs to be reflected upon.
To say, "I want a shortcut," is not fair to the family. It's not fair to
society because society should value life, and we should all value life.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm from Albany, New York, and I've
been struggling with coming to terms with some people who think that
people with disabilities are not oppressed in this country. I would just
share a comment that I heard from a very wise gentleman who is very
much involved in monitoring the changes of managed care in this coun-
try. That comment is that it's the large corporations' dollars that drive
the HMO plans and tell them what they will pay for, what they will not
pay for. What we have seen with regard to people with disabilities is that
where it used to be under a "fee for service" plan, people with disabilities
were a profit opportunity for providers, now we are a cost center.
I come from a state that spends $5 billion a year to stick people in
nursing homes. How much do you think we spend on personal-assisted
services in the community? It's a fraction of that. It's very, very impor-
tant to look at the big picture, what's going on, what the effect is for the
broader community, not just for people with disabilities, but for all of us.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm a dietician, and I used to work at
Cook County Hospital. I also worked at a County sister facility in Oak
Forest. When you are too old and sick to stay at County, they put you at
Oak Forest. When I was working there it had 2,500 chronic disease pa-
tients. Being a dietician, I was in charge of their nutrition and hydration.
Eighteen years later because of myasthenia gravis and encephalitic
coma and a few other tricks in my life, I ended up as a patient in Oak
Forest; and many of my patients were still there. My concern is that
people are getting dumped into places like Oak Forest. Those people are
not represented on stage.
There was not one of us there who was not on a stretcher. You just
got a hospital gown. That's the only thing you owned because they took
everything else away. That's the limbo situation that I've lived for three
years.
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But God bless her, my roommate had been there thirty-two years
and only could move her eyeballs. They had her falsely diagnosed as
retarded on her chart. All that time they treated her like a sack of pota-
toes, and finally Joann and I learned that she could just barely move her
eyeballs and we established a system so that we could spell.
We started spelling for three years night and day and even at the
end, when I was considered her family on her chart, because she had
none that would come visit her anymore, we spelled out her living will.
It was denied because they didn't want the chart to look messy; because
she had been there a long time; because they didn't want to make sure
that indeed this woman had been feeling all of these years, when they
had treated her like a bag of crap.
She wasn't even the person who had been there the longest. There
was a guy there sixty-two years. Those long-term care folks are stuck in
the indigent facilities right now, not the nursing homes, which are nice in
comparison. You had one towel a week, if you were lucky. You had one
shower a week, if you were lucky.
Those are the people in limbo that I fear is the alternative that we
are facing right now before we can even reach either the concept of
choice to die or the choice, as you've been putting it, to live in quality.
DR. GILL: I'm feeling a real pang of conscience here or else I
wouldn't try to strain the moderator's patience with me. I feel so much
has been said about the diversity of opinion in the disability community
that I think it's almost misleading. Of course we are a diverse commu-
nity. So are African-Americans. So are women. So are gay people. But
we come together on issues.
We did pass the ADA against immense opposition, and a lot of
those people with diverse opinions realize that this was important for
everyone in our community. Subsequent to that, I think it was the Na-
tional Council on Disability, before Marca joined it, did a survey to find
out how many in our great, huge, diverse community even know about
the Americans with Disabilities Act; and we found that the same number
that is quoted as the majority who would support assisted suicide in the
disability community were people who didn't even know about the
ADA.
In other words, we came together and fought for a law to protect
people in our community, the majority of whom didn't even know about
it. So, I mean, think about that when we think about how important
majority representation is. We are diverse, but we do come together, and
it's important for us to come together to protect our community. 159
159 The conference concluded with an original production entitled Forever Profaned (by
her condition). Susan Nussbaum created the two-person dialogue especially for the confer-
ence. Susan Nussbaum and Tekki Lomnicki performed the program.
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